such persons, as well as those made by his own hand: and the largest ordinary sense is that in which words ought to be construed, where there is nothing in the occasion on which they are used, or in the context, to restrict them.' It is manifest then, on the plainest principles, that for a volunteer, or much more for a body of volunteers, for political purposes, to pay the arrears of rates and taxes due from indigent or embarrassed defaulters, even without their knowledge or authority, is to perpetrate a fraud, which will, when detected, be prevented from conferring the elective franchise. In the case of the The Queen v. The Mayor of Bridgenorth,* payments had been made in gross sums to the overseers, by persons belonging to a political party in the borough, as was alleged, for political purposes, in order to entitle certain persons (seventy-eight in number) to be placed upon the burgess list, under statute 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 9: some of such persons stating that they had not authorized such payments, nor knew of their having been made. The rule for a mandamus to insert the name, which in the revision before the mayor and assessors had been expunged, was discharged, on the ground that such simulated payments were not the payments contemplated by the statute. 'Putting the most general case,' said Lord Denman, ‘if a man pay another's rates without authority from him, and as a volunteer, is that a payment by the person rated? -We ought to promulgate our opinion without delay. If the practice described were to prevail, there would be great danger of the most enormous bribery. The statute, in requiring that the rates shall have been paid, contemplates some payment by the party's own act.' This doctrine applies with even greater force to the case of the parliamentary, than to that of the municipal franchise. There is another class of cases, to which such principles are inapplicable namely, where by an arrangement between landlord and tenant, the former pays the rates and taxes, the latter reimbursing him, or paying an additional rent. It is clear that such a payment by the landlord is a payment by the tenant, so as to satisfy the statute under consideration. It appears to us,' said Lord Chief Justice Tindal, that the payment being one to which the claimant was liable, and having 10 Adol. & Ell. 66. been made on his own account, by those whom he procured to make it, by giving value for it, is sufficient within the 27th section of the statute.* Whether it would have been sufficient,' he added, 'under the statutes conferring settlements, is a question different from that before us.'+ So, again, where a house was occupied in the Government Dockyard at Chatham by a servant of the government, who had allotted the house to him for his residence in that capacity, he having the exclusive use of the house (paying no rent) as part remuneration for his services; no part of the house being used for public purposes; and the occupant would, if he had not had this house, have been allowed for one, in addition to his salary;-he being rated as occupier, but the paymaster-general paying the rates in part remuneration for the occupier's services, who, had he paid them himself, would have been repaid by the Admiralty: -it was held that this was an occupation, rating, and payment of the rate which satisfied section 27. In the case of joint occupiers, a payment of the whole rate, by one, was held to be virtually a payment by each;§ but if the only name appearing on the rate be that of the individual paying, his payment will not enure in favour of his co-tenants: they will not be constructively rated; nor is the case one of misnomer, inaccurate, or insufficient description, remediable under statute 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 75.|| It is clear, therefore, that those who wish to acquire the franchise, must exercise personal vigilance. In the Digest, at pp. 378, 379, A., will be found several cases worthy of consideration, with reference to these points. And in a case before an election committee,¶ it was held, that if the tenant choose to make the landlord his agent for payment of the rates and taxes, and the landlord should omit to do so, the principal must be bound by the laches of his agent, as in the case of any other agent. Such is the New Borough Franchise created in 1832, and since then, from time to time, carefully modified by the legislature, so as to place it upon a satisfactory footing, and diminish Hughes v. Overseers of Chatham, 5 M. & G. 79; post, p. 378, A. + See also Cook v. Luckett, 2 C. B. 168; post, p. 379, A. the excessive stringency of one or two of the conditions originally imposed. II. THE OLD RESERVED FRANCHISES. This branch of the borough franchise is twofold, as regulated by the Reform Act of 1832: consisting of old rights reserved in perpetuity, and old rights reserved for a time. They will be here treated, briefly, under these two divisions. Before, however, proceeding to consider them according to this arrangement, it may be useful to offer a few general observations on the nature of the borough franchise, as it existed previously to the memorable epoch above adverted to. In the famous case of Ashby v. White,* Mr. Justice Powys, in delivering his judgment, thus spoke of the borough franchise as it then [1703] existed, 'There is a vast intricacy in determining the rights of electors, and there is a variety and a different manner and right of election in every borough, almost. As in some boroughs every potwaller + has a right to vote; in some residents only vote; and in others the outlying burgesses that live a hundred miles off: nay, I know Ludlow, a borough, where all the burgesses' daughters' husbands have a right to vote.' These various rights depended on the several charters, customs and constitutions of the respective boroughs, which were so intricate and confused, as to occasion infinite disputes; which the legislature sought at length to obviate, in the year 1696, by ‡ prohibiting, as false returns of members, those which were trary to the last determination of the House of Commons upon the right of election;' subsequent statutes, § enacting that any determination of a committee of the House of Commons, as to the right of voting for any particular place, made under the circumstances specified in the acts, should thereafter be conclusive on Ante, pp. 3, 4. ti. e. a cooker of his own diet, 2 Steph. Comm. 387. + 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 1, post, p. 172, A. 'con 2 Geo. 2, c. 24, s. 4, post, p. 189, A.; and stat. 34 Geo. 3, c. 83. The last determination' is still of importance, and authoritatively cited, in the discussion of the old reserved rights; as in the Great Marlow case, Bar. & Aust. 85 [A. D. 1842]; to show that there the right of voting is in the inhabitants who pay scot and lot; and in Lichfield, in the bailiffs, magistrates, freeholders of 40s. per annum, and all that hold by burgage tenure, and in such freemen only of the city as are enrolled, paying scot and lot there.' Id. 344. the subject for ever. In alluding to the first of these statutes (7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 7), Mr. Justice Powys says, with some quaintness, in the case above cited, 'We are not acquainted with the learning of elections, and there is a particular cunning in it not known to us, nor do we go by the same rules, and they often determine contrary to our opinion without doors. The late statute, which enacts that the last determination of the House as to the right of election shall be a rule to the judges on the trial of every cause, is a declaration of their power; and the paths the judges are to walk in are chalked out to them, so that they are not left to use their own judgments; but the determination of the House is to be the rule of law to us, and we are not to examine beyond that.' About a century and a half afterwards, matters had indeed altered with reference to the relations between the courts of law and the House of Commons; which, in the year 1843, entrusted the Court of Common Pleas* with the power of deciding what was or was not election law, as declared by statutes, such decisions to be conclusively binding on committees of the House of Commons: and on stepping upon the very threshold of this new class of duties, we find the Lord Chief Justice prohibiting the citation of decisions of committees of the House of Commons, as authorities binding on the court. † It was recently stated in the House of Commons that there were at that moment eighty-five different franchises in the country, from potwallers up to ten pound householders, 'necessarily leading to enormous trouble, expense and complication.'‡ In thus reserving the old rights of voting, the former inconveniences arising out of their complexity, remain for the present in full force. Those of the old rights, however, reserved for a time only, and that under strict conditions, have been ever since the year 1832 in a process of extinction: the ultimate result being of course greatly to simplify the consolidation of the elective franchise for boroughs. 1. Old Rights Reserved in Perpetuity. These rights are those of-(1.) Freeholders and burgage tenants in towns being counties corporate; § (2.) Freemen and * Ante, p. 22. + Whithorn v. Thomas, 7 M. & G. 4. 5 June, 1849, Hans. cv. (3rd Series) 1166. The right of voting in counties at large, extended by ss. 19 and 20, liverymen in the city of London, and burgesses or freemen elsewhere. (1.) The case of the former class, freeholders and burgage tenants, is provided for by the 31st section of the Reform Act; and the places to which it applies are the following six cities and towns being counties of themselves, or counties corporate: BRISTOL, EXETER, HAVERFORDWEST, LICHFIELD, NORWICH, and NOTTINGHAM. In Exeter, Haverfordwest, and Norwich, freeholders in general have the right of voting, without any distinction of value: In Bristol, and Nottingham, only forty shilling freeholders: In Lichfield, forty shilling freeholders, burgage tenants, and enrolled scot and lot freemen.† The value of the qualifying freeholds in these places, with an important exception, remains unaltered; but, in order to be registered, every freeholder or burgage tenant must have been in possession or receipt of the rents and profits for twelve calendar months next previous to the 31st of July in each year, unless the freehold or burgage tenement came to the voter at any time within such twelve months by descent, succession, marriage, marriage settlement, devise, or promotion to any benefice or office: and he must have resided for six calendar months next before the 31st of July within the city or town, or seven miles of it, or any part of it. The limits within which freeholds or burgage tenants will continue to qualify, are determined by the Boundary Act; so that all such as are situate within the new boundaries, though without the previous limits, will qualify. The exception above alluded to relates to freeholders for life, or lives, by reason of the proviso to the 31st section expressly referring to the 18th section; by the operation of which no freeholder for his own life, or the life of another, or for any joint lives, is entitled to vote, unless he satisfy one of three conditions:-he must be in the actual and bonâ fide occupation of the property; or he must have acquired it by marriage, marriage settlement, devise, or promotion; or the property must be of the clear yearly value of ten pounds, above all rents and to copyholders and leaseholders, is not given to the holders of these kinds of property in cities and towns being counties of themselves. Post, p. 241, A. ↑ Ante, p. 109, note §. Ante, p. 81. |