265, 10 Week. Rep. 186, 5 L. T. N. S. 658. property for the payment of debts and adjusting | lauds (1861) 30 Beav. 302, 8 Jur. N. S. 88, 31 L. J. Ch. the equities between the parties, establishes it for the purpose of a final dividend. Jones v. Smith (1889) 31 S. C. 527. In a bill for the winding up of a partnership's affairs, the contract or agreement for the formation of the copartnership, with its terms and conditions, must be set forth in order to show an existing partnership, and it must also be shown that there was an understanding or agreement between the partners, whereby land purchased was to become partnership property, and it should also be shown that it was purchased with partnership funds, otherwise the bill will be defective. Little v. Snedecor (1875) 52 Ala. 167. The fact that a lease of mining property, to be used for the Joint benefit of the partners, was taken in the name of one with the understanding that he was to transfer to the others their respective interests, is immaterial in a suit between partners for the settlement of partnership affairs. Reed v. Meagher (1890) 9 L. R. A. 455, 14 Colo. 335. Where the complainant is to furnish the capital and the defendant to perform the labor in the purchase of property in a partnership relating to the buying and selling of lands, the losses are to be borne equally between the partners and will be ordered sold by the court upon the winding up of the partnership. Olcott v. Wing (1845)4 McLean, 15. An account for clearing and building upon joint lands, and of the rents thereof, is a proper matter of consideration in proceedings for the settlement of partnership affairs. Jones v. Jones (1861) 23 Ark. 212. Where the plaintiff is adjudged the owner in fee of the premises, free from any lien thereon by defendant's judgment, neither party can recover costs. Root v. Wheeler (1861) 12 Abb. Pr. 299. In a suit instituted by one partner praying a sale of the partnership property, the court will, on motion, direct an inquiry whether it be for the benefit of all parties interested, that the works and property should be sold, or carried on for the purpose of winding up the concern. Crawshay v. Maule (1818) 1 Swanst. 495. Where partnership property is indivisible and suited only to a certain purpose, and the interest of the parties required that it should be sold, the power of the court to order a sale and conveyance is unquestionable. Megibben v. Perin (1892) 49 Fed. Rep. 183; Power v. Power (1891) 12 Ky. L. Rep. 793. Under an agreement alleging that the real estate should be divided between them, or that the partner should be allowed to retain the portion that stood in his name and in his possession at the date of the dissolution, any balancès being credited to the party entitled to it, the partners are entitled to have the whole of the partnership property sold upon the winding up of the firm's affairs. Lyman v. Lyman (1829) 2 Paine, C. C. 11. If the surviving partners have not acted in good faith, and accounted to the parties entitled for the surplus assets of the partnership property, including real estate, the remedy is against them. Solomon v. Fitzgerald (1872) 7 Heisk. 552. The mere fact that a difficulty in the title of partnership lands exists, is no objection upon a dissolution and settlement of the partnership, to the ordering of sale of such title as the partnership has, although such difficulty might prevent the best sale from being effected. Waugh v. Mitchell (1837) 21 N. C. 510. In Waters v. Taylor (1813) 2 Ves. & B. 299, the court decreed a sale of the whole partnership estate, real and personal, in a partnership business, dissolved by the conduct of the partners, making it impossible to carry on the partnership. Where a business carried on in partnership was afterwards transferred to other premises, which were purchased by one of the partners with partnership property, bought in the first instance partly with such property and partly with money borrowed by one partner, and afterwards repaid out of the partnership effects and partly upon the credit of the former house, which belonged to the partnership, it was held that a decree, upon a petition for winding up the partnership business, that such house should be sold, was correct. Nerot v. Burnand (1827) 4 Russ. 247. To a bill filed for the settlement of a partnership, in the purchase and sale of lands, and praying an account, the defense of the statute of frauds must be specially pleaded. Patterson v. Ware (1846) 10 Ala. 444. In closing the partnership affairs, the partners have the legal right as against a mortgagee of one of the partner's shares to sell the real estate for money, and for this purpose can give a good title unaffected by the mortgage, or they can exchange it for other available property for the purpose of conveniently adjusting their affairs with creditors and each other, and for the purpose of winding up their business. Tarbel v. Bradley (1878) 7 Abb. N. C. 279, affirmed, Tarbell v. West (1881) 86 N. Y. 280. Where, previous to the death of one partner, a salary was paid to another partner, and he also claimed compensation for caring for the premises used in the business, which were the property of himself and another deceased partner, who also had other real estate not so used and which he took care of and showed a profit, it was held that although in the latter he was entitled to compensation, yet as to the former he was not so entitled. Beck v. Thompson (Nev.) May 7, 1894. Where partners, for the uses and purposes of their business, took a conveyance of lands and subsequently another became a member of the firm the deed continuing in the name of the original grantees, and later one partner sold out to his copartners all interest in the firm property and quitclaimed to original partners his real estate, took from them a mortgage, the new firm continuing in business using the real estate until their failure when they compromised with their creditors, including such retiring partner who signed the composition deed for a certain amount as unsecured, and subsequently sought to foreclose the mortgage which it was contended the composition deed destroyed, it was held that the receipt of the mortgage and the accompanying bond caused the claim against the partnership to cease and that such retiring partner could therefore only look to his security for the purpose of paying his debt. Baxter v. Bell (1879) 19 Hun, 367, 368. Where a portion of the real estate standing in the name of one partner at his decease, upon which a portion of the building built by the firm with the firm's money was placed and greatly increased its value, was devoted to the business of the firm showing their intention to treat it as partnership property, the court held that in making a division of the partnership property the estate of the deceased partner should be allowed to value the land at the time of its appropriation by building, but that the increased value should be divided among the copartners in proportion to their respective interests in the profits of the business from the funds of which the improvements were made. Ballantine v. Frelinghuysen (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 266. Where the plaintiff and defendant, copartners in business of cutting and selling wood and timber, plaintiff, being the owner of certain land, verbally agreed to sell defendant one undivided half of the And at such sale the partners have been given a wood and timber standing thereon, and that the right to bid. Rowlands v. Evans, Williams v. Row-same should then be the property of the firm, & Creditors (1895) 47 La. Ann. 346. small portion of the wood and timber being taken by the individual partners, and cannot be regarded off the purchase money not being paid, and plain- as owned by the partnership, yet the partners have tiff mortgaged the lot and notified the defendant the right to require the application of such propthat he would not be allowed to cut any more tim-erty to pay the partnership debts. Calder v. Their ber and in the settlement of the partnership accounts the defendant claimed damages equal to the amount he would have realized by the cutting of the remaining wood, the court held that such damages could not be allowed in the taking of the partnership accounts. Reid v. McQuesten (1881) 61 N. H. 421. In Falkner v. Hunt (1875) 73 N. C. 571, a bill was filed in equity to set up and settle the partnership, plaintiff alleging that he and the defendant had entered into an agreement for the purchase of a tract of land in which a millsite and mill were situated, and that they were to build a new mill, the plaintiff doing the work and the defendant furnishing the materials and money, and out of the profits the land was to be paid for, the defendant reimbursing his outlay and plaintiff being paid for his work, and afterwards the profits or losses were to be shared equally as partners; and the defendant received the profits, reimbursed himself, and paid all but a small balance for the land. The court held the partner was entitled to an account | and that such contract need not be in writing. Where real estate was contributed to the capital stock of a company at an estimated valuation, and was afterwards destroyed by fire and rebuilt by mutual consent with partnership funds, the loss falling upon the partnership, the property being partnership property and a part of the capital, the partner contributing it having been credited with its value in the stock account, it was held upon a dissolution he could not withdraw the burnt part, while the buildings which filled its place were the product of the investment of partnership funds with his consent, and were of a different value, and the court held that such property could only be settled by treating such property as partnership property, ascertaining its value at the time of dissolution and stating the account accordingly. Clark's App. (1872) 72 Pa. 142. Where the evidence showed that the property in question was partnership property, used and treated as such by the parties and improved with partnership funds, the title thereto being by agreement taken in the name of one partner really for the use and purposes of the partnership and vested as the partners intended that it should be, it was held that although the property was realty, yet in the estimation of a court of equity it has been thus converted into personal estate for all partnership purposes, and along with other partnership effects was subject to the firm's debts and losses and to a return of the capital advanced by each partner upon a division of the balance of the firm profits, and that therefore one partner had no right to call for a conveyance of his interest as a tenant in common until the trust fastened upon such property for partnership purposes had been fully satisfied, the legal title remaining in the party in whom the mutual consent of the parties had vested it, the only remedy of such party being by action to dissolve the partnership and for an accounting. Kruschke v. Stefan (1892) 83 Wis. 373. XXVII. Division by partnership prior to dissolution. Where part of partnership real estate has been divided, there is no presumption of the division of the residue in the absence of evidence to that effect. McGuire v. Ramsey (1849) 9 Ark. 518. XXVIII. In Louisiana. Under the Louisiana laws immovables bought for the partnership must be deemed owned jointly 28 L. R. A. Whether acquired in the partnership name, or when shown to have been purchased in the name of one of the partners for the partnership. Ibid. If any immovable property be purchased in the name of the firm, the partners become joint owners. McKee v. Griffin (1871) 23 La. Ann. 417; Guilbeau Bros. v. Melancon (1876) 28 La. Ann. 627; May v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (1892) 44 La. Ann. 444. Yet they hold for the firm benefit. May v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. supra. It is not partnership property, liable to the payment of the firm debts. Bernard v. Dufour (1841) 17 La. 596. And therefore one partner cannot afterwards alienate it without the consent of the other partners. Civil Code, art. 2796; Thomas v. Scott (1842) 3 Rob. (La.) 256; Weld v. Peters (1846) 1 La. Ann. 432. The title to a portion of the property may be in the partner, but the value belongs to the partnership. Baca v. Ramos (1836) 10 La. Ann. 417, 29 Am. Dec. 463; McKee v. Griffin, supra. But the partners have a right to partition it. Pecot v. Armelin Bros. (1869) 21 La. Ann. 667. Either of the partners has the right to sell his undivided share or interest in the property, and such is liable to be used for his private debts. McKee v. Griffin (1871) 23 La. Ann. 417; Baca v. Ramos (1836) 10 La. 417, 29 Am. Dec. 463. A transfer of the share of a partner by him will operate as a divestiture of his interest and preclude his contesting the transferee's title. May v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (1892) 44 La. Ann. 444. Commercial partners may own real estate, but the real estate owned by them does not enter into their commercial assets. Guilbeau Bros. v. Melancon (1876) 28 La. Ann. 627. Yet in equity real estate acquired for the partnership is liable for the partnership debts. Calder v. Their Creditors (1895) 47 La. Ann. 346. So equity will enforce the rights of the equitable owner by compelling the legal one to make a conveyance to the other. Baca v. Ramos, supra; Hall v. Sprigg (1819) 7 Mart. (La.) 243, 12 Am. Dec. 506. Where partnership entries are relied upon to overthrow the title of the partner to immovable property acquired by him, the entry shall clearly import the acquisition was for the partnership. Calder v. Their Creditors, supra. If the books of the firm explicitly show that the land in question was bought and paid for with the funds of the partnership, for the account and use of the partnership, such a purchase of immovable property by members of a copartnership, even though the title be taken in the names of the individual partners, has precisely the same effect as if the title be taken in the name of the firm; in either case the individual partners become joint owners. May v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (1892) 44 La. Ann. 444, following Allen v. Whetstone (1883) 35 La. Ann. 849; Thomas v. Scott (1842) 3 Rɔb. (La.) 256. Where the act of sale by which real estate was acquired showed that the purchase was made by the parties as partners trading under a firm style, a note being given for half of the purchase money signed by the firm, it was held the partners were joint owners and that either of them could sell his undivided share or interest in the property which was liable to seizure for his private debts. In such a case, however, the partner must account for the price, as he could not acquire any part for his private use without compensating his partners. Baca v. Ramos (1836) 10 La. 417, 29 A.m. Dec. 463. E. W. VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, Plff. in 1. The requirement of equality and uniformity in taxation is satisfied by such regulations as will secure an equal rate and just valuation without reference to the method of valuation, and in order to be uniform a tax need not be imposed and assessed upon all property by the same agency or officers. 2. A tax on sales of oysters to be assessed and paid weekly while other property is assessed and taxes paid thereon once a year, does not for that reason violate the principle of equality and uniformity. 3. A tax on sales of oysters expressly authorized by Const., art. 10, § 2, is not an income tax within section 4, which exempts incomes un der $00. oyster fund," since the oyster fund is merely an account and not the object of the tax. (March 21, 1895.) ERROR to the Circuit Court for Gloucester County to review a judgment in favor of defendant in a proceeding to subject him to the penalty for violation of the oyster law. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. R. Taylor Scott, Atty Gen., for the Commonwealth. Messrs. J. N. Stubbs and W. C. L. Toliaferro for defendant in error. Riely, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Section 5 of the Act of the General Assembly approved February 25, 1892, entitled "An act to amend and re-enact sections 2131, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2137, 2148, 2151, 2153, and to repeal sections 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, and 2147 of chapter 97 of the Code of Vir ginia in relation to oysters, and to add independent sections thereto" (Acts 1891-92, chap. 363, p. 595), contain the following provision: 4. A provision for a fine on & tong man who fails to make a weekly return of sales of oysters for taxation does not add to or increase the tax so as to affect its equality and uniformity. 5. A provision giving an option to pay "The inspector shall require each the sum of two dollars in discharge of all tong man registered in his district to make obligation for taxes on sales of oysters, which is to him, on the Saturday of each week, or merely in lieu of the tax imposed on such sales to within three days thereafter, during the law. be paid weekly, does not, at least as to one who ful season, a true and accurate return of the does not avail himself of the privilege, make the amount of sales made by him during the tax a license instead of a property tax. week preceding: and the inspector shall col 6. An act to amend and re-enact certain lect from said tong man on the aggregate sections of the code of Virginia and repeal amount of sales for that week an amount others in relation to oysters, and to add inde-equal to the amount of tax that may be levied pendent sections thereto, all of which have a by the state on any other species of property; natural connection with the general subject of but if at the time of registering his boat, any oysters, does not embrace more than one sub-tong man shall prefer, and elect to pay, and ject. 7. The title of an amendatory statute of the code affected thereby. pay to the inspector the sum of two dollars, the inspector shall give him a receipt therefor, in which he shall state that the said pay. ment is a discharge of his obligation under this section for the entire season for which his boat is registered, so far as the weekly returns and the amount to be paid thereon is fail to make such report as is provided in concerned. If any tong man shall this section, he shall be guilty of a misde. 9. The amount of a tax on oysters is suf-meanor, and upon conviction thereof he shall ficiently stated within the meaning of the be fined not less than ten dollars nor more Constitution, art. 10, § 16, by a provision that it than fifty dollars." Iverson Brown, the deshall equal the amount of taxes levied on any fendant in error, who was a tong man of oysother species of property. 10. The object of a tax being suffi-istering his boat, to pay to the inspector the ters, and had not elected, at the time of regciently stated in the statute which creates it, the title of a subsequent mandatory statute merely continuing the tax need not repeat the object of the tax. 11. The object of an oyster tax being expressly stated "to obtain revenue" it complies with the constitutional provision that the object must be stated although the Code, chap. 97, § 2135, provides that the taxes shall be paid "into the public treasury to the credit of the NOTE. For public fisheries in general, see Law-| ton v. Steele (N. Y.) 7 L. R. A. 134, and note; Wright v. Mulvaney (Wis.) 9 L. R. A. 807, and note. As to state regulation of shipments of oysters or taking of them by nonresidents, see State v. Harrub (Ala.) 15 L. R. A. 761. See also 28 L. R. A. 480, 812. sum of two dollars in discharge of his obliunder the said statute in the county court of gation for the entire season, was indicted for failing to make the return which was due Gloucester on the 5th day of October, 1893, from him to the inspector on the week ending September 16, 1893, or within the three days thereafter, of the amount of his sales of oysters. To the indictment the defendant As to equality of taxation, see Daly y. Morgan (Md.) 1 L. R. A. 757, and note; Chaddock v. Day (Mich.) 4 L. R. A. 809. and note (including distinction between licenses and taxes: Cook v. Port of Portland (Or.) 13 L. R. A. 533, and note; State v. Moore (N. C.) 22 L. R. A. 472. demurred. The court sustained the demurrer, | on conviction, to the payment of a fine, and gave judgment for the defendant. Upon while the owners of other property subject a petition by the commonwealth to the judge of the circuit court of Gloucester county for a writ of error to the said judgment there was a pro forma refusal, in pursuance of an agreement between the attorney for the commonwealth and for the defendant, in order that the case might be promptly brought before this court. A writ of error was thereupon granted by one of the judges of this court. By an agreement in writing and filed with the record all errors and objections to the indictment, except as to the validity of the statute upon which it was based, were waived by the counsel for the defendant. The only question, then, for our consideration is the constitutionality of the statute above quoted. It is first assailed on the ground that the tax prescribed is not equal and uniform, and that, therefore, the statute is obnoxious to section 1 of article 10 of the Constitution. In support of this contention quite a number of objections to the act were urged. Section 1 of article 10 of the Constitution prescribes that: "Taxation, except as hereinafter provided, whether imposed by the state, county, or corporate bodies, shall be equal and uniform, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as pre scribed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of prop erty of equal value." An inspection of the statute under consideration shows that the principle of equality and uniformity was strictly observed in the imposition of the tax. The value of the oysters for taxation could not well be ascertained or fixed in a more just manner than is prescribed by the statute. It is to be ascertained by the aggregate amount of sales each week during the oyster season. It is their actual value in market, and not merely their appraised value. A more accurate mode of ascertaining the valuation for taxation of oysters subject to be taxed could not well be devised; and the rate of taxation is precisely the same as is prescribed for other property. The inspector is to collect each week from a tong man on the aggregate amount of his sales for that week an amount equal to the amount of tax that may be levied by the state on any other species of property; no more, no less. The tax prescribed is exactly the same as that which is levied by the state on any other species of property, and the valuation is ascertained in the most accurate and just manner. There is no just ground to complain of the tax for inequality or want of uniformity. It is objected that the valuation for taxation of oysters is not ascertained in the same way, or by the same method, that is prescribed for other property; that the valuation of other property is assessed by officers elected or appointed for the purpose; that the tax on oysters is to be assessed and paid weekly, while all other property is only assessed annually, and the tax paid annually; and that the failure of a tong man to make weekly a return of his sales to the inspector is made a misdemeanor, and subjects him, to taxation are not liable to be punished for a like delinquency. Neither one nor all of these objections affect the equality or uniformity of the tax imposed on a tong man, nor offend against section 1 of article 10 of the Constitution. Whether true or false, they do not operate to impose any greater burden on him than is borne by the owner of any other species of property of the same value. They do not add one iota to the tax he has to pay, and the statute is therefore in strict accord with both the letter and spirit of the constitution in the respect complained of. The constitution does not prescribe that the valuation of all property for taxation shall be ascertained in the same way or manner. It is not even implied. In the nature of things, it could not be done. The many kinds or species of property with their diverse characteristics render it impossible. The valuation is to be ascertained as prescribed by law, -that is, by the legisla ture, -and in as just a manner as possible; and on such valuation the same rate of tax shall be imposed as on other property, so that "no species of property shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value." The requirement of equality and uniformity is satisfied by such regulations as will secure an equal rate and a just valuation without reference to the method of valuation, and, in order to be uniform, a tax need not be imposed and assessed upon all property by the same agency or officer. Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Clarke County Suprs. 78 Va. 269; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 337, 338, 29 L. ed. 419; Central Iowa R. Co. v. Wright County Suprs. 67 Iowa, 199; and Louisville & N. A. R. Co. v. State, 25 Ind. 177. The legislature may prescribe any method it may deem best for attaining a just and fair valuation of any species of property, and the court could not declare any such law void, unless it manifestly violated the principles required by the constitution. The fact that oysters are required to be assessed, and the tax to be paid every week, while other property is only assessed and the tax paid once a year, does not work inequality in the amount of the tax paid. The tong man does not pay weekly on the same property. In the result he only pays on the aggregate amount of his sales during the season the regular pro rata tax that is paid on all other property. The fact that he pays the tax in weekly installments instead of one annual payment does not increase the amount of his tax one stiver. The amount to be paid to the state is precisely the same, whether paid in one single payment or in weekly installments. It is claimed that the tax in question, be ing assessed on the aggregate amount of sales of oysters, is an income tax, and is, therefore, violative of section 4, article 10, of the Constitution, which exempts incomes under $600 from taxation. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say that the tax is as sessed on sales, and not upon income, and that the section of the constitution referred to has no application to the case; and, fur thermore, that the tax on the "amount of sales of oysters" taken from their natural beds is expressly authorized by section 2 of the said article of the Constitution. that this is in substance and effect a license tax, and not a property tax, and is therefore obnoxious to section 2 of article 10 of the Constitution. This claim is not well founded. It is further objected that because the act The constitution expressly authorizes the subjects a tong man to a fine of not less than legislature to impose a tax on the amount of $10 nor more than $50 if he fail to make to sales of oysters taken from their natural beds the inspector the required weekly return of by any citizen in any one year, but limits the sales, it discriminates against the tong man, tax to the rate imposed upon any other species as no other owner of property subject to taxa- of property. The statute, pursuing directly tion is liable to a fine for a like delinquency. the constitutional provision, requires a tong If this were in fact true, it would not be man to make return to the inspector of the cause to declare the statute void for inequal amount of his sales of oysters so taken, and ity or want of uniformity in the tax imposed the inspector to collect from the tong man on on tong men of oysters. It in no wise adds the aggregate amount of sales an amount to or increases the tax. That remains fixed, equal to the amount of tax levied by the state and is the same that is "levied by the state on other property. Thus the tong man is reon any other species of property. If the quired to pay on the amount of his sales as tong men respect the law by which the valua- the constitution authorizes, and not othertion of oysters for assessment is to be ascer- wise; and only such amount as is equal to tained, they will never incur the fine. A the tax imposed by the state on other propstatute that is otherwise valid is not rendered erty. The statute does not, therefore, offend invalid by having a penalty affixed for its against the constitution, and it is difficult to violation. The wrong of the citizen can see how it can be so claimed. The provision never make a valid law void. But the claim that if the tong man, at the time of registerof discrimination is not founded in fact. ing his boat, shall prefer and elect to pay, Owners of other property are subject to pun- and pay the sum of two dollars, such pay. ishment for a like delinquency. The pen- ment shall be a discharge of his obligation alty prescribed by the statute in question is for the entire season for the tax imposed on for failing to make the return of sales to the the amount of his sales, is simply a privilege inspector, who is to assess the tax. Under extended to him, which he may either accept the general law, forms for lists of valuations or decline. He is under no compulsion whatare furnished by the assessor to the owners ever to avail himself of it. He is without of personal property, which they are required cause of complaint on this score. Nor, unto fill out by listing their property and affix-less accepted, does it affect the tax imposed ing valuations thereof, and which, after be- in strict adherence to the constitutional proing verified by oath, are required to be re-vision. We have now disposed of the many turned to the assessor or clerk of the court within ten days thereafter; and the failure to return the same within the time required, and to make oath to its truth and fairness, subjects the offender to a forfeiture of not less than $30 nor more than $1,000. Va. Cole, SS 491, 494, 497. Statutes imposing It is next contended that it is repugnant penalties for failure or refusal to make such to section 15 of article 5 of the Constitution, returns or to return such lists are quite com- which is as follows: "No law shall embrace mon, and have been uniformly upheld. more than one object, which shall be exWashington v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 258; Com. pressed in its title; nor shall any law be rev. Byrne, 20 Gratt. 165; State v. Bell, 61 N. vived or amended with reference to its title, C. 76; Com. v. Cooke, 50 Pa. 201; Hartford but the act revived, or the section amended, V. Champion, 58 Conn. 268, 25 Am. & shall be re-enacted and published at length. Eng. Encyclop. Law, p. 206. Nor does the The title of the act was stated at the beginstatute infringe in the least on the provision ning of this opinion, but for convenience in of the constitution which authorizes a tax to examining the objection made to its validity be imposed on "the amount of sales of oys- or sufficiency under the foregoing provision ters" taken from the natural beds by any of the constitution, it will be here repeated. citizen "in any one year at a rate It is entitled: "An act to amend and renot exceeding the rate of taxation imposed enact sections 2131, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2137, on any other species of property." Article 2148, 2151, 2153, and to repeal sections 2141, 10, 2. It imposes, as has been seen, a tax 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, and 2147 of chapter on the weekly sales of oysters equal to the 97 of the Code of Virginia, in relation to amount of the tax that may be levied by the oysters, and to add independent sections therestate on any other species of property; but to." It is claimed that the body of the statprovides that "if at the time of registering ute embraces many objects, instead of one his boat any tong man shall prefer and elect object, as required by the constitutional proto pay, and pay to the inspector the sum of vision, and, further, that these many objects two dollars, the inspector shall give him a are not expressed in the title; that it both receipt therefor in which he shall state that amends and repeals many sections of the the said payment is in discharge of his ob- code, and that the independent sections have ligation under this section for the entire sea- various objects, such as registering boats son for which his boat is registered, so far to be used in taking oysters from their nat as the weekly returns and the amount to be ural beds, arranging oyster districts, surpaid thereon is concerned." It is insisted veying oyster-planting ground, assigning objections raised to the constitutionality of the statute on the ground of inequality or want of uniformity in the tax it imposes, and the objection that it is a license, and not a property tax. It is, in my opinion valid against such attack. |