Wilde Serjt. The payment of the costs in Aspinal v. Stamp was a condition precedent imposed on the Defendant, which the Plaintiff did not waive by consenting to go to trial; and that was the ground of the decision. But here the order for payment might be enforced at any time; and the Plaintiff could go to trial whether the costs were paid or not. As to the attorney's lien, his affidavit does not disclose any. TINDAL C.J. The order for the payment of the interlocutory costs in this case was not, strictly speaking, a condition precedent; but it was a bargain of which the Defendant has had the advantage; and though if the Plaintiff's attorney had proceeded strictly he might at once have obtained the costs by attachment, that ought not to be urged too strongly against him, the omission being in effect an indulgence to the Defendant. We think, therefore, that upon the Plaintiff's attorney satisfying the prothonotary that any thing is due to him from the Plaintiff in respect of this cause, his lien should be allowed; and that, subject to such lien, the set-off prayed should be allowed. Rule absolute accordingly. 1832. DOE V.. CARTER. HUTCHINSON v. BLACKWELL. April 27. WHEN this cause was at issue and the record had A submission been passed, the jury process issued, and the to refer a venire had been returned by the sheriff, but before the subject matter cause, and the thereof, and the issue therein, to the award of a barrister, does not authorize him to order a verdict to be entered up. 1832. HUTCHINSON V. cause had been entered for trial, it was by a submission made in the Court of King's Bench, which recited that this action was pending in the Court of Common Pleas, BLACKWELL. agreed by the parties" to leave the same, and the subject-matter thereof, and the issue therein, and the costs of such action," to the arbitrament, final end, and determination of a barrister, and to abide by and perform such award, order, and determination as the said arbitrator should make of and concerning the matters, disputes, and differences subsisting between them as thereinbefore mentioned; that the costs of the reference, award, and action should be in his discretion; and that the submission thereby made should be made a rule of the Court of King's Bench. The arbitrator ordered a verdict to be entered for the Plaintiff for 2047. 10s., and that the Defendant should pay the costs of the cause. The submission was made a rule of the Court of King's Bench. Taddy Serjt. obtained a rule nisi to enter up a verdict pursuant to the award, or that the Defendant should withdraw his plea of not guilty (the action was in trover) and enter a cognovit for the sum of 2047. 10s. Wilde Serjt., who shewed cause, objected, that under this submission the arbitrator had no authority to order a verdict to be entered; that no jury having been sworn, a verdict could not be entered on the postea; and that, the submission having been made a rule of the Court of King's Bench, this Court had no authority to interfere. When the Court called on Taddy. The arbitrator having authority to decide the cause, the subject-matter thereof, and the issue therein, had, in effect, authority to enter a verdict, for without that he could not determine the issue; and the application is necessarily made to this Court, as the Court of King's Bench have no authority over the record here. The agreement to abide by the award empowers the Court to carry it into effect, if not by verdict, at least by ordering a cognovit to be entered. TINDAL C. J. Probably either of the modes suggested would meet the substantial justice of the case; but we must look to see whether we have authority to do what is required. The terms of the submission are to leave the cause, the subject-matter thereof, the issue therein, and the costs to the award of an arbitrator. Now, in ordinary cases, a provision is made that he shall be at liberty to enter a verdict, and that no writ of error shall be brought. That clause being omitted here, we must suppose the parties did not intend to give that authority to the arbitrator, or any power beyond that of proceeding by attachment for non-performance of the award. It is the fault of the parties that they have, perhaps inadvertently, made the submission a rule of the Court of King's Bench. PARK and GASELEE JS. concurred. ALDERSON J. I remember an award being set aside in the Court of Exchequer on the same objection. Rule absolute. 1832. HUTCHINSON บ. BLACKWELL. 1832. April 27. notice of bail to describe the holders or freeholders, BELL and Another, Assignees of the Sheriff of Omission in NOTICE of bail served on the 30th of January last, in a cause between the Plaintiffs and Foster and bail as house- Churton, omitted to describe the bail as freeholders or householders as required by the rule of Trinity 1831 (a), does not under the old form of notice having been pursued by mistake. The Plaintiffs, instead of objecting to the bail, on the Trinity 1831, 4th of February took an assignment of the bail-bond and commenced proceedings thereon. The Defendant take an assign- having given a regular notice and put in and perfected other bail on the 11th of April, the rule of authorise the Plaintiff to ment of the bail-bond. The objection should be made when the bail come up. Wilde Serjt., on the part of the bail to the sheriff, obtained a rule nisi to stay the proceedings on the bailbond as irregular. Jones Serjt. shewed cause, and contended, that the original notice of bail not being conformable to the rule of Trinity 1831, was a nullity; and that the Plaintiff being in the same condition as if he had received no notice, was entitled to proceed on the bail-bond. In Wallace v. Arrowsmith (b), where the notice of bail was a nullity, it was held that an assignment of the bail-bond was regular. Wilde. The notice here was merely informal, not null; the Plaintiff should have taken the objection when the bail came up. In Wallace v. Arrowsmith, the bail were attorneys' clerks. (a) 7 Bingh. 782. (b) 2 Bos. & P. 49. TINDAL C. J. It appears to us that the notice was merely informal, and not à nullity. It is true, the rule of Trinity 1831 prescribes a form of notice; but it was not intended that every blank or omission in the form should authorise an assignment of the bail-bond: that would only be putting the parties to unnecessary expense, which it was the object of the rule to prevent. Objections of this nature should, as under the old practice, be made when the bail appear. In the case in Bosanquet and Puller the bail were attorneys' clerks, who are not, under any circumstances, allowed to be bail. PARK and GASELEE JS. concurred. ALDERSON J. By not taking the objection at the time, the party deprives the Court of the power of doing that which the justice of the case may require. 1832. BELL v. FOSTER. Rule absolute. UMBRAGIO OBICINI V. BLIGH. April 27. THIS 'HIS was an action of debt brought to recover a In order to sum which the Plaintiff claimed to be due to him sustain a suit in England on a judgment of the Vice Admiralty Court of the island for damages of Malta. At the trial of the cause before Tindal C. J., awarded by an Admiralty London sittings after last Trinity term, a verdict was Court abroad, found for the Plaintiff for 2997., subject to the opinion the transcript of the Court on the following case: of the proceedings in the Admiralty Court should shew expressly, and not by mere inference, the sentence of the Admiralty Court, and that the Defendant was within its jurisdiction. The |