1832. GIBB บ. MATHER. the Plaintiffs below proved, that they were partners together in trade, and holders of this bill of exchange, which was as follows:-"Liverpool, 27th of September 1828, four months after date, pay to the order of myself in London 175l. 10s. value received in timber. Duncan Gibb. To Messrs. Chapman and Fairclough, Liverpool. Payable in London." The bill was accepted as follows: "Accepted at Messrs. Jones, Lloyd, and Co. bankers, London. Chapman and Fairclough." And indorsed as follows: "P. pro Duncan Gibb. John Kempster." The signature Duncan Gibb to the bill was proved to be the handwriting of the Defendant below; and the acceptance of the bill by Messrs. Chapman and Fairclough, the handwriting of Thomas Fairclough, one of the partners in the firm of Messrs. Chapman and Fairclough. The Defendant below himself presented the bill for acceptance to the said Thomas Fairclough, and himself received back the bill from the said Thomas Fairclough so accepted as above stated. The indorsement "P. pro Duncan Gibb. John Kempster," was the handwriting of the said John Kempster, who, when he so indorsed the bill, was duly authorized by the Defendant below to indorse it on behalf of the Defendant below. The bill was presented at Liverpool to the said acceptors Messrs. Chapman and Fairclough for payment, on the 30th day of January 1829, on which day the bill had accrued due, and the said acceptors then and there refused to pay the same; and notice was given on the same 30th of January 1829, by the Plaintiffs below to the Defendant below of the presentment of the bill to the said acceptors, and of their refusal to pay the These facts were also admitted by the counsel for the Defendant below. Parke J. then delivered his opinion to the jury, that the said several matters so produced and given in evidence and admitted to be true, same. were were sufficient to entitle the Plaintiffs below to a verdict, and with that direction left the case to the jury, who found for the Plaintiffs below. A bill of exceptions having been tendered to the above direction of the learned Judge, it was now argued by The Plaintiffs F. Kelly for the Defendant below. below have no claim on the Defendant below, unless they conform to the contract into which he has entered. That contract is expressly to pay in London. Formerly, when the acceptor of a bill of exchange ac- cepted it payable at a particular place, the Court of King's Bench held that such an acceptance was an expansion, not a qualification of his liability to pay every where; that a demand might be made on him in the particular place in question in addition to all other places in which he might be found; but that, as he was liable in all places, it was not necessary to aver or prove a demand at the particular place in question. The Court of Common Pleas, on the other hand, held that the designation of a particular place of payment was a qualification of the contract, and that, therefore, a demand at such a place must be averred and proved. The House of Lords in Rowe v. Young (a) decided that the Court of Common Pleas had put the true construction on such a contract, but immediately passed an act of parliament, rendering the liability of an acceptor such as it had been expounded by the Court of King's Bench, unless to the designation of a particular place of payment in his acceptance he added the words, "and not elsewhere;" which words not being found in the acceptance of this bill, the acceptance is a general acceptance: that act, however, 1 & 2 G. 4. c. 78., is, by its title, preamble, (a) 2 Brod. & Bingh. 165. where see all the authorities col lected. and 1832. GIBB V. MATHER. 1832. GIBB V. MATHER. and enactments, confined to the case of acceptor. Now, in the case of a drawer of a bill of exchange, or maker of a promissory note, the Court of King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas always concurred in holding, that the mention of a particular place of payment in the body of such instrument was an essential part of the contract imperative on the holder, who must therefore aver and prove a demand at that place in order to charge the drawer or maker. Sanderson v. Bowes (a), Roach v. Campbell. (b) It may be said that the bill in this case having been accepted generally before it was issued by the drawer, the latter has given currency to such general acceptance, and therefore is estopped to object that demand has not been made at the particular place specified. But though an acceptor may by apt words limit his own responsibility, or make it differ from the contract of the drawer, as by accepting at a longer date, or for a part only of the sum mentioned in the bill, no case can be found in which he has been allowed, under any circumstances, to enlarge the responsibility of the drawer. The fact, therefore, of the drawer's having issued the bill with this acceptance on it, may shew that he did not object to the expansion of the acceptor's liability, but is no proof that he consented to the expansion of his own. Roscoe, contrà. The statute 1 & 2 G. 4. c. 78. enacts, that an acceptance such as the present shall be deemed a general acceptance to all intents and purposes. Now those words would be superfluous, and a main object of the statute would be defeated, if a demand which would be sufficient as against the acceptor, should be held insufficient as against the drawer. In Selby v. Eden (c) a bill of exchange was, by the drawer, made (b) 3 Campb. 247. (c) 3 Bingh. 611. payable (a) 14 East, 500. payable in London and there accepted; and yet it was held that averment or proof of presentment in London was unnecessary; and in Fayle v. Bird (a) that decision was confirmed. F. Kelly. The cases referred to are both actions against the acceptor; and in Fayle v. Bird Lord Tenterden nonsuited the plaintiff for want of a due presentment, though he afterwards acceded to the authority of Selby v. Eden for the sake of uniformity. : Cur. adv. vult. TINDAL C. J. This was an action by the indorsees against the drawer of a bill of exchange after nonpayment by the acceptor. Upon the trial of the cause it appeared, upon production of the bill, that the drawer, in the body of the bill, required the drawees to pay to the order of himself "in London," the sum mentioned therein that the bill was addressed to Messrs. Chapman and Fairclough, Liverpool, with the additional words "payable in London," and that it was by them accepted at "Messrs. Jones, Lloyd and Co. bankers, London." It appeared further, that on the day the bill became due, it was presented for payment to the acceptors at Liverpool, who refused payment, and that due notice of such refusal was given to the Defendant below. The learned Judge, who tried the cause, directed the jury that the evidence above stated was sufficient to entitle the Plaintiffs below to recover, and the jury found their verdict accordingly for the Plaintiffs below. The propriety of this direction now comes before us upon a bill of exceptions tendered by the Defendant below; and the question raised for our consideration is this, Whether in an action against the drawer of the bill above set (a) 6 B. & C. 531. forth, 1832. GIBB V. MATHER. 1832. GIBB บ. MATHER. forth, on the ground of nonpayment by the acceptor, it is, or is not, necessary to prove a presentment for payment at the banking house in London where the same is made specially payable by the acceptance. And we are all of opinion that such special presentment is necessary, in order to enable the holder to recover against the drawer of the bill. Before the passing of the statute 1 & 2 G. 4. c. 78., it was a subject of considerable doubt in the courts of law whether, in the case of a bill drawn generally, but accepted payable specially at a particular place, an action could be maintained against the acceptor, without averring in the declaration, and proving at the trial a presentment for payment at the place where the drawee had by his acceptance made the bill payable. Upon that point the Court of Common Pleas had held a presentment of the bill at the place named in the acceptance to be necessary, on the ground that it was a qualified acceptance only; the Court of King's Bench, on the contrary, had held it was unnecessary to make any such presentment, on the ground that the acceptance was a general acceptance, with a mere intimation of a place of payment, if the holder thought proper to apply there. The conflicting opinions of the two Courts upon that point were set at rest before the passing of the statute, by the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of Rowe v. Young (a), by which judgment the opinion held by the Court of Common Pleas was decided to be the law of the land. But the doubt which had been formed, was confined to the case where the question arose between the holder and the acceptor; in cases between the indorsee and the drawer, upon a special acceptance by the drawee, no (a) 2 B. & B. 165. doubt |