Treasury empowered to grant compensation for the loss of the sale of and appointment to offices abolished by this act, to the chief clerk and custos brevium of the Queen's Bench and the prothonotaries of the Common Pleas. (s. 24.)

life, such annual sum as the commissioners of herein-after mentioned, to tax all bills of costs her Majesty's treasury shall think proper to indiscriminately which shall have arisen or fix and appoint, not exceeding in any case the which may arise in cases of a civil nature in net annual value of the office or situation for- any of the said Courts, or in the Court of Ermerly held by him, and not being less in any ror in the Exchequer Chamber, although such case than three fourths thereof, provided that costs may not have arisen in respect of busisuch annual sum shall exceed the superannua-ness done in the Court to which such masters tion allowance to be ascertained as herein-after may belong; and the Judges of the said mentioned; and every person appointed or to Courts, or any eight or more of them, of whom be appointed to any situation as aforesaid the chiefs of each of the said Courts shall be under this act, where such annual sum shall three, shall and they are hereby required, by amount to a less sum than the superannuation any rule or order to be from time to time allowance to be ascertained as hererein-after made either in term or vacation, to establish mentioned, or who was not entitled to and has such regulations as may be necessary for the not received compensation in respect of any purpose of enforcing uniformity of practice in former office held by him under the provisions the allowance of costs in the Common Law of the said act, and who shall hereafter resign Courts, and of ensuring as far as may be prachis office or situation with the sanction and ticable an equal division of the business of under the authority of the Lord Chief Justice taxation amongst the masters of the said or Lord Chief Baron of the Court to which he Courts; and such Judges shall appoint some shall belong in consequence of his being inca- convenient place in which the said business of pable, from infirmity of mind or body, to dis-taxation shall be transacted for all the said charge the duties thereof, shall be entitled to Courts. (s. 23.) receive such superannuation allowance as the said commissioners of her Majesty's treasury shall think proper to direct; and in ascertaining and awarding the amount of such superannuation allowance the said commissioners shall take into consideration the whole period during which any such person shall have been permanently employed in any office or situation in either of the said Courts, or in any other public office or situation prior to the passing of this act, and shall proceed according to the principles laid down by 4 & 5 W. 4, c, 24, and all such sums and allowances which shall be so awarded and granted under the authority aforesaid shall be paid and payable and be charged and chargeable in the same way as is herein-before provided in respect of the salaries of the Masters, clerks, and mesClerk of the warrants in Court of Common sengers of the said Courts respectively, and the Pleas and master or secondary of the Court of necessary expences of the said offices. (s. 21.) Queen's Bench continned in the office of reNo Compensation allowed for Loss of Rightgisters of deeds in Middlesex, notwithstanding of Appointment.-Provided, that in the event the abolition of their offices in the Courts at of any reduction being hereafter made in the Law. (s. 28.) number of the masters, clerks, or messengers created or authorized by this act, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Chief Baron, and masters SCHEDULES to which the foregoing Act refers. of the said Courts respectively for the time being shall not be entitled to compensation for the loss of any right of appointment vested in them or either of them by virtue of this act. (s. 32.)

Masters empowered and required to tax Costs indiscriminately in the said Courts.-And reciting that it would tend to the despatch of business, and would assimilate the practice and promote uniformity in the allowance of costs, if the masters of the said Courts appointed or to be appointed under this act were empowered to tax costs which have arisen or may arise in each of the said Courts indiscriminately it is therefore enacted, that from and after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, the masters of the said Courts appointed or to be appointed as aforesaid are hereby authorized, empowered, and required, subject to such rules and orders as

Treasury empowered to grant compensation to certain officers of the Court of Common Pleas who were in office prior to 24th May, 1830. (8.25)

Persons whose offices are abolished to re

ceive full amount of compensation under 11
G. 4, and 1 W. 4, c. 58, until the Treasury
shall otherwise determine under the provisions
of that act. (s. 26.)

the nature of the offices abolished. (s. 27.)
In fixing compensation regard to be had to

SCHEDULE (A )

Offices abolished by this act from and after the
first day of July, one thousand eight hundred
and thirty-seven.

On the plea side of the Court of Queen's
Bench.

The office of

The Chief Clerk.

Secondary or Master of the Queen's Bench
Office.

Clerk of the Rules.
Clerk of the Papers.

Clerk of the Docquets and Judgments.
Signer of the Writs.

Clerk of the Declarations.

Clerk of the Common Bails or Appear

ances, Estreats and Posteas, Custos Brevium et Recordorum.

Changes in the Law.-Selections from Correspondence.

Clerk of the Inner and Upper Treasuries.
Clerk of the Outer Treasury.

Clerks of the Nisi Prius for London, Mid-
dlesex, and the several Circuits in Eng-
land and Wales.

Bagbearer to the Custos Brevium.

Clerk of the Errors.

SELECTIONS

FROM CORRESPONDENCE.

HOURS OF LEGAL BUSINESS.

To the Editor of the Legal Observer.
Sir,

289

Having observed that the columns of your

Filacer, Exigenter, and Clerk of the Out- widely circulated and valuable publication are

lawries.

Signer of the Bills of Middlesex.

In the Court of Common Pleas.

The office of

The Custos Brevium.

Prothonotaries.

Secondaries.

Clerk of the Judgments.

Clerk of the Reversals of Outlawries.

Clerk of the Docquets.

always open to every remark or suggestion of your correspondents, which may prove either useful to the profession or beneficial to the public in general, permit me, as one who has long belonged to a profession which does honour to our country, to offer a few remarks on an evil of great magnitude, which is of long standing, and is working destruction on those who are engaged in their duties as attorneys, or on those who fare still worse, viz, their clerks. It is a well known fact, that

Clerk of the Warrants, Enrolments, and numbers of those useful members of society

Estreats.

are daily brought to the verge of the grave, and even to the grave itself, by means of the length of time which they are kept confined in their offices, which time is greatly lengthened by the very late hour at which the public offices open. I myself, in iny own office, have two or three young men, whom I am necessitated to keep confined in this manner, and whose constitutions I find are gradually, from being most robust, becoming exceedingly weak. It will be said that these arrangements have existed so long that they cannot be

On the plea side of the Court of Exchequer. altered; but I would ask, how many hours are

The office of

The Master and Prothonotaries.

Clerk of the Rules.

Filacer.

Clerk of Errors.

Clerk of the Pleas.

SCHEDULE (B.)

Persons appointed by this Act as the Masters of the Superior Courts of Common Law. The five Masters on the plea side of the Court of Queen's Bench, namely :

Thomas Le Blanc, Esquire.
Fortunatus Dwarris, Esquire.
Sir Archer Denman Croft, Baronet.
Richard Goodrich, Esquire.
James Bunce, Esquire.

The five Masters of the Court of Common
Pleas; namely:-

Henry Belward Ray, Esquire.
Alexander Atherton Park, Esquire.
John Henry Cancellor, Esquire.
Edward Griffith, Esquire.

Edward Robert Porter, Esquire

now unprofitably spent in bed instead of being actively employed in the business of the day? Why not open the public offices at nine o'clock, and shut them again proportionably early; then the health of those engaged in our business would be preserved, and the business itself would be done with more alacrity. But it will be argued by those who would oppose this arrangement, that these hours will not agree with the sitting of the Courts; but I will say that, instead of interfering with it, they will be much more suitable than at present; for will not most of the business be finished at the offices? and thence we can proceed to the Courts, most of which rise not later than four o'clock. By this arrangement, the hardworking attorneys and clerks will be released from their professional duties by seven or eight o'clock, instead of, as is now the case, being kept until nine or ten. These early hours may not suit the more fashionable of our fellow-workers, but I would appeal to their feelings, as men, to say whether they would endanger the lives or impair the health of a large community, in order to gratify themselves

The five Masters on the plea side of the Court by a few hours more sleep. It is not from a

wish to be reforming, which is the general cry
in this age, but for the benefit of the public,
and of that class to which I have alluded, that
I now trouble you. If you could find a corner
in your journal for these few lines, you would
bestow a great obligation on myself, and--if
you should, by publishing thein, cause the
plan to be at all adopted-an unspeakable
blessing on society at large; and making the
cause to cease, you will cause to cease also the
effect.
G. B.

290 Selections from Correspondence.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor; King's Bench.

LEGAL EXAMINATION HONOURS.

Sir,

I should suggest the correspondence which has been carried on respecting the anticipated examination and the "honours" which some are professedly anxious to contend for, might with propriety be closed. W. A. and his colleagues, if desirous of acquiring honours, had better enter themselves in some college where their ambition might be gratified, and their abilities tested. There is a great difference between the medical and legal profession requiring an examination and distributing medals and honorary distinctions. In the former, greater assiduity is required, more general knowledge, unremitting attention, and years of toil in narrowly studying the component parts of the human frame, and medicines to combat and expel diseases to which our frail nature is subject. The examination of a medical man is of unquestionable utility: a single drop of a most simple herb, in ignorance of its proper ties, or ignorance of the proper treatment of disease, might at once end the sufferings of a patient, or inflict upon him a serious injury for life; no person, therefore, having regard to his life or safety would employ a man who has been unable to pass an examination, which is a guarantee that he possesses some knowledge of his profession, and to which the examiners add honours for proficiency in the different branches, as a reward for years of successful application of arduous study. The medical profession opens a source for investigation and study, which is impossible to bind by fixed rules.

a

The comparison has been generally drawn between the medical and legal professions as to granting honours, &c. Now the law, as regards the attorney's department (which is the only one we have to consider), likewise requires years of close application and attention. He is supposed to have become versed in the principles of our constitution, and the laws necessary for its wholesome regulation and support; and, as a profession, to be intimately acquainted with the practical bran hes, so as to work the system, and explain and advise on the minutia on which a practitioner is constantly resorted to. This becomes easy when the rules of law are thoroughly unders.ood; and, as law is but an exercise of the reason, the exercise of the faculties will produce generally a correct conclusion; but if the practitioner has not confidence in his own abilities, he has a higher class to resort to for aid. Comparatively speaking, the attorney has a plain straight-forward course to pursue, but sufficient to keep in full exercise his most vigilant attention. The examination is instituted to try whether the candidates really understand the principles of law and the administration of justice. It would be useless to ask opinions on any point, for who ever has been in an office well knows how various are the ideas entertained by men of the most eminent rank in the profession on a case submitted. If your correspondents are so anxious to obtain distinguished honours, let them bear in mind that a university education is open to them, by which two years of their servitude would be abridged. W. F.

SUPERIOR COURTS.

--

Lord Chancellor's Court.

SOLICITOR'S LIEN.

Money was recovered in the course of a cause and paid into Court. The party entitled afterwards became bankrupt, and the conduct of the cause, as well as the money in Court, devolved on his assignees, who discharged his solicitors and employed others. The solicitors to the cause in the course of which the money was recovered had a lien for their costs on that fund.

Chancellor, dismissing a petition praying payThis was an appeal from an order of the Vice ment of solicitors' costs out of a fund in Court. The bill was filed for the purpose of carrying into effect a contract for the purchase of some horses from Alexander, one of the defendants; and to restrain a sale of the horses to another person. The fund on which the lien was claimed consisted of a sum of 209%., which had been allowed to Alexander as the price of the keep of the horses, and which had been ordered to be paid into Court. Alexander had since become a bankrupt. Messrs. Abraham and Robson, the petitioners, had been the solicitors for Alexander previous to his bankruptcy; but on that event they had been dismissed without payment of their costs, and they claimed to have their bill discharged out of the fund in Court. The Vice Chancellor dismissed the petition.

Mr. Cooper and Mr. Dixon, for the petitioners, said it was too clear for argument that this was an ordinary case of lien, and that the circumstance of Alexander's bankruptcy could make no possible difference as to the petitioner's claim to their costs out of the money realised in the course of the cause.

Mr. Jacob and Mr. Pigott endeavoured to show that as the fund was no longer Alexander's money, but belonged to his assignees, it was not liable to the payment of the petitioners' demand.

The Lord Chancellor.-This was an ordinary case of lien; the money was realised in the course of the suit; while the petitioners were the solicitors of the party, and by their aid. The solicitors had a clear right to be paid out of this money, and it was quite immaterial by which of the defendants the money was paid in. The petitioners were not only entitled to have their claim allowed, but also entitled to the allowance of it with costs.

Pounsett v. Alexander and others.-Sittings at Lincoln's Inn, July 21, 1837.

King's Bench.

[Before the Four Judges.]

ATTORNEY'S SIGNED BILL.

If a defendunt intends to rely on the nondelivery of a bill by an attorney, within the terms of the statute, he must plead such non-delivery.

Assumpsit on an attorney's bill. Plea, non

Superior Courts: King's Bench.

Mr. W. H. Watson, in support of the demurrer.-The contract stated in the declaration is an express contract for service for a year, and it cannot therefore be terminated by a mouth's notice, terminating at any time in the course of the year. [Lord Denman, C. J.— There is no statement of any stipulation as to the manner of terminating it.] There is none. Mr. Justice Patteson.-The case of Morgan The contract, according to the terms of it, is v. Ruddock, was determined entirely on the to commence on a certain day in each year. statute. That was the case of an apothecary, A dismissal, therefore, in the middle of the and the words of the statute relating to apothe-year, is insufficient. In Beeston v. Collyer, a caries are very strong, and shew that it is part of the plaintiff's case, in an action on an apo. thecaries bill, to prove that the plaintiff flls the character in respect of which alone he is

it was determined that a general hiring for a year, particularly of clerks and respectable servants, where no misconduct is imputed, can only be put an end to at the end of a current year. No misconduct is imputed here; but the defendant, by his plea, sets up a general right to dismiss upon a month's notice. It was there distinctly declared that such a hiring was a hiring for a year, and so on from year to year, for so long a time as the parties Vscribed in the declaration; and such an imshould respectively please, and may be so deplied yearly hiring is not destroyed by the salary being paid monthly, nor is it within the Statute of Frauds. The party here is not a menial servant. In that case, as in this, an in the case of a menial servant; but the Court attempt was made to justify the dismissal as said, that the law, founded upon usage, which

292

Superior Courts: King's Bench; King's Bench Practice Court.

long established custom, and the jury would therefore presume that in fact the parties entered into the contract subject to that custom. That is not the case here. There must be judgment for the plaintiff.

justifies the discharge of domestic servants on | of the notice is so well and so universally ungiving a month's notice, though there was a derstood, as in the case of domestic servants, yearly hiring, does not apply to a person in for instance, that it is spoken of as a matter of the situation of a clerk to an army agent. A law, though it has no pretention to be so confortiori, if it does not apply to a clerk, it can-sidered. It is there a matter of universal and not apply in such a case as the present. The rule to be applied here is the same as would be applied to the holding of a tenement, or to a composition for tithe. In the recent case of Fawcett v. Cash,b it was held that a hiring at so much per month, or a general hiring, in the absence of any custom to rebut the presumption, is a hiring for a year. [Lord Denman, C. J.-There is nothing in the law distinguishing the hiring of menial servants from others; but the distinction in this case is founded upon a well-known custom, by which the jury would say, each party in each case was bound. We do not think that we need hear you further.]

Mr. Justice Littledale concurred, and, after stating the pleadings, said,-It seems to me, that if no notice is given, a new contract is created at the end of each year to enure during the succeeding year, thus going on from the end of one year to the end of another, and that it must be finished at the end of a year, by a reasonable notice terminating at that time. What is a reasonable notice varies according to circumstances. The defendant here does not deny the contract, and his plea does not set up a legal answer to it.

is here stated, and it is plain, that as soon as the year began the party was entitled to remain in the employment till the end of the year, unless he was guilty of some misconduct, which would operate as a breach of the contract. In answer to the question which this record raises, I say that the legal consequence of this contract is, that the contract must be put an end to, if adversely, at the end of some one year. How many months' notice should be given we are not now called on to say.

Mr. Munsel, in support of the plea.-The plea is good. All these contracts are to be decided by reasonable notice, and the plea Mr. Justice Patteson.-The question here here shews a reasonable notice. That was is, what is the legal consequence of the constated by Mr. Justice Burrough, in Beeston v. tract as stated on the record. What is reaCollyer, though, under the particular circum-sonable notice might be a question for the stances of that case, the Court thought that jury, but that question is not raised on these the reasonable notice required there was one pleadings. The commencement of the contract which would terminate at the end of the current year. The plea here sets up a reasonable notice. The year in which the plaintiff was dismissed was the third year of the term, and though the hiring might in the first instance be considered as a hiring for a year certain, yet, after the first year, it was in the option of either of the parties to put an end to it by reasonable and usual notice. There is a clear distinction between a dismissal taking place in the first year and after the expiration of that period. In Fawcett v. Cash, Mr. Justice Taunton said, "It is unnecessary to consider what the effect would have been if the disinissal had taken place after the first year," an expression which shews that that learned Judge thought the dismissal might have been good after the first year, though it was not within that period. The plaintiff here ought to have taken issue on the plea, and then the defendant might have raised the question upon the evidence, whether, in an engagement of this sort, a month's notice was not a reasonable and usual notice.

Lord Denman, C. J.-I do not entertain a doubt in this case. The plaintiff in his declaration states an agreement for a service from year to year. The defendant does not deny that; but says that he offered the plaintiff more money than would be sufficient to cover what would become due on the regular and usual notice, namely, one month's notice. There is nothing on the face of the contract to shew that any such notice was agreed upon Now it is the duty of the defendant to shew the existence of such a term in the contract, so to raise the question of fact for the jury. That is the case with regard to all contracts of general hiring. In some of them the period

b 3 Nev. & Man. 177; 5 Barn. & Ad. 901.

Mr. Justice Williams.-The dismissal in the third is the same as if it had occurred in the first year. The contract is a contract from year to year, and the notice, whatever it is, should terminate with the given year. There is no suggestion of misconduct here, and the notice stated on the plea is therefore clearly insufficient with reference to the contract, as stated on the record.

Judgment for the plaintiff.-Williams v. Byrne, T. T. 1837. K. B. F. J.