it was purchased for and was treated as partnership property, that presumption of ownership arising from the face of the deed will be overcome, and the property will be treated as belonging to the partnership. Authorities supra. It has been insisted that when a partner buys real estate for his firm with its money, and takes the title in his own name, which title is spread upon the records of the county, those who have financial dealings with him are presumed to have done so on the faith and credit of that property, and the partnership is estopped afterwards to claim the property against the claims of the creditors of such partner. This doctrine is true, certainly, in cases of bona fide purchasers of such property, for value and with out notice, that it belonged to the partnership. But it cannot be extended further, without overthrowing all our adjudications So under a judgment against one partner of the | equity upon the share of such partner, but such firm only his portion can be sold on execution. Price v. Hunt (1849) 33 N. C. 42.

may convey it to one of their own number, | rule that a partner in a bankrupt firm shall may partition or divide, and the lien will not prove in competition with the creditors thereby be destroyed. Creditors as such can- of the firm. They are, in fact, his own crednot be said to have any lien on the partner-itors, and he cannot be permitted to diminish ship effects. There are conditions in which the partnership assets to the prejudice of a creditor has been allowed to avail himself those who are not only creditors of the firm, of this quasi lien of a partner, but it is de- but also of himself. If, therefore, a partner rivative only, and not of original existence. is a creditor of a firm, neither he nor his But, in no event can a creditor of an in- separate creditors (for they are in no better dividual partner acquire any greater inter-position than himself) can compete with the est in the assets of the firm of which the joint creditors as against the joint estate. partner is a member, than the partner him- Lord Hardwicke, it is true, in Ex parte self is entitled to, which is nothing, if the Hunter, 1 Atk. 223, allowed this to be done; partnership is insolvent. The stream in law, but that case has not, in this respect, been no more than in nature, can rise higher than followed, and has long been considered as its source. Lindley, in his work on Part- overruled." 2 Lindley, Partn. p. 720, § 721, nership, states the principles so aptly, we and authorities cited; Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. quote what he says on the subject. Subject 490; Warren v. Taylor, 60 Ala. 218; Farley to certain exceptions, within which this case v. Moog, 79 Ala. 153, 58 Am. Rep. 585; does not fall, he says: "It is an established Goldsmith v. Eichold, 94 Ala. 116; Buchan

arate and individual property surrendered by an insolvent member of a firm. Bernard v. Dufour (1841) 17 La. 596.

The interest of a partner purchasing real estate out of his own moneys, although the same is improved by the partnership firm, is subject to execution for his individual debt. Averill v. Loucks (1849) 6 Barb. 19.

| subject to his individual debts. Chandler v. Jessup (1892) 132 Ind. 351.

A deed executed by a copartner, of one undivided moiety of copartnership real estate to pay his individual creditors, after the dissolution of a firm, conveying the legal title of one moiety thereof, is subject to the implied trust that the creditors of the firm and the other partners shall So a creditor of an individual member of the be first paid out of the partnership amounts, and partnership is entitled to preference, as regards operates only to give to the individual credithe separate property of such partner, over a cred-tors named in it a lien on the interest of such partitor of the firm. Kirby v. Carpenter (1849) 7 Barb. ner in the land, after payment of all the partner878. ship debts with interest. Cunningham v. Ward (1888) 30 W. Va. 572.

The creditor of a separate partner, purchasing under an execution the legal title in the real estate held by his debtor, takes such title, subject to the hens and trusts with which it stands chargeable in favor of the partnership creditors and the partners themselves. Jones v. Parsons (1864) 25 Cal. 100.

And an insolvent copartner, unable to pay the debts which the firm owed, is guilty of a fraud upon the joint creditors, if he authorizes his share of the firm property to be applied to the payment of a debt for which neither he nor his property are liable, at law or in equity. Wilson v. Robertson (1860) 21 N. Y. 592, 19 How. Pr. 355.

A provision in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, that partnership effects of an insolvent firm may be applied for payment of the individual debts of a partner, is a violation of the statute and furnishes conclusive evidence of a fraudulent intent. Ruhl v. Phillips (1866) 2 Daly, 49.

If an assignment executed by partners in trade is frauduleut, a judgment creditor of an individual partner may secure a lien upon the real estate, and such lien will be effectual as against the assignee in bankruptcy when obtained prior to the bankruptcy proceedings. Johnson v. Rogers (1876) 15 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 1.

The creditors of an individual member of a copartnership have preference over those of another member, and one member to the creditor of another and to another member, for any amount paid in in excess of the share he was bound to contribute, or in excess of his proportion of the debts of the concern. Hiscock v. Phelps (1872) 49 N. Y. 97.

Where payments are made out of the firm property and funds, for the purchase or improvement of real estate, not purchased or used for partnership purposes, the title being taken in the names of the individual partners, or of others on their account, the sums so paid being by the act of payment withdrawn from the firm's assets, as between them and the firm, such property becomes the individual property of the partners or of the grantee, the share or interest of a partner being

In the case of a mortgage by a partner of his individual property to secure a firm debt the property being sold and the partnership debt paid thereunder, the partnership owning a part of the real estate the title to which was in the two partners as tenants in common, a partnership right growing out of the expending of partnership funds on the buildings and machinery, the proceeds of the sale being in the hands of an assignee, the individual creditors of the partner are not entitled in equity to have the partnership fund in priority to the creditors of the partnership, and the assignment giving preferences with partnership interests must go to the partnership assignee. Kendall v. Rider (1861) 35 Barb. 100.

b. Where property held prior to partnership.

Partners cannot so change the character of real estate originally owned by them as individuals, not derived by them in any way from the partnership so as to give priority to firm over separate creditors by simply making entries in the books and treating it between themselves as partnership property without giving some notice or doing some acts equivalent to notice, to their individual creditors. National Union Bank of Maryland v. National Mechanics Bank of Baltimore (Md.) (1894) 27 L. R. A. 476.

Tenants in common of real estate, conveyed to them by separate deeds, each paying for the portion conveyed to him and owning an undivided half, afterwards entering into a parol partnership under which such property is to be considered as belonging to the firm and using it for firm purposes, do not in equity render it liable as firm property for the payment of the partnership debts, as against separate creditors who have given credit to the partners individually upon the strength of the partners being owners as tenants in common. Parker v. Bowles (1876) 57 N. H. 491.

Where the parties put into the common stock every particle of property, both real and personal,

▼. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 167, 5 L. ed. 601, 47 Am. Dec. 305; Jones v. Fletcher, 42 Ark. 422; Paige v. Paige, 71 Iowa, 318, 60 Am. Rep. 799; Story, Partn. SS 97, 360, 361; 13 Am. & Eng. Encyclop. Law, p. 611; 17 Am. & Eng. Encyclop. Law, p. 1195.

The written agreement executed between the partners on the 17th May, 1879, recites, that in the course of their business, the three

brothers composing the firm of Moses Bros. had acquired titles to real estate in the individual names of the one or the other of said parties, and it was provided by that agreement, that all real estate or interest therein then held by either of the members of that firm, in his individual name, was the property of the partnerhip, having been brought into the firm, or bought with its

A mortgage by a partner of his interest in partnership real estate, which is known by the mortgagee to be partnership property, is not a mortgage of a specific part of the real estate, but of his interest in the portion mortgaged, after the payment of the firm debts and liabilities, and the settlement of the accounts as between the partners. Beecher v. Stevens (1876) 43 Conn. 587.

except household furniture and apparel, together | indicated. Williams v. Gillies (1878) 75 N. Y. 197, rewith the liabilities, without any express provision versing 13 Hun, 422. with regard to future acquisitions or liabilities, each devesting himself of all present possessions and binding himself to apply himself faithfully and diligently to the management of the partnership, there being no ground for supposing that the parties expected any such thing as the individual property or liabilities, such a transaction cannot strictly be called a partnership, but rather a universal hotchpot of all their properties and liabilities, present and prospective, so that the partnership creditors can claim no priority over the private creditors of such parties, such parties strictly speaking being tenants in common. Rice v. Barnard (1848) 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54.

IV. The position of mortgagees.

Upon the question of mortgages of partnership real estate and the powers of the partners in re

Such a mortgagee takes his interest subject to the equities in favor of the firm creditors and of the partners inter se. Smith v. Evans (1871) 37 Ind. 526; Kelly v. Hutton (1868) L. R. 3 Ch. 703, 37 L. J. Ch. 917, 19 L. T. N. S. 228, 16 Week. Rep. 1182.

And has no priority over a creditor of the partnership attaching the partnership property, and it matters not whether such creditors are prior or subsequent to the mortgage in point of time. Lovejoy v. Bowers (1840) 11 N. H. 404.

It is not until the interest of a partner has been definitely ascertained and set apart as his share, that his mortgagee has any claim under the mortgage available against such specific property. Tarbel v. Bradley (1878) 7 Abb. N. C. 279.

spect thereto, see notes to Yorks v. Tozer (Minn.) ante, 86, and Galbraith v. Tracy (Ill.) ante, 129. A mortgagee is a purchaser, and where acting bona fide is entitled to the rights of such. Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer (1882) 38 Ohio St. 339; Williams v. Sprigg (1856) 6 Ohio St. 588; Williams v. Engle-purchaser under a sheriff's sale of the firm property

brecht (1881) 37 Ohio St. 383.

And so is the mortgagee of an individual partper's share where he acts without notice of the fact that it is partnership property. Page v. Thomas (1885) 43 Ohio St. 38, 54 Am. Rep. 788; Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer, supra.

Such mortgagee cannot foreclose as against a

to satisfy the judgment creditor of the firm. Kistner v. Sindlinger (1870) 33 Ind. 114.

Yet a mortgagee of one partner of his interest in partnership real estate, bona fide without notice of partnership liabilities has been held entitled to Although a mortgagee without notice, finding hold as against partnership creditors. McDermot the legal title in the name of the individual part-v. Laurence (1821) 7 Serg. & R. 438, 10 Am. Dec. 468. ners, who lends money and takes a mortgage on the premises, will be protected as a bona fide purchaser, yet the judgment creditor can make no such claim. Page v. Thomas, supra.

If in the firm name partners make a promissory note with a mortgage upon real estate, use the firm name in the body but execute it in their individual names, it is a legal conveyance from the partnership, as also from the partners themselves, and may be foreclosed against one, more, or all of the partners. Printup Bros. v. Turner (1880) 65 Ga. 71. Where four out of five partners mortgage partnership real estate and the mortgage is foreclosed and the land sold, the proceedings being otherwise regular, the sale will operate to convey the interest of all the partners who join in the mortgage. Cottle v. Harrold (1884) 72 Ga. 830; Printup Bros. v. Turner, supra.

Although the legal title under a contract between a retiring and continuing partner for the purchase by the latter may still be vested in the partners yet the continuing partner being the equitable owner, has power to mortgage the same, and the mortgagee is entitled to decree in foreclosure. Seaman v. Huffaker (1878) 21 Kan. 254.

Under an oral agreement between parties for the purchase of real estate each to contribute his share with the title taken in the name of one who gave a bond and mortgage for the unpaid purchase money, a judgment in foreclosure proceedings cannot be rendered upon the bond as against the others, as there is nothing to show that the name of the party whose name appeared in the deed is used as the firm name or that any other person is

The firm creditors have a right to be made parexecuted by a partner on partnership real estate to ties to foreclosure proceedings, upon a mortgage secure his individual debt for the purpose of subjecting such estate to the payment of the partner. ship debts. Conant v. Frary (1875) 49 Ind. 530.

See further, upon the effect of notice of a partnership, infra, head VII.

V. The position of judgment creditors. Such property is subject to the payment of the judgments against the firm for partnership debts, in preference to judgments against the partners individually. Erwin's App. (1861) 39 Pa. 535, 80 Am. Dec. 542; Overholt's App. (1849) 12 Pa. 222, 51 Am. Dec. 598.

If any part of the property levied upon by virtue of the execution belonged to the firm, such property will not be liable for any indebtedness, except a partnership debt, until the debts of the firm are all paid. Muir v. Leitch (1849) 7 Barb. 348; Schenck v. Ingraham (1875) 5 Hun, 402; Payne v. Matthews (1836) 6 Paige,20,3 L. ed. 881,29 Am. Dec. 738. The levy and sale of the land upon a judgment against an individual member of the firm passes no interest or estate in it to the purchaser. Oliver's Estate (1890) 9 L. R. A. 421, 136 Pa. 43.

Partners owning real estate in their individual names, not disclosing the fact of a partnership or that their interests in such land are such, cannot subsequently change the condition by parol evidence, as against a creditor who has obtained a lien upon such property. Geddes' App. (1877) 84 Pa. 482.

funds for partnership purposes. The testimony of M. C., H. C., and A. H. Moses, taken before the register, shows that the acquisition of real estate, after that agreement was signed, continued as before, viz., that in many instances the title was taken in the name of the partner effecting the transaction, but all real estate, whether the title was so taken, or in the name of the firm, was bought

The face of the conveyance determining the character of the title as to judgment creditors and mortgagees, and as to such it cannot be altered by parol. Holt's App. (1881) 98 Pa. 257.

A judgment against a partnership is a lien upon the real estate of the individual partners. Royer Wheel Co. v. Fielding (1886) 101 N. Y. 504.

With the same effect as if such judgment were for the separate debt of such partner, and the principle that the separate property of an individual partner is to be first applied to the payment of his separate debt, has never been held to give priority as to such property to a subsequent judgment for an individual over a prior fu lgment for a partnership debt, even though courts of equity will give but a mere equitable lien prior in point of time a preference over a subsequent judgment in cases where such prior lien is specific in its performance. Meech v. Allen (1858) 17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465.

And a court of chancery will so control it as to restrict it to the actual interest of the judgment debtor in the property, so as to fully protect the rights of those who have a prior equitable interest | in or liens upon such property, or in the proceeds thereof. O'Donnell v. Kerr (1875) 50 How. Pr. 334, following Buchan v. Sumner (1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 165, 5 L. ed. 599, 47 Am. Dec. 305; Wilkes v. Harper (1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 354, 5 L. ed. 672; Sieman v. Austin (1859) 83 Barb. 20; Monticello Hydraulic Co. v. Loughry (1880) 72 Ind. 566; Peet v. Beers (1853) 4 Ind. 46; Troost v. Davis (1869) 31 Ind. 34; Glidewell v. Spaugh (1866) 26 Ind. 319.

The equitable doctrine being that a judgment and the legal lien of its docket bind only the actual interest of the judgment debtor, and are subject to all existing equities which are valid as against bim. Ells v. Tousley (1828) 1 Paige, 280, 2 L. ed. 647; White v. Carpenter (1830) 2 Paige, 217, 2 L. ed. 882; Gouverneur v. Titus (1837) 6 Paige, 347, 3 L. ed. 1015.

for the firm, paid for out of its funds and was taken and treated as its property, and not as the property of the member in whose name the title stood, excepting the residences of H. C. and A. H. Moses in Montgomery, and the residence of said A. H. Moses in Sheffield, and a lot given to him in Sheffield by the Sheffield Iron & Coal Company. A careful review of all the evidence satisfies

Where a lien of a judgment is suspended by an order vacating the judgment, when such order ceases to have any validity by being vacated, the lien is revived. Buchan v. Summer (1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 166, 5 L. ed. 599, 47 Am. Dec. 305, distinguished in King v. Harris (1866) 34 N. Y. 330, 336, a case where the judgment had not been docketed so as to create a lien.

If the land is purchased by the partners with their individual funds, the firm holds only such an interest in the land as arises from the fact that it was the individual property of the partners, and as such the land is liable to be taken for debts upon scire facias, but a judgment is not a lien until after scire facias is issued. Stadler v. Allen (1876) 44 Iowa, 198.

Upon a judgment recovered against a mercantile firm real estate can be sold by the sheriff under a f. fa. issued against the firm. Hunter v. Martin (1845) 2 Rich. L. 541.

So the interest of a cestui que trust in land will pass to the extent of an execution upon the land as his estate. Jarvis v. Brooks (1853) 27 N. H. 37, 59 Am. Dec. 359, 23 N. H. 136, following Pritchard v. Brown (1828) 4 N. H. 397, 17 Am. Dec. 431.

By a sale of land on a judgment, the lien of the judgment and the right to redeem are gone. Shepard v. O'Neil (1848) 4 Barb. 126.

An injunction to restrain a sale of partnership lands will be granted as against a judgment creditor of one partner. Harney v. First Nat. Bank of Jersey City (N. J.) May 15, 1894.

Neither general assignees, nor assignees in bankruptcy, nor judgment creditors, can be relieved against a prior equity. There must be a purchase and a payment of value without notice of the trust, before this can be defeated. Sieman v. Austin (1859) 33 Barb. 20.

Section 2605 of the Alabama Code of 1886, which provided that a judgment recovered in an action, which should bind the joint property of all of the ex-associates, as if all had been made defendants and been sued upon their joint liability, does not apply to the case of a judgment obtained against partners sued in their common firm name without giving their individual names and under such a judgment partnership property subject to execution, and

Such lien being subject to all equities which ist against such land in favor of third persons at the time of the recovery of the judgment. Buchan v. Sumner (1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 165, 5 L. ed. 599, 47 Am. Dec. 305; Moyer v. Hinman (1855) 13 N. Y. 190; Ells v. Tousley (1828) 1 Paige, 280, 2 L. ed. 647.

But no lien is created by the recovery of a judg-only partnership property, can be levied on or ment until it is docketed, and therefore no question of notice or contest, as to the priority, can arise between a creditor holding a judgment not docketed, and a party having no specific lien by mortgage, or any conveyance of title. Blydenburgh v. Northrop (1856) 13 How. Pr. 290; Foot v. Dillaye (1873) 65 Barb. 523.

And an amendment of the docket of a judgment made after the title of the judgment debtor had been devested in the due course of law does not operate to give a lien on the estate sold under a prior incumbrance. Sears v. Mack (1853) 2 Bradf.

409.

So a judgment properly entered, but irregularly docketed through the omission of the clerk, under the initial letter of the judgment debtor's Christian name, instead of the initial letter of his surname, has no priority to a subsequent judgment properly entered and docketed. Buchan v. Sumner, supra, distinguished in Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Dake (1876) 1 Abb. N. C. 301; Sears v. Mack, supra.

seized, and land conveyed to a partnership in its common or firm name cannot be levied upon under such an execution because as a partnership it has neither a legal title nor a perfect equity, the legal title being in the tenants in common as individuals and not subject to be forced out of them to meet partnership debts, except by proceedings in equity, which destroy pro tanto its character as land and convert it into personalty. Powers v. Robinson (1890) 90 Ala. 225.

Where the description of the parties to the deed identified the property as belonging to a partnership, but the conveyance was to the persons named their heirs and assigns, creating a legal title in joint tenancy, and the judgment was against the same persons as individuals, describing them in like manner as partners, the single bill being the act of each under hand and seal, it was held the judgment necessarily became a charge upon the legal title with a right to sell it upon exemptions, such judgment being a charge as against subse

us that the decree of the chancery court on | that said claim arose on account of trust funds this question was correct.

in said Moses' hands as a receiver in the case of Paul v. Knox, which he advanced to the firm of Moses Bros., of which he was a member, without taking the security required by the court; that Moses Bros. were indebted to said H. C. Moses for said advances at the time of the general assignment made by them

Let us now refer specially to the petition of Robert Goldthwaite, as receiver in the case of Paul v. Knox, in which it is stated that petitioner's claim had been adjudicated and allowed in this case, for $18,108.11, as a claim against the esstate of H. C. Moses; quent purchasers. Lauffer v. Cavett (1878) 87 Pa. 78 Ind, 590; Parker v. Bowles (1876) 57 N. H. 491; 479.

Where a suit is brought against copartners, or against the survivors of a partnership, it is not necessary to declare against or pray process as to all the members and to have a return of non est inventus as to those not served in order to bind their interest in the partnership effects, and in either case the judgments will end the partnership as to the partners sued and served as to their individual property and all the property of the partnership. Printup Bros. v. Turner (1880) 65 Ga. 71.

VI. The position of purchasers. The several members of a partnership firm cannot be regarded in law as holding real estate as tenants in common, unless it is conveyed to them as such by name, and each partner is required to Join in the conveyance of real estate in order to pass the entirety thereof to the purchaser, and therefore if one partner only executes a conveyance, whether in his own name or in that of the firm, the deed will not pass anything more than his own interest. Moreau v. Saffarans (1856) 3 Sneed, 695, 67 Am, Dec. 582.

a. From the firm.

The purchaser of an interest in the real estate of a partnership acquires the legal title and not a mere equity. McCauley v. Fulton (1872) 44 Cal. 362. While a copartnership is solvent and going on, the creditors, strictly speaking, have no equity against the assets of the partnership, and therefore a sale of any portion of the joint property to one of the partners bona fide and for valuable consideration will be valid against any claim by the partnership creditors. Waterman v. Hunt (1852) 2 R. I. 298.

Tarbell v. West (1881) 86 N. Y. 287; Hiscock v.
Phelps (1872) 49 N. Y. 97; Page v. Thomas (1885) 43
Ohio St. 38, 54 Am. Rep. 788; Cavander v. Bulteel
(1873) L. R. 9 Ch. App. 79, 43 L. J. Ch. 370, 29 L. T. N.
S. 710, 22 Week. Rep. 177.

In equity as well as at law. Buchan v. Sumner
(1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 165, 5 L. ed. 599, 47 Am. Dec. 305.
So if a bona fide purchaser is without informa-
tion equivalent to notice, of the existing equity,
on a new consideration paid for. Martin v. Wage-
ner (1873) 1 Thomp. & C. 509, 518.
And unless the record in the register of deed's
partnership property, or that the property is pur-
office indicates that the land is held by the firm as
chased jointly with partnership funds. Hammond
v. Paxton (1885) 58 Mich. 396.

One of two partners purchasing real estate with partnership funds, and subsequently selling it to which such partner is a member, and in point of a third party who transfers it to a corporation of fact a substantial owner, the transaction is not a

bona fide purchase. Maloy v. Associated Lace Makers' Co. (1890) 28 N. Y. S. R. 735.

Where real estate is conveyed to a firm in the firm name, and also to one partner in trust for the firm, the latter property being conveyed by a partner who died insolvent and indebted to the copartnership without personal representatives, nothing passes by the deed in the land conveyed to the firm so as to oust the claims of partnership creditors. Donaldson v. State Bank of Cape Fear (1827) 16 N, C. 103, 18 Am. Dec. 577.

A third party, who has purchased real estate from a partner, cannot be restrained by injunction issued in a suit between the partners for the liquidation and settlement of the partnership

Where real estate is conveyed to partners as ten-affairs, from using or enjoying such property ants in common, a purchaser who purchases in pending such partnership suit, where the sellgood faith without notice of the partnership ex- ing partner had not been proved to be indebted isting will be protected as against the claim of the to the other partner, such purchaser not being a partners and the partnership creditors. Tilling-member of the copartnership or connected therehast v. Champlin (1856) 4 R. I. 173, 67 Am. Dec. 510. with, even though it be alleged that such purAnd where a bona fide sale is made of the prop-chaser knew that the property was partnership erty of a firm by its members, before any proceed- estate. McKee v. Griffin (1871) 23 La. Ann. 417. ings, either in law or in equity, are instituted by a creditor of the firm, the latter cannot by any subsequent proceeding acquire a lien upon the property thus disposed of. Gwin v. Selby (1855) 5 Ohio

St. 96.

c. Of partner's interest. Partner's dealing in real estate taking title deeds

which makes them tenants in common, and containing on their face no evidence of the trust, and therefore not bound by the assignment of each

other for valuable consideration without notice.

If the property be parted with by sales severally made, neither party has the dominion or possession and there is nothing through which the equi- put it in the power of each other to circumvent ties of the creditors can work. McNutt v. Stray-upon their face, but incumbered with secret equi. innocent persons by the exhibition of titles clear horn (1861) 39 Pa. 269.

And a partner after receiving his proportion of the value of real estate belonging to the firm, cannot afterwards be permitted to urge his legal title to the prejudice of a bona fide purchaser, who has paid the value to the firm. Thomas v. Scott (1842) 8 Rob. (La.) 256.

b. From partner holding the legal title. If the legal title is vested in one partner a bona fde purchaser from him of the real estate without notice, either express or constructive, of its being partnership property, will be entitled to hold it free from any partnership claim, a court of law viewing it in general, according to the legal title. Hoxie v. Carr (1832) 1 Sumn. 173; McMillan v. Hadley (1881)

ties. Boyce v. Coster (1850) 4 Strobh, Eq. 25.

The purchaser of an interest in the real estate of a partnership acquires the legal title and not a mere equity, the title acquired being chargeable in equity with a lien in favor of the other partner, which can only be enforced in equity and is not recognizable at law, being simply an equitable right to have the property applied in payment of the partnership debts. McCauley v. Fulton (1872) 44 Cal. 362.

To the same effect, Coles v. Coles (1818) 15 Johns. 160, 8 Am. Dec. 231; Greene v. Graham (1831) 5 Ohio, 264; Ross v. Heintzen (1868) 36 Cal. 314; Blake v. Nutter (1841) 19 Me. 16; Peck v. Fisher (1851) 7 Cush. 387; Buchan v. Sumner (1847) 2 Barb. Ch. 193. 5 L