this letter without assuring you that I verily believe when the french shall see you are positively resolved to attack the lines, they will not dare to defend them; for should they be forced between Antwerp. and Lierre, their army must be lost; and how fatal that must be to France, you can best judge. I am confident if you miss this occasion, you will repent it when it is too late." * New obstructions, however, resulted from the recent failure. A vehement dispute arose among the dutch generals, who strove to throw on each other the blame of their ill success. Opdam laboured to extenuate his own culpable negligence and want of spirit; while Slangenberg, proud of his gallantry and good fortune, redoubled his invectives against all who had incurred his envy; and even presumed to accuse Marlborough of having exposed the dutch troops to defeat, from the mean and selfish motive of jealousy. A quarrel equally violent arose also between Slangenberg and Cohorn, while employed in arrangements for the march of the troops from Lillo. Cohorn, in, a fit of resentment, again quitted the army, and the command devolved on Slangenberg, At this period Marlborough returned to his army, to watch the motions of Villeroy, who, being joined by Boufflers and a reinforcement under Bedmar, had quitted his lines, and advanced to Sandhofen. To maintain the communication with the forces about Lillo, which was in some degree affected by this movement, the british commander, Camp at Thielen, July 4-15. 1703. on the 7th, transferred his camp to Vorstelar; and the french, drawing still nearer to Antwerp, established themselves in the strong position of St. Job. While Marlborough was labouring to sooth the resentment of Cohorn*, new difficulties arose in another quarter; for instead of the encouragement and support which he expected from the pensionary, he received from him a letter, testifying his fears respecting the intended attack on the lines, and his unwillingness to incur the responsibility attached to the attempt. On this epistle Marlborough observes, "The factions are so great in Holland that the pensionary dares not take any thing upon himself, so that I fear at last things will go wrong for want of a government." + in He was too tenacious of his purpose to yield either to the alarms of his friends, or the contentions and jealousies of those on whom he was obliged to depend. By importunity, he at length extorted the consent of the dutch government for the two armies to unite, and attack the enemy the position of St. Job. With this view he moved on the 22d of July from Vorstelar to Brecht. Being," he writes to lord Godolphin, march to-morrow, I begin to write this day, but shall not seal it till I come to the next camp, which is intended to be at Brecht, it being about half a league from the french camp. Our design is, that the troops at Lillo should march at the same time, we do, and join us on Tuesday morning early, on 66 * Letter to Godolphin, Vorstelar, July 8–19. 66 to the heath, in order to attack the french in their camp, which some pretend to think they will stay in, they having fortified it; but I take it for granted that as soon as they know of our march, they will retire behind their lines; for although they are stronger than we did imagine they could have been, when we shall be joined, we shall be much stronger than they." After noticing the neglect of the dutch commanders, in making the requisite preparations, he continues: "These things make me believe that the attempt is not in earnest intended, although from the Hague they seem very desirous of it, and have given orders to their deputies, that joined the army two days ago, to use their utmost diligence to get all things ready for the attack. I shall be able by my next to let you know positively how far this matter will be attempted; for after our joining upon Tuesday, we shall be so near the lines, that we shall hardly have any forage; so that we must force the lines, or march from them." In a postscript, written when he had reached the camp, he concludes: "I am very glad I wrote thus far yesterday; for I am so tired, having been near fourteen hours on horseback, that I should not have been able to have writ. The french have not marched yet, but I believe they will this night. We shall begin our march at three to-morrow morning; so that, about seven, I hope we shall join the army at Lillo, after which we shall march directly to them, if they continue in their camp. But you may be very much at your ease; for I think it is one thousand to one they do not stay, for they can be behind their lines in one hour's march." Marlborough, in conformity with this determination, moved on the 23d of July at three in the morning, and advancing at the head of the cavalry, reached the great heath of Antwerp, where signals were made for the junction of Slangenberg with the troops from Lillo. But at this moment a heavy smoke rising from the camp of the enemy, announced their retreat behind their lines. At ten, Slangenberg appeared, and Marlborough riding forward with an escort of six squadrons, held a conference with him, to settle the disposition of the forces. The junction being effected, the two armies encamped, that of Marlborough between Campthout and Westdown, and that of Slangenberg at Capelle. As the enemy had declined a battle in the open ground, it was now necessary to adopt a resolution for an attack on their lines. For this purpose a council of war was held at Campthout, the head quarters: all the former objections and difficulties were revived and again discussed; and after a warm debate of five hours, no conclusion was adopted. "I was forced to end it," says the commander, by desiring that each of them would put their opinions in writing, against nine to-morrow morning. I see enough, I think, to be sure the lines will not be attacked, and that we shall return to the Meuse. I intend to go out tomorrow morning, with a body of horse, in hopes to get near enough to view the lines." 66 The result of all these deliberations and delays, when it was necessary to act, will be naturally anticipated. The timid and cautious spirits, who had terrified themselves with imaginary difficulties, were not tempted to encounter real obstacles, even by the prospect of decisive success. We describe the event of all these movements and deliberations, in his own words. "On Friday I went with 4000 horse to see the lines. They let us come so near, that we beat their out-guard home to their barrier, which gave us an opportunity of seeing the lines; which had a fosse of twenty-seven feet broad before them, and the water in it nine feet deep; so that it is resolved that the army return to the Meuse, and in the first place take Huy. Upon the whole matter, if we cannot bring the french to a battle, we shall not do any thing worth being commended. My letter of the 8th, which began with Sir, and was directed by Cardonnel, was intended for you, but was writ by candle-light, as this is; and my eyes are so bad, that I do not see what I do; so that I hope you will excuse me, that I do not answer all in your two letters of the 9th and 13th. We shall begin to march from hence on Thursday.' Marlborough now measured back his steps to the Meuse, to effect the reduction of Huy, which, though small, was considered as a post of some importance, because it covered Liege, opened the navigation of the Meuse, and facilitated an attack on Namur. He returned nearly in the same direc * To lord Godolphin, Campthout, July 15-26. and 19–30. 1703. |