5. And the less, as that Court has undoubtedly exclusive jurisdiction in the question of prize. So that the Courts here will not interfere by prohibition, even if they take a view of the law on that subject different from the view taken by the Admiralty Court; Lord Camden v. Home (a); and whatever is incidental to such a question, as the amount of damage or the like, can also only be tried there; Faith v. Pearson (b), Smart v. Wolff (c); but when the amount to be paid has been once ascertained, a debt is established, the discharge of which the Courts here will enforce by the same remedies as any other debt. TINDAL C. J. Shaped as these proceedings are, the Court cannot with sufficient certainty see on the face of them that which is necessary to make the Defendant liable in this action; and what weighs most with me is, that the Defendant nowhere appears to have been brought within the jurisdiction of the Vice Admiralty Court, but that the proceedings, as set out, are upon the face of them imperfect. The only mention of the Defendant is where the captured vessel is styled "La Madona della Lettera, taken by his Majesty's ship of war Glatton, George Miller Bligh, Esq. commander, and brought to Malta.” Now that mode of expression does not convey the idea that Bligh was present on the occasion of the proceedings in the court at Malta, for a captured vessel is commonly sent to port for condemnation in charge of a prize master. Neither does it appear that he was present in October 1810, when application was made for a monition; for it is granted upon an allegation that the proctors had made "repeated applications to the captor's agent for the payment of the amount of the special damages as confirmed, but that they had not been able (a) 1 H. Bl. 476. 4 T. R. 382. 6 Br. P. G. 203. (b) 2 Marshall, 133. to 1832. OBICINI V. BLIGH. 1832. OBICINI v. BLIGH, to obtain the same." On the contrary, it appears, from the language of the return to the monition, that he was not present, the deputy marshal certifying that "the monition was not served on the within-named George Miller Bligh, by reason of his having left the island some time ago, and that he has not at present returned to Malta." It is left in uncertainty when he quitted the island, and we may fairly infer that if it had been possible, it would have been stated on the proceedings that he was present. But I do not rely on that alone, for his personal attendance was not strictly necessary, and it was, as has been forcibly urged, his duty to proceed to a port for the due condemnation of the captured vessel. Still there was something to be done in the Admiralty Court on his part and with his authority; the appointment of a proctor ought to have been properly authenticated; and if that took place, I cannot see why the statement of it is omitted on this transcript. A proctor has much more power than an attorney; he is styled dominus litis; he is appointed with solemnity by an instrument under seal, or by the Judge; and his appointment is a matter of record; Clerke's Praxis, 2d part. It appears, on this transcript, that all the proceedings of the Court have not been set out, for it recites, "The Judge having pronounced the goods to belong as claimed, and by interlocutory decree the same to be restored to the claimant for the use of the owners and proprietors;" but this interlocutory decree is nowhere set out. Now it was the business of the Plaintiff at least to make the necessary selection for the information of this Court; and the fair inference from the omissions is, that the whole of the proceedings, if set out, would not have shewn the appointment of any proctor for Bligh. It further appears that no agent of Bligh's resided in Malta. The monition indeed is served on Robertson, but in the next proceeding it is stated that Jackson 1832. Jackson appeared for him, and " alleged him not to be the agent of his Majesty's ship Glatton, and that he was not in possession of any effects belonging to the said ship." This allegation is not contradicted, but thereupon the proceedings terminate; from which we must infer that the applicants were incompetent to deny the allegation of Jackson, and that Robertson must be taken not to have been the agent of the Defendant. If so, the proceedings against him have been carried on when neither he was present nor any proctor or agent to attend to his interests. And though the Plaintiff has set out the monition, which is in the nature of a writ of execution, he has nowhere stated the judgment on which that monition is grounded. When the Plaintiff had the power of producing the proceedings which have been thus withheld, we should proceed in the dark if without more precise information we were to hold the Defendant liable. It is of extreme importance that the Plaintiff should be held strictly to the proof of his claim, for the consequences would be serious to the Defendant if he should be held liable to this demand after a lapse of twenty-two years; when he can neither investigate the claim nor recover over from parties who originally might have been liable to contribute. The ground of my decision, however, is, that I do not see my way on these proceedings, which are manifestly so imperfect, to find the Defendant liable. On that ground alone I think there ought to be judgment of nonsuit. PARK J. It is not necessary for us to proceed on any other ground than the glaring defect of these proceedings. No libel is stated, no responsive allegations. It does not appear for whom Mattei claimed, nor what was the judgment on the subject of damages; the monition is ordered to be served on Bligh or his agent, and it is served on Robertson, who disclaims being agent, OBICINI V. BLIGH, 1832. OBICINI ข. BLIGH. agent, or having any effects of the captors. In short, the whole proceedings are so imperfect that it is impossible for us to come to any decision on them, and after a lapse of twenty-two years, the case has an extremely suspicious appearance. GASELEE J. I think there can be no doubt of the authority of this Court to entertain the Plaintiff's suit, if the judgment in the Vice Admiralty Court had been properly set out; for that judgment appears to have been final. And as to the appearance of the Defendant Bligh, there is a great deal in the argument, that he, as captor, was bound to take the cause into the court at Malta: but the ground of my decision is, that this transcript discloses no decree for the payment of any specific sum: for the monition is no part of the judgment; it is either the equivalent of a writ of execution, or a prelude to it by way of attachment; and this Court cannot consider an instrument in such a form as sufficient evidence of a judgment to the same amount. The transcript, therefore, being defective in not stating a decree for any specific amount, the Plaintiff has failed to establish any cause of action, and a nonsuit must be entered. ALDERSON J. I am of the same opinion. The proceedings, as set out, are too imperfect to enable us to give any judgment but that of nonsuit. The Plaintiff sues as administrator of Mattei, and should, therefore, shew who Mattei was, and in what right he claimed. But many important parts of the proceedings are not set out, such as the appointment of a proctor for the Defendant Bligh, and the statement in detail of Matter's claim. The Court directs the restoration of part of the cargo, and refers it to a body of merchants to ascertain the amount of damage, if any, sustained by the owners of the property. The report of the merchants is stated to to have been afterwards confirmed, but what the report was nowhere appears, nor the amount found to be due for damages; for the monition cannot be taken as part of the judgment of the court, or evidence of the sum specified in the decree. If the proceedings stopped there, they would be too imperfect for us to rest any decision upon them, but the monition ordering that a certain sum shall be paid by the agent of the captor, is served upon Robertson, who disclaims the agency, or that he has any effects belonging to the Glatton, and what is done after that does not appear. It is perfectly consistent with all that appears on this record, that another monition may have issued, and that the money may have been paid. The proceedings set out, being therefore so imperfect, the Court has no alternative but to pronounce Judgment of nonsuit. 1832. OBICINI V. BLIGH. DUNCAN v. PASSENGER. April 27. UPON special demurrer it was objected that the The county in declaration in this cause was destitute of alleany the margin of the declar sufficient gation of venue. In the margin alone, there was ation held a "Middlesex to wit; " and a certain day being specified, all the material facts were alleged to have taken place "then and there." Adams Serjt. argued, that though this might suffice on general demurrer, Mellor v. Barber (a), to allow it on special demurrer, would be to dispense with the necessity of observing any of the formal rules of pleading, more especially of alleging facts with the ancient certainty as to time and place. (a) 3 T. R. 387. venue, on special de murrer. Sed |