or take away all their functions. The diffi- | one of the cases this language is used: "The culty that attended the determination of the effect upon the whole state of abrogating local Allor Case, supra, was not that officers known government in a single city or township, by another name had undertaken to discharge and leaving everything to the unrestrained the functions, but that the attempt had been passions of bad men, would inevitably be made by the police officers, who had not pernicious beyond estimate." Youngblood v. been chosen by the locality. There has not Sexton, 32 Mich. 417, 20 Am. Rep. 654. Hapbeen for many years, in the city of Detroit, pily, such a contingency is a very remote one. an officer known as a "supervisor, ""commis- In Atty- Gen. v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 212-226, sioner of highways," or "overseer of high- 55 Am. Rep. 675, Mr. Justice Morse says: ways" but the functions of such officers have "The nearer the officers are to the people over been discharged by other officers, and no one whom they have control, the more easily and has ever questioned the right of substitution, readily are reached the evils that result from or charged that the constitution has been vi- political corruption, and the more speedy olated. A health board is, under our stat- and certain the cure. The form of our state utes, an organic incident of every township, government presupposes that the people of city, or village in the state. In the Mahaney each locality, each municipal district, or Case it was held that the police officers were political unit, are intelligent and virtuous state officers, yet in the Allor Case, supra, it enough to be fully capable of self-governwas held that they could not supplant the ment." Conceding that there exists, by imconstabulary; and in Detroit Board of Met- plication, the power to provide for such a ropolitan Police v. Wayne County Auditors, contingency, it is but an emergency power, supra, it was held that these officers could the exercise of which is sanctioned only by not police territory adjacent to the city of the emergency, and must then be provisional Detroit, and that the people of such territory only. It certainly was not intended that such could not be subjected to any delegated gov- power could be invoked to supplant our local ernmental powers not exercised by their own governmental system, or that, with the help representatives. Why not, if the people of of a mere fiction, there would be ingrafted the city of Detroit can be so subjected? Con- upon that system, as a permanent structural stables and sheriffs are charged with the pres- part thereof, a feature so utterly repugnant to ervation of order, yet, in respect of the mode the whole theory of local self-g -government. of their selection, the constitution makes no I regard the doctrine of the Mahaney Case as distinction between these officers and town- utterly inconsistent with the principles unship clerks or registers of deeds. The legis- derlying the subsequent decisions of this lature is authorized to organize counties as court, a few only of which have been referred well as cities and villages, and boards of su to, and am of opinion that the case should pervisors are empowered to organize town not be regarded as authority upon the quesships. When organized, each derives its pow. tion raised here. ers, as to the selection of its officers, from the constitution, and not from the legislature, or the board of supervisors. Section 14, arti. cle 15, expressly provides that "judicial offi cers of cities and villages shall be elected, and all other officers shall be elected or appointed, at such time and in such manner as the legislature may direct." By this provision the constitutional guaranties accorded to townships and counties, respecting the matter of 1. local self-government, are extended to cities and villages. It seems to me very clear that the theory of the constitution is to organize. these local subdivisions as constituent gov. ernmental entities, to invest them with the largest measure of function and responsibil ity, to bring representatives and constituency into close relations, and thus secure to the officer the largest measure of moral support in the discharge of his duties, and to the locality, being the most directly interested, and having the best means of information, the right of selection and rejection. I am aware that officers may become derelict in the performance of their duties, but under the constitution the legislature may provide for the removal of any officer elected by a county, township, or school district; and there is no doubt of the power to provide for the removal by the governor of any officer of any municipality, in the discharge of whose functions the state has a special interest. The constitution itself points out the remedy in such case. But it may be said that a community may become incapable of self-government, and in See also 44 L. R. A. 716. DETROIT, GRAND HAVEN & MIL- v. City of GRAND RAPIDS. (........Mich.........). Railroad property cannot be sold for street assessments. A railroad right of way cannot be benefited by the opening and paving of a street across it so as to subject it to an assessment for such improvement. (Hooker, J., and McGrath, Ch. J., dissent.) (July 2, 1895.) APPEAL by complainant from a decree of The facts are stated in the opinion. The land, being necessary to the enjoyment of the franchise, is not subject to sale. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids 102 Mich. 374. NOTE. For note on the liability of railroads to assessments for public improvements, see Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Milwaukee (Wis.) ante, 249. By the charter of the city (title V. § 21), this property is not assessable for this improve ment unless it, the property assessed, is deemed to be specially benefited (Charter Grand Rap ids, title VI. §§ 4, 15). No benefit received by the owner in respect of some other parcel outside the assessment district would be sufficient. No general benefit to the railroad company or to its franchise would be proximate enough to warrant it if any such benefit existed. Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63. The benefit must be of such kind as to benefit now the property for the uses in which it now serves the public. New York & N. H. R. Co. v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 534. Special assessments are made upon the assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially and peculiarly benefited in the enhancement of the value of property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds. Cooley, Taxn. p. 606; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 386, 34 Am. Rep. 451; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 705, 28 L. ed.571. The assessment of property for a local improvement without or beyond its enhancement is pro tanto the taking of private property for public use. Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 519, 90 Am. Dec. 634; Williams v. Detroit,2 Mich. 560; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 161; Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids, 92 Mich. 564; Jones v. Detroit Water Comrs. 34 Mich. 275; Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Mich. 435; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 43, 2 Am. Rep. 76; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 26. Railroad property generally exempt from taxation is also exempt from special assessments except where specially benefited. Cooley, Taxn. 650, 651; 2 Rorer, Railroads, p. 1492, notes 2, 3; Dill, Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 752, note, p. 921. Right of way not specially benefited is not assessable. Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 33 Pa. 41: Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 424; Pittsburgh's Petition, 138 Pa. 424; State v. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 331; New York & II. R. Co. v. Morrisania Trustees, 7 Hun, 652; Bloomington v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 134 Ill. 451; Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Ansonia, 61 Conn. 76; Re Commissioners of Public Parks, 47 Hun, 304. Where the property is such as cannot be sold to pay special assessment, and no provision is made to collect the assessment, it is reasonable to suppose the legislature did not intend the property should be assessed. Big Rapids v. Mecosta County Suprs. 99 Mich. 351; Bloomington v. Chicago & A. R. Co. supra; Mount Pleasant v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 11 L. R. A. 520, 138 Pa. 365; New York & H. R. Co. v. Morrisania Trustees, supra; Allegheny City v. Western Pennsylvania R. Co. 138 Pa. 375; Re Commissioners of Public Parks, supra. Although courts will not generally interfere, except in a case of plain abuse of sound discretion, yet where property assessed is so situated that it cannot possibly receive any benefit, they would interfere to prevent the wrong. Oregon & C. R. Co. v. Portland, 22 L. R. A. 713, 25 Or. 229; Hanscom v. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37; Poulsen v. Portland, 1 L. R. A. 673, 16 Or. 450; State v. Brill (Minn.) 59 N. W. Rep. 989; Fifty fourth Street, 165 Pa. 8. Mr. William Wisner Taylor for appellee. Grant, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant city opened North Lafayette street across the complainant's right of way. The railroad bed, which is 100 feet wide, crosses the street at an angle of less than 45 degrees. An assessment district was established by the common council, on which was assessed the cost of the pavement, under a charter requiring assessments according to benefits received. The defendant included in this district the complainant's right of way to the distance of 100 feet on each side of the street. It divided this into three parcels, fixing the values at $1,000, $480, and $600, respectively. More than one twentieth of the entire cost was assessed to complainant. The assessment on the $1,000 piece was $569; on the $480 piece, $373; and on the $600 piece, $63. It thus appears that on one piece nearly 80 per cent of its entire value was assessed as benefits, and on another piece more than 50 per cent. 1. The first question is settled by the case of Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 102 Mich. 374, which holds that railroad property cannot be sold for these assessments. 2. The right of way so assessed contains the main track and one side track. It has nothing else upon it, and is used for no other purpose. It has already been dedicated to a public use. and the question is presented whether a railroad right of way can be assessed by municipal corporations for public improvements. So far from being any benefit, it is established by the evidence that the opening and paving of the street were a damage to the complainant. A right of way cannot be benefited by the opening and pav. ing of a street across it. None of the buildings of the complainant are within two blocks of this crossing. We can see no bene. fits. immediate or prospective, to the complainant. The division of the right of way into three parcels was arbitrary, as were also the valuations and supposed benefits. The point is so clearly and concisely stated by the court of Pennsylvania that we quote the opinion in Philadelphia v. Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co., 33 Pa. 43: "The municipal authorities paved the Gray's Ferry road for a considerable distance, at a place where it lies side by side with the defendants' railroad, and now seck to charge them with the half of the cost of it; but they cannot do it. Their claim has no foundation either in the letter of the law, or in its spirit, or in the form of the remedy. Not in the letter, because the defendants do not own the land sought to be charged, and have only their right of way over it. Not in the spirit, because the paving laws are means of compulsory con. tribution among the common sharers in a common benefit, and as a railroad cannot, from its very nature, derive any benefit from the paving, while all the rest of the neighborhood may, we cannot presume that the compulsion was intended to be applied to them. Not in the form of the remedy, because the execution of this sort of claim is levari facias, a writ not commonly allowed against corporations, and which would hardly produce much when directed against a public right of way. It would be strange legisla tion that would authorize the soil of one public road to be taxed, in order to raise funds to make or improve a neighboring one." The same doctrine is held in Junction R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 424; State v. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 331; New York & H. R. Co. v. Morrisania Trustees, 7 Hun, 652; Bloomington v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 134 Ill. 451; Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63; South Park Comrs. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 107 Ill. 105; New York & N. H. R. Co. v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 534. Decree is reversed, and decree entered in this court for complainant in accordance with the prayer, with the costs of both courts. said to be equally apparent that there are none in the latter. The charter of the city of Grand Rapids provides for local assessment of the cost of street improvements. The council determines the amount to be assessed, and the assessment district, and the board of review act as commissioners to make the assessment. Charter 1891, title 6, §§ 4-6. Notice of the assessment by publication is provided for, and the council hears appeals. Id. SS 8-10. Apparently all proceedings in this case were regular, and complainant's right to relief depends upon the jurisdiction of the board of review and council to act in the premises upon its land. It is said that there is no jurisdiction in cases where the land is occupied for railway purposes and is used only for tracks. In other words, where the premises will not be benefited the proceedings are said to be void for want of jurisdiction. If we could say, as a legal proposition, that all railroad lands are exempt from assessments, or that all such lands except depot grounds are exempt, then we might say that this land should have been excluded from the assessment district by the council as not subject to assessment. But we have held that railroad lands are subject to local burdens where benefited, and whether benefited or not, and how much, are ques tions of fact. The owner has the right to a hearing upon appeal when he feels aggrieved at the assessment, but, unless we are to say that all persons who think that their property is not benefited may ask the court of chancery to review the decision of the commissioners and council upon the facts, the determination of the council must be considered final upon the subject. To hold that there is no jurisdiction where there are no benefits would make the jurisdiction of the board depend upon whether a court of chancery could be induced, under different proofs, to differ from the board in its opinion as to benefits. This land was determined to be a part of the assessment district by the council. It was their province to determine that question. The board determined that it would be benefited. This was within their prescribed duties, and was subject to an appeal, which complainant did not avail itself It is insisted that the complainant's land of. If it was a fict that the premises were is not subject to assessment for the improve benefited, complainant's land should be asment, and that for that reason also the com- sessed; if not, it should not have been. plainant is entitled to the relief asked. The decision of this question by the tribunal to case of Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Grand which it was confided should be final. South Rapids holds that the premises involved in Park Comrs. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. suthat case were subject to assessment for street pra; Brown v. Grand Rapids, 83 Mich. 107. improvement. The difference between that The decree of the superior court should be case and this is that in that the lands adjoin-reversed, and a decree entered here perpeting the street improved were used for depot ually restraining the sale of the premises purposes, while in this they were used for named in the bill of complaint. Long and Montgomery, JJ., concurred. Hooker, J., dissenting: The city of Grand Rapids caused an assessment for paving a street to be made upon two pieces of land forming a portion of the complainant's road bed, and the bill in this cause was filed to restrain a sale of the parcels for such assessment. The complainant's right of way crosses the street, and 100 feet in length of said right of way on each side of the street was included in the assessment district. The bill was dismissed, and the complainant has appealed. The decision in the recent case of Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 102 Mich. 374, is conclusive of this case to the extent that the premises assessed cannot be sold upon proceedings to collect the amount of said assessment. no other purpose but the roadbed, consisting The of the main track and one siding, and while McGrath, Ch. J., concurred with Hookthe benefits to the former are apparent, it is ler, J. 28 L. R. A. TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT. Sallie T. DUGGER et al., . for Use of SE- | Fisher, 9 Baxt. 239; Brown v. Haywood, 4 อ. Heisk. 360; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554, 24 Am. Dec. 511; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 492, 39 Am. Dec. 189; McKinney v. Memphis Over MECHANICS & TRADERS' INS. CO. ton Hotel Co. 12 Heisk. 104; Daly v. State, OF NEW ORLEANS, Appt. 1. The court will not construe as re trospective Acts 1893, chap. 107, § 1, making void stipulations limiting liability on insurance policies to less than the full amount of loss if that does not exceed the amount of insurance. 2. The equal protection of the laws is not denied by Acts 1893, chap. 107, § 1, making void all stipulations in insurance policies limiting liability to less than the full amount of loss if this does not exceed the amount of insurance. 3. Disseisin of privileges or deprivation of property otherwise than by the law of the land or due process of law contrary to Const., art. 1, § 8, or U. S. Const., 14th Amend.. § 1, is not made by Acts 1893, chap. 107, § 1, making void all stipulations in insurance policies which limit liability to less than the full amount of loss if this does not exceed the amount of in surance. 13 Lea, 232; Woodward v. Brien, 14 Lea, 522; Green v. State, 15 Lea, 708; Burkholtz v. State, 16 Lea, 72; Neely v. State, 4 Lea, 316; Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn. 272. For a full and able discussion of this sub ject, we also refer the court to the case of Lowe V. Rees Printing Co., decided by the supreme court of Nebraska, June 6, 1894, and reported in 24 L. R. A. 702, 41 Neb. 127. Chapter 107 of the Acts of 1893 is violative of the constitution in that it deprives, or undertakes to deprive, insurance companies and persons who effect insurance on their property of their liberty of making contracts, and in this way is a deprivation of a right of property without due process of law. Stratton v. Morris, supra; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 22 L. R. A. 340, 147 Ill. 66. Also Low v. Rees Printing Co. supra; Frorer v. People, 16 L. R. A. 492, 141 Ill. 171; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 640. Messrs. Stokes & Stokes and Sam Holding also for appellant. Messrs. Haynes & Hays, for appellees: Where a statute is founded on public policy, party cannot waive its provisions even by express contract. a Wis. 449, 28 Am. Rep. 552; Queen Ins. Co. v. Reilly v. Franklin Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 48 Leslie, 9 L. R. A. 49, 47 Ohio St. 409. contracts in any but a prescribed manner, they Where a statute prohibits the making of are, of course, void if made in any other. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 455, p. 648. A contract is illegal when it is opposed to public policy, or violates provisions of a public statute. Stevenson v. Ewing, 87 Tenn. 47; Ohio Life APPEAL by defendant from a decree of the Ins. & T. Co. v. Merchants Ins. & T. Co. 11 Chancery Court for Madison County in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover the amount alleged to be due on a policy of fire insurance. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Thomas Steele, for appellant: The exception in favor of those who insure cotton in bales is a partial and discriminating provision in favor of persons who do that class of insurance, and it cannot be separated from the body of the act without very ma. terially changing its scope; and, therefore, this provision taints the whole, and makes the entire statute void. Stratton v. Morris, 12 L. R. A. 70, 89 Tenn. 497. The classification is equally as arbitrary as that condemned by the supreme court inMorgan v. Reed, 2 Head, 276; Memphis v. NOTE.-As to prospective operation of statute, see authorities collected in note to Stewart v. Van dervort (W. Va.) 12 L. R. A. 50. For a construction of statutes making insurance policies valued, see note to Havens v. Germania F. Ins. Co. (Mo.) 28 L. R. A. 107. See also 35 L. R. A. 227. Humph. 1, 53 Am. Dec. 742; City Bank of New Haven v. Perkins, 29 N. Y. 554, 86 Am. Dec. 332: Schmidt v. Barker, 17 La. Ann. 261, 87 Am. Dec. 527; Bowman v. Gonegal, 19 La. Ann. 328. 92 Am. Dec. 537; Tatum v. Kelley, 25 Ark. 209, 94 Am. Dec. 717. A contract prohibited by law is void. Persons v. Jones, 12 Ga. 371, 58 Am. Dec. 476; Rice v. Maxwell, 13 Smedes & M. 289, 53 Am. Dec. 85; Milton v. Haden, 32 Ala. 30, 70 Am. Dec. 523; Hervey v. Moseley, 7 Gray, 179, 66 Am. Dec. 515. Courts indulge every reasonable intendment favorable to the constitutionality of a public statute. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 90 Tenn. 466. States may prescribe conditions upon which foreign corporations may do business within their limits. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. 130 U. S. 396, 32 L. ed. 979; Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co. 1 Fed. Rep. 475; Home Ins. Co. of New York 7. Morse, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 456, 22 L. ed. 370; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. of New York, 94 U. S. 539, 24 L. ed. 151. Mr. E. H. Hatcher, also for appellees: A foreign corporation is not an individual or a citizen, within the meaning of any constitutional provision, except where there is a question of jurisdiction involved. Hope Ins. Co. of Providence v. Boardman, 9 U. S. 5 Cranch, 57, 3 L. ed. 36; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 177, 19 L. ed. 359; Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Francis, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 215, 20 L. ed. 78; Fire Asso. of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 30 L. ed. 342; State v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co. 17 L. R. A. 856, 18 R. I.-; Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 24 L. R. A. 504, 86 Tex. 654; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 23 L. R. A. 264, 58 Ark. 407; Com. v. Wilson, 56 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 230. The act in question is not class legislation, aside from the fact that it applies to corporations, or rather, in this case, to a foreign cor poration. Fire A880. of Philadelphia v. New York, State v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co., Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. v. Chowning, and Leep v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. R. Co. supra; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am. Rep. 129; Truss v. State, 13 Lea, 311; State v. Schlemmer, 10 L. R. A. 135, 42 La. Ann. 1166; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145; Summerville v. Pressley, 8 L. R. A. 854, 33 S. C. 56; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. Wallace, 11 L. R. A. 789, 136 Ill. 87; Hancock v. Yaden, 6 L. R. A. 576, 121 Ind. 366; Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380; Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 17 L. R. A. 385, 36 W. Va. 802; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis (Tex.) 17 L. R. A. 286; McCandless v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 18 L. R. A. 440, 33 S. C. 103. In Parks v. Parks, 12 Heisk. 633, an act was held valid giving to cotton brokers a special lien upon cotton sold by them. In Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 376, a statute was held valid which prohibited persons from contracting for or speculating in witness fees, or buying them at less than their face value; but such fees as were traded for merchandise or hotel bills were excluded from the operation of the act. See also Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 9 Tenn. 469; Cook v. State, 13 L. R. A. 183, 90 Tenn. 407; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 494; State v. Rauscher, 1 Lea, 97. The legislative competency to regulate the power of contracting was vigorously upheld in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. pp. 480, 481. Fourteen states have passed laws making all insurance policies what are known as "valued policies," by which it is enacted that when a policy is issued on real property, and there is a total loss without the fault of the assured, the amount of the loss is conclusively estab lished by the amount of the policy itself. Richards, Ins. pp. 572, 573. These various statutes have invariably been upheld whenever brought before the courts. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Ill. v. Eddy, 19 L. R. A. 707, 36 Neb. 461; 1 May, Ins 3d ed. 31 a. p. 51; Havens v. Germania F. Ins. Co. 26 L. R. A. 107, 123 Mo. 403. Even if this exemption of cotton in bales were invalid, it would not affect the validity of the other portion of the act. Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. pp. 209-214; Tillman v. Cocke, 9 Baxt. 429; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 23 L. R. A. 264, 58 Ark. 407; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 506; Miller v. American Mut. Acc. Ins. Co. 20 L. R. A. 756, 92 Tenn. 172. Where the language of an act might be construed to operate in præsenti, in which case it would be unconstitutional, or in future, in which case it would be constitutional, the latter is imperative upon the courts. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, §§ 82, 178, 181; Broom, Legal Maxims, 8th ed. *36; | Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 77: Dewart v. Purdy, 29 Pa. 113; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552, 30 Am. Rep. 244. Messrs. Lynn & Lynn also for appellees. Beard, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant is a foreign insurance company which, having complied with the requirements of chapter 122 of the Acts of the Legislature of 1891, and doing business in this state, delivered in 1894 to the complainant in Tennessee the fire insurance policy in controversy. The property covered by this policy was burned while it was in operation, and the insurer declining to pay the full amount of the loss, as claimed, the assured filed the bill in this cause. The defendant company admitted its liability for three fourths of this loss, and with its answer tendered and paid into the lower court the amount conceded to be due; but it insisted that it was under no other or further obligation, on account of a clause in the policy which is as follows: "It is a part of the consideration of this policy, and the basis upon which the rate of premium is fixed, that in the event of loss this company shall not be liable for an amount greater than three fourths of the actual cash value of the property covered by this policy at the time of such loss; and in case of other insurance, whether policies are concurrent or not, then for its pro rata proportion of such threefourths value." On the other hand, the complainant contended that this stipulation was inoperative and void, by reason of section 1, chapter 107, of the Acts of the General Assembly of Tennessee passed at the session of 1893, and which is in words and figures as follows: "Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Tennessee, that insurance companies shall pay their policy holders the full amount of loss sustained upon property insured by them; provided, said amount of loss does not exceed the amount of insurance expressed in the policy; and all stipulations in such policies to the contrary are, and shall be, null and void; provided however, that insurance policies upon cotton in bales shall not be subject to the provisions of this act. This act was assailed by the defendant company in the court below as unconstitutional. The chancellor, however, held that the act was constitutionally passed, and that its legal ef fect was to make null and void the clause in the policy set out above. He therefore gave complainant a decree for the full amount of the loss, less the sum admitted and paid into the registry of the court below. The case |