had been violated by the capture of the ship in question; such agents being usually parties to suits of this kind; Twee Gebroeders (a); but that would give neither to him nor to his administrator any interest in the sum now sought to be recovered. Thus in Pigott v. Thompson (b), where A. agreed in writing to pay the rent of certain tolls which he had hired, "to the treasurer of the commissioners;" it was held, that no action for the rent could be maintained in the name of the treasurer. And this Court may examine and impeach the legality of foreign judgments. Arnot v. Redfern (c), Walker v. Witter. (d) Fifthly, this is in effect a question of prize or no prize, over which the Court of Admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction. Thus in Le Caux v. Eden (e) it was held that an action would not lie at common law for false imprisonment, where the imprisonment was merely in consequence of taking a ship as prize, although the ship had been acquitted. And Willes J. said, “I am of opinion that the action is not maintainable. I may perhaps go upon narrower ground than the rest of the Court, but the rule I would lay down is, that, where the injury is the necessary and natural consequence of the capture, the Court of Admiralty has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction." And Buller J. said, "There is no case in which it has ever been holden that such an action would lie; and, if it could be maintained, there are, in every war, such frequent opportunities for it, that it must have happened in every day's practice, or some instances, at least, must have been in the memory of those who have had long experience in Westminster Hall; but there is not the smallest trace of such a (a) 3 Rob. 162. (d) Dougl. 1. deter determination, or even dictum, in any Court in England." [Alderson J. In Le Caux v. Eden the Court were called on to draw an inference from the foreign judgment, namely, that the party was entitled to damages: here we are only asked to enforce the payment of the sum specified in the monition.] But that involves the original question of prize or no prize. The principle established in Le Caux v. Eden was acted on in Mitchell v. Rodney (a) and Sinclair v. Fraser, there cited. Wilde Serjt. contrà. 1. It sufficiently appears on this transcript that the Defendant had notice of the proceedings of the Court of Vice Admiralty, and was properly subjected to its jurisdiction. Indeed in the suit in that Court he must have been the actor, and have required the appearance of the parties interested in the captured vessel. That vessel is alleged to have been taken by the Glatton, of which the Defendant was the commander. Now it is the duty of the captor to proceed to condemnation; 33 G. 3. c. 66.; Case of The William (b), The Huldah (c), The Susanna (d); he is the only person liable for damages; and his acts bind all persons under him; Diligentia (e); and upon the evidence before this Court, the monition appears to have issued in a proceeding in the Court of Vice Admiralty for the condemnation of the Madonna. Every thing incidental to such a proceeding, such as the appointment of proctors, the examination of evidence, and all that precedes the sentence of the Court, must be presumed to have been rightly done. The Court must be accredited for the due observance of its own practice; and as the suit could not have existed except upon the captor or his agent pro (a) 2 Br. P. C. 423. (b) 4 Rob. 214. (c) 3 Rob. 235. (d) 6 Rob. 48. A a 4 ceeding 1832. OBICINI บ. BLIGH 1832. OBICINI V. BLIGH. ceeding for condemnation, it sufficiently appears that he had notice of the suit, and was within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The Court of Vice Admiralty receiving credit for the correctness of its intermediate proceedings, the monition, which is equivalent to a writ of execution, refers to the judgment of the Court, and sufficiently establishes the existence and amount of a debt, the payment of which this Court will enforce. It is no doubt necessary that a certain amount should be shewn; Hall v. Odber (a); but when that is established, it is for the Defendant to impeach, if he can, the regularity of the judgment; Galbraith v. Neville (b); and the Plaintiff is not bound to set out the whole proceedings; Appleton v. Lord Braybrook. (c) In Buchanan v. Rucker, and Cavan v. Stewart, it appeared on the proceedings that parties entitled to notice had never been summoned to appear; though that would not invalidate a judgment where by the law of the country the Court had authority to proceed in the absence of the party; Douglas v. Forrest (d); but here the Defendant Bligh, being the actor in the Vice Admiralty Court, was the person to summon, not to be summoned. 3. The proceedings, as set out on this record, are not interlocutory in the sense in which that term is used in English law, but final and conclusive. Restoration of the captured vessel is ordered, and a sum to be paid for the damages of detention. Nothing further was to be expected from the Court, which is the test that the proceeding is at an end, and the judgment, though termed interlocutory in the civil law, has the effect of a definitive sentence. "Illud dicitur decretum interlocutorium, habens vim sententiæ definitiva, quando illud decretum est finale et non speratur alia sententia seu aliud decretum super illo articulo, re, vel causâ, sed per illud imponitur finis illi rei de quâ interlocutum est." (a) That is, on the main point of the suit, for the question of costs is incidental to every judgment, and does not affect its conclusiveness on the point to be decided. The 33 G. 3. c. 66. s. 28. expressly enacts, that the decisions of Admiralty Courts shall have the force of a definitive sentence. If so, the amount of damages awarded, which is sufficiently disclosed by the monition, is a legitimate cause of action in the Courts of this country. In Gilbert's treatise on debt (b) it is laid down" that the act of law, that is, the judgments or acts of courts of justice, may reduce men's acts of any sort to a certain value, whether they be acts of benefit, or of injury and injustice. And when a certain value is set upon such action, it creates a debt to the party to whom it is by law appointed, for, though there be no actual contract, yet the debt arises ex quasi contractu; for as it is common justice to repair injuries, so when the law has settled the compensation of the injury, the law supposes a contract engaging the party to make a compensation. Besides, the law being the common rule to settle all disputes, when once the quantum of the damage or injury is adjusted by the decision of one of its courts, that decision or judgment ought in right reason to create a debt, as much as if the parties themselves had chosen arbitrators to determine between them, who had awarded a certain sum of money, which, as has been already observed, might be recovered by an action of debt." So Blackstone says (c), "That if one hath once obtained a judgment against another for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution thereupon, he may afterwards bring an action of (a) Oughton, ord, Judie. tit. 123. (b) Gilbert's Law and Equi ty, 390. 1832. OBICINI V. BLIGH. (c) 3 Comm. 159. debt 1832. OBICINI ข. BLIGH. debt upon this judgment, and shall not be put upon the proof of the original cause of action; but upon shewing the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law immediately implies that by the original contract of society the defendant hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it." The principle, therefore, laid down by Lord Tenterden in Carpenter v. Thornton, that an action on a judgment only lies where the Court can review the grounds of the judgment, appears too narrow, for that would exclude actions on judgments of record. Even in Carpenter v. Thornton, Lord Tenterden takes a distinction between the judgments of courts in this country and those of foreign courts. The decision in Henly v. Soper shews that it was not intended to lay down the principle so broadly as it appears in Carpenter v. Thornton. There it was held that an action would lie upon the decree of a colonial court of equity for the balance of an account between partners. In such action the Court would look at the substance, without regarding the form of the proceedings upon which the decree was founded. And Courts here do not exact the proof of strict regularity in the proceedings of foreign courts. In Molony v. Gibbons (a) the Court assumed that the attorney in the foreign court was well appointed; and if the judgment in such a court appear to be final, Bernardi v. Motteux (b), it has always been held that an action lies here for the amount. Walker v. Witter. (c) 4. Whether Mattei was the person entitled to claim damages was altogether a question for the Court of Vice Admiralty, Sinclair v. Fraser (d), which cannot be presumed to have erred so far as to have admitted improper parties to the suit; (a) 2 Campb. 502. (b) Dougl. 575. (c) Dougl. 1. (d) 20 Howell's St. Tr. 468. |