Italy's Rival Liberators.

A MONTH since, it was asserted in these pages, that "no personal bitterness against this or another minister, no intrigues of old Republican comrades, no temptations of the sweets of power in his own hands, will make Garibaldi swerve one hair's breadth from his straight and loyal path." The great question in Italy at the present moment is, how far has the above statement been justified by the hero's conduct during the past month. It must be frankly admitted that very much uneasiness and many misgivings have been caused by the course he has been latterly pursuing; that "the party of action" (as the dreamers mesmerized by Mazzini's eloquence and phantasmagoric Utopias most absurdly call themselves) has been led to imagine, that the real man of action was about to become an instrument in their hands; and that the "black party" (as the reactionists, priests, and legitimists are called) has conceived hopes, engendered by his conduct. The friends of Italy beyond the Alps also have been very seriously alarmed by the symptoms of dissension which have been suffered to appear on the surface of Italian affairs. From the beginning, these foreign friends, having the old history of Italy in their minds, have been oppressed with a constant dread that all might be sacrificed and lost by dissension and party strife; and now it has, not without reason, seemed to them that their worst misgivings were about to be realized. All this is true. Yet the present writer is nevertheless disposed to adhere to his previous opinion, that Garibaldi will not swerve from the straight and loyal path on which he started.

It must be admitted, that the reputation of Garibaldi has very seriously suffered in the course of the last month. He does not stand where he did in the opinions of his countrymen. It is painful to see so brilliant a career obscured; and to feel that a noble heart is exposed to the risk of losing that central place in the Valhalla of Italian glories, which he so truly merits, from the unfortunate circumstance of being called on to assume duties for which he is not fitted. But that he has thus rapidly lost ground in the esteem of the nation-that, in truth, he is risking his future place in Italian history-is a very reassuring and comforting fact to Italy and the friends of Italian hopes. The immensity of the prestige Garibaldi possessed, the wonderful power of his name, were such as to seem irresistible, and to justify the supposition that he could have led the nation with him on any path he chose to follow. Nations more sage and less impulsive than the Italians are supposed to be, have been led to mischief ere now by less justifiable hero-worship. But it is evident that the Italians will not be so led on this occasion. And the waning of the enthusiasm

for the popular hero is the measure of the calm and well-considered determination of the Italians to become a united and independent constitutional kingdom. Evidently, the nation will not have at any price aught that shall militate against that consummation. Garibaldi is- has every . element for being-the idol of the popular heart. He has by no means ceased to be so. Count Cavour is the object of no such enthusiastic affection. He has few or none of the qualities necessary for making himself a popular hero. Yet let it once be seen that the wise and reserved patrician diplomate is the pilot most capable of steering the national barque to the desired harbour, that the gallant chieftain so beloved for his noble nature, so admired for his impetuous chivalry, is likely to risk the great object in view, and the nation-with whatever regret, with whatever sacrifice of its favourite hero-worship, and pulling down of the popular idol-will rally round and support the man who can attain the object which it is bent on accomplishing, with a unanimity of which history has few examples.

We have had sundry manifestations during the last fortnight of imperial and royal plans and intentions; but the fact of most real and permanent importance to the welfare and hopes of Italy, which the chronicler of passing history has to note, has been the strong and unmistakable set of the current of popular Italian opinion in the direction that has been indicated. The nation is still willing, nay anxious, to accept Garibaldi as its liberator, and to lay at his feet the tribute of its hero-worship in no stinted measure. But it is prepared to depose him from his pedestal if he persists in a line of action calculated to cause suspicion that he wishes to lead it elsewhither than in the direction it is bent on following.

How far has Garibaldi merited the check which his still rising reputation has unquestionably suffered during the past month? How far is it probable that he will recover his lost ground in the affections of the nation? How far is serious danger to the future of Italy likely to arise from his present and future conduct? A satisfactory reply to these questions would furnish a tolerably sufficient and accurate notion of the present position and probabilities of the Italian question.

It is impossible to deny that the mismanagement and incapacity exhibited since the feats of arms which liberated Sicily and Naples from the Bourbon tyranny, have been deplorable. Eighteen millions of ducats of debt have been incurred in Sicily, with very little to show for it. Nothing has been organized. Almost everything that should have been done has been left undone; and much has been done that ought never to have been done. It is hardly necessary, but to prevent possible misconception it may be stated, that in blaming the squandering of money in Sicily, it has never for an instant entered into the mind of anybody to conceive the shadow of a suspicion of intentional malversation, either on the part of the Dictator himself (the notion of which would be too absurdly preposterous), or on that of his subordinates. The money has been simply wasted by incapacity. And the amount of demerit

which attaches to Garibaldi is simply this-that he was incapable of accomplishing the extremely arduous task of co-ordinating, legislating, and improvising a social and civil organization. Like the man who had never played the fiddle, but was ready to try whether he might be able to do so, Garibaldi not only essayed to finger the instrument, but to perform one of the most difficult pieces possible on it, and failed egregiously. Our hero is a hero; not only a masterful man in fight, but a hero of self-denial, purity of intention, and patriotism. But he is not a statesman. He has the gift of knowing men, too, in the field. In the cabinet a baby is not more at the mercy of those who would seem other than they are.

But how far can we absolve from blame a man who, with most disastrous results, undertakes a task which he is wholly unable to perform? On this point the liberator's conduct in Sicily must be very differently judged from that which has marked his rule in Naples. His plea, that if he had immediately caused the annexation of Sicily to the remainder of free Italy, he should have deprived himself of his base for further operations against Naples, was a true one. It was essential that, even at the cost of all that has taken place in Sicily, Garibaldi should hold that island in his own hands till his further work in Naples should be performed. But when that was accomplished, or all but accomplished-when Naples was free-the annexation ought to have been made at once. "What!" said a leading member of the Mazzinists to the present writer: "in order that a Piedmontese Government might send the man who has freed Italy to plant cabbages!" Now, in these words may be read the whole policy of the Mazzinian party as regards Garibaldi, the motives of their obstinate resistance to the annexation, and the grounds of their bitter disappointment and anger because the Italian Government has done exactly that which the "party of action" had been for many previous weeks urging them to do. Garibaldi was originally one of themselves. He turned out to be a great power-just the Deus ex machina, who might possibly make feasible schemes and hopes, seen to be otherwise chimerical even by the most sanguine of the Reds. "And shall the men of the monarchy filch from us our great man, confiscate to their own profit all that he has won, and which could not have been won without him, and then send him to plant cabbages? Shall the detested monarchy be built up by our own man beneath our eyes?" The decree, which makes the annexation a fait accompli, snatches from them their last hope. And it may be safely assumed that, however they may find it necessary to humour the strong set of the current of public opinion, by professing to look forward to annexation at some future time, their hope and ulterior views are to make a Neapolitan republic the means of bringing all the rest of the peninsula ultimately under the sway of the "Mazzinian idea." When the expedition of Garibaldi to Sicily resulted in a success so complete and consequences so wonderful, the "party of action thronged, like vultures to a carcase, round the man who had for the

nonce so large a power in his hands. And though they signally failed in persuading him to deny or throw off the fealty and loyalty he had promised to the monarchy, they unfortunately succeeded in inducing him to link himself with associates who, to put it in the mildest phrase, wished that which the nation did not wish, and to confide the fortunes of the country to men who were the notorious apostles of republicanism. The amount of judgment and discretion exercised by him in the selection of men to serve the State may be instanced by the appointment of M. Alexandre Dumas to be director of the museum-a matter of small consequence, but which may be selected for citation, because all Europe is able to perceive the outrageous absurdity of the appointment.

A course of conduct marked by acts equal in discretion to this, and by a series of manifestoes and speeches still more alarming, at length made it absolutely necessary for the Government of King Victor Emmanuel to take in hand the reins, which this Phaeton was so managing as to threaten the cause of Italian regeneration with speedy overthrow and fatal catastrophe. But the Government has not entertained the smallest intention of sending the Dictator back to his island "to plant cabbages." History, indeed, tells of a patriot hero, who was entirely ready to return to his cabbages when the work for which he had left them was done. And mankind have judged that such readiness was not the smallest part of his glory. Garibaldi's work is not, however, quite done yet; although almost all that he can advantageously do separately from the action of the Sardinian Government, will in all human probability have been accomplished before these lines can meet the eye of the reader. And, on the other hand, it is just to observe that no smallest symptom of self-seeking has given any one the right to doubt that Garibaldi himself would be ready to emulate the civic virtue of the old Roman Dictator, if Italy could not advantageously avail herself of his further services. But this will not be needed. The advance of the Piedmontese army with the rè galantuómo -the honest king, as the Italians love to call the sovereign of their choice -at the head of it, into the southern part of the kingdom, will put all this to rights. It is said that Garibaldi is heartily sick of his disastrous attempt at statesmanship, and anxious to give it up into more competent hands, so that he may be at liberty to play the part of which he is so great a master. This he will now have to play shoulder to shoulder with the generals of the national forces. In that position he will no longer be beset by the evil influences which have recently been so thick around him. Already the stormy petrels of the "party of action" are beginning to fly away from a scene in which their occupation is gone. No Mazzinian theorists will whisper in his ear counsels respecting the handling of his troops in the field. The right man will be once more in the right place; and all the dangers, which were a few days ago making all Europe uneasy respecting the completion of the great work on which Italy is engaged, will be removed by the advance of King Victor Emmanuel. The decision of his Government to take that step has not been reached one moment too soon.

Cavour and Garibaldi have been alluded to in the title of this paper as the rival liberators of Italy. Untoward circumstances have placed the two men before the world in that light. And although within the last few days matters have taken a turn which justify a hope that they may cease to occupy such a relative position, the events of the month have led men more than ever to regard them in that light, by restoring and adding to the reputation of Cavour, in the same proportion in which they have diminished that of Garibaldi. The cession of Nice injured Cavour very deeply in the minds of Italians. They have by no means yet forgotten it. They conceive, unjustly in all probability, that the surgeon who recommended the knife, did so injudiciously and unnecessarily. They are persuaded that the operation might have been avoided; and while the body is still quivering with agony, they cannot feel cordially towards the operator. A time will come when Cavour will be judged more justly. Already a feeling of renewed confidence and approbation has been generated by the recent acts of the Government. The absolute necessity of having him, and no other pilot, at the helm, is fully recognized. And the most earnest wish of the Italians at the present moment-the one event, which would give greater pleasure than almost anything else that could happenwould be to see a cordial reconciliation between the statesman and the general.

If the events of the last month have dimmed the brilliant reputation of Garibaldi, they have done yet more to cure any section of the Italian people of any inclination to put faith or hope in Mazzini and his followers. There are persons who declare their belief that he is a paid agent of Austria. The notion is preposterous; but assuredly he would have been very conscientiously earning his wages if he were so. Unprejudiced, open-minded, and charitable men still hold Mazzini to be honest. That is to say, they consider that he honestly believes his scheme for the regeneration of his country to be that most calculated to ensure its future welfare. It has become, however, very clear that he is prepared, not only to risk, but absolutely to prevent, the reconstitution of Italy on other principles, or by any other means, than his own, at whatever hazard of replunging her into all the miseries from which she is just escaping. It is probable that if, on these grounds, Mazzini were accused of selfish ambition or of playing the part of the dog in the manger, he would defend himself, at least to his own conscience, by asserting that his views are larger and farther-sighted than those which he opposes;-that it is better for the abiding interests of humanity in the far future, that Italy should continue to be a hotbed and provoking cause of such discontent and revolution as may at any day lead to that new constitution of society all over the world, which he deems the sine quâ non of human improvement, than that she should become tranquillized by such a measure of good government as will make her a contented and happy supporter of a social constitution based on principles in his opinion vicious. But it is also abundantly clear that Italy has no mind to be the "corpus vile" on