1831. POWELL บ. EASON. sequently to the discharge of the insolvent, and there are no words in the act which relieve the insolvent from such a claim. The relief is confined to debts due at the time of the discharge. As to debts to become due by bond, annuity, or otherwise, the fifty-first section, which applies to them, cannot include a debt like this, for it says the Court shall ascertain their value, regard being had to the original price given for such sum or sums of money, deducting therefrom such diminution in the value thereof as shall have been caused by the lapse of time since the grant thereof to the time of filing such prisoner's petition." 66 ALDERSON J. The fifty-first section was meant to benefit annuity creditors, by enabling them to claim for the whole amount, instead of the mere arrears due at the time of the discharge. Rule discharged. Nov. 12. Defendant, upon certain terms favour able to Plain tiff, was al THORNE v. Marquess of LONDONderry. THIS cause, an action for an assault on a female ser vant, was entered for trial by a common jury at the sittings after last Trinity term; it was twice called on late in the day, and as often postponed on the reprea special jury sentation of the Defendant's counsel, that it would occupy after the cause a long time. The cause having been made a remanet lowed to have had stood for trial by a com- to this term, the Defendant now obtained a rule for a mon jury dur- special jury; which rule ing a whole sittings, and had been twice postponed at the instance of the Defendant. Wilde Serjt. moved to discharge, on the authority of the rule of Court, which requires that the rule for a special special jury be served two days before the adjournment day after each term (a). The application should have been made before the adjournment day of the last sittings. Jones Serjt., on the part of the Defendant, offered judgment of the term, the production of certain witnesses, and other facilities to the Plaintiff, as the condition of retaining the special jury. These terms were not acceded to; but The Court allowed the Defendant to retain his special jury upon condition of his fixing the cause for trial on a certain day, giving judgment of the term, and bringing up certain witnesses required by the Plaintiff. Rule to set aside the rule for a special jury (a) R. T. 52 G. 3. 4 Taunt. 600. 1831. THORNE ບ Marquess of Mayor and Corporation of NORWICH v. GILL. Nov. 16. THE sheriffs and coroners of Norwich being members Practice. of the corporation, Taddy Serjt. moved that the Court would enjoin the prothonotary to approve or appoint elisors to whom. process should be directed; the prothonotary thinking he could not do so without an order from the Court. The Court acceded to the application, and made the rule absolute in the first instance. Rule absolute. Elisors. 1831. Nov. 16. Practice. SCRUTON v. DAWSON. JONES Serjt., upon the usual affidavit, moved to change the venue from London to the city of Norwich, unless the Plaintiff would consent to try in the county of Norfolk; but The Court refused to accede to the application, except on an affidavit disclosing special grounds for it, and Jones (a) See Walton v. Hutton, 1 Chitty's Rep. 14., and 1 Tidď's Pr. 655. (8th ed.) in not. Also I Took nothing. (a) 15 Petersdorff's Ab. tit. Venue, in not. Nov. 16. WILLIAMS v. LEWSEY. As against an EXECUTION being issued in this cause against the execution Defendant's goods, the sheriff, before the goods creditor, a landlord is en- were sold, received notice from the Defendant's landtitled to a full lord to retain 450l. for a year's rent. year's rent, although he has been used to remit some portion of it to his tenant. The sheriff, under an indemnity, refused to retain more than 360%, on the ground that the landlord had abated his rent to that amount. On a motion calling on the sheriff to pay over the 450%. to the Defendant's landlord out of the proceeds of the Defendant's goods, the landlord deposed, that though on account of hard times he had made a voluntary reduction in the Defendant's rent, yet he always considered himself entitled to demand the full amount, and and gave his half-year's receipt for "1807. in satisfaction of 2251.," whereupon, TINDAL C. J. said it was a very clear case. The landlord was not bound to make an abatement to the tenant's creditors, because he had chosen to make an abatement to the tenant. 1831. WILLIAMS v. LEWSEY. Rule absolute. Wilde Serjt. for the landlord; Andrews Serjt. for the sheriff. BRIDGES, Widow, v. SMYTH, Spinster. Same v. Same. Nov. 16. judgment for Plaintiff in this Court might be set MRS. BRIDGES had judgment in this Court in Held, that a the above two actions to the amount of 8167. 15s., and she dying after the judgments were entered up, Frowd, her attorney, who claimed to be a judgmentcreditor, had taken out letters of administration. Miss Smyth had a judgment in the Court of King's Bench to the amount of 30521. against Mrs. Bridges, and Frowd was requested to set off the 8167. 15s. against the 30521. This he refused to do: whereupon, Wilde Serjt. obtained a rule nisi for Miss Smyth to enter satisfaction on the judgment rolls in this Court, upon acknowledging satisfaction for 8167. 158. on the judgment for 30521. in the Court of King's Bench, and for Frowd to pay the costs of the application. off against a judgment for Defendant in K.B., although Plaintiff was dead, and the judgment was assets in the hands of her administrator: Held, that the judgment in K. B. for Defendant was valid, although not entered up within two terms after death of Defendant, verdict having been given during her life, and the delay occasioned by a motion touching an award. Storks 1831. BRIDGES บ. SMYTH. Storks and Russell Serjts. shewed cause, and objected, first, that the judgment in the Court of King's Bench was invalid; Mrs. Bridges having died after verdict, and judgment not having been signed within two terms after her death, as it ought to have been pursuant to 17 Car. 2. c. 8. Secondly, That execution had been executed by Mrs. Bridges, she having issued a writ of elegit, and having commenced actions of ejectment to enforce it. Thirdly, That Mrs. Bridges being dead, and Frowd being her administrator, the judgments in this Court were in a different right, and could not be set off without compromising the interests of creditors; and That Frowd had a lien for his costs upon the judgments in this Court. Wilde, in answer to the first objection, stated, that the verdict in the King's Bench had been obtained before the death of Mrs. Bridges, and was taken subject to the award of an arbitrator as to the amount, which award was also made before the death of Mrs. Bridges; but that she obtained a rule nisi to set aside the award, against which rule, owing to the pressure of business in the Court, cause could not be shewn within two terms after the death of Mrs. Bridges. In answer to the second, he stated that the actions of ejectment had not been proceeded with, and cited Simpson v. Hanley (a), where the defendant was allowed to enter satisfaction on the roll upon a judgment obtained against him, on his acknowledging satisfaction for the amount upon a judgment obtained by him in C. P. against the plaintiff for a larger amount, although he had the plaintiff in custody in execution of that judgment; and Lomas v. Mellor (b) to the same effect. |