character, and that they had respectively freehold estate in their respective rooms. Per Maule, J.-They have an equitable estate, and are not liable to arbitrary amotion. Simpson v. Wilkinson, 7 M. & G. 50.

The Duke of Norfolk, in 1693, founded a hospital in Yorkshire and endowed it out of lands and corn rents vested in trustees, who paid out of the fund weekly stipends to each inmate, originally 2s. 6d. a-week, besides allowance for coals and clothing. The weekly payment had subsequently been increased to 10s. a-week, and even that amount might be exceeded, in the event of a surplus of funds existing. By a statute passed subquently, however, the trustees were empowered to add pensioners, and distribute the surplus to them, paying them such fixed sums as they should think fit, and to increase or diminish the stipends, but never to reduce them beneath 3s. 6d. a-week. The appointment was for life: Held, that the inmates had no absolute right, legal nor equitable, to the funds beyond 3s. 6d. a-week, and were consequently not entitled to be registered as freeholders. These stipends were liable to be diminished, at the discretion of persons over whom the claimants had no control. Ashmore v. Lees, 2 C. B. 31. This case will be found more fully reported, post, stat. 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 74.

[See also Baxter v. Brown, 7 M. & G. 198, post, stat. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25.]

The monthly payments secured by mortgage to the trustees of a benefit building society, under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32, constitute a charge" upon the estate within the meaning of the statute 8 Hen. 6, c. 7. Copland v. Bartlett, 6 C. B. 18.

A., possessed of a freehold estate of the yearly value of 51., mortgaged it for 100.; the deed was declared to be a security for the principal sum only, and the power of sale was for payment of that sum only, at a day long past; but it was found, as a fact, that interest had been regularly paid upon the 100l., at 5 per cent.: Held, that A. had not an interest in land "to the value of 40s. by the year at the least above all "charges," within the 8 Hen. 6, c. 7, and therefore was not entitled to be registered for the county." Lee v. Hutchinson, 8 C. B. 16, and see Beamish v. The Overseers of Stoke, Law Journal Rep. N. S. vol. 21, p. 9 (C. P.), post, 382.

[See also post, stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32.]

STAT. 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, "An Act for the Relief of the Poor."

A poor rate that has not been duly allowed and confirmed by two justices pursuant to the statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, is void and not merely irregular; the nonpayment thereof of such rate does not disqualify a party from being placed upon a borough register, under 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 27. Fox v. Davis, 6 C. B. 11.

STAT. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, [ante, p. 174, A.] "An Act for the further regulating Elections of Members to serve in Parliament, and for the preventing irregular Proceedings of Sheriff's and other Officers in the Electing and Returning such Members."

S. 6. See Pryce v. Belcher, 3 C. B. 58, and S. C. 4 C. B. 866.

S. 7.-A. having contracted for the purchase of B.'s house for a valuable consideration, sold it to C., D., E., F., G. and H. in equal shares, and caused a conveyance to be executed from B. to the subvendees, as tenants in common. A. was not stated to have been a party to the conveyance; the purchase money was paid to B. by the hands of A., but was the proper money of the subvendees. The house was let, and the subvendees received the rents for their own use respectively. The object of A. in proposing the purchase to the subvendees was to increase the number of voters; but the purchase on the part of the subvendees was a bona fide investment of their money they expected that the possession of the property would entitle each of them to a vote, but there was no understanding before or at the conveyance, that they should vote in any particular way, or in support of any particular interest: Held, that the conveyance was not void under 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, and that the subvendees were entitled to be registered. Quære, whether the conveyance would have been void, if the increasing the number of voters had been the object of B. in conveying. Marshall v. Bown, 7 Man. & Gr. 188.

A., B., C. and D. joined in partnership to work a fulling mill. Money was subscribed by all the partners, with part of which freehold land was bought, which was

conveyed to A. and B. in fee; with other part a mill was built on the land, and machinery for the mill was purchased. By a partnership deed executed by A., B., C. and D., the trusts of the land, mill, &c., were declared to be (among other things), that A. and B. should stand seised and possessed of all the estates, property, goods, &c., upon trust for the benefit of themselves and their partners, as part of their partnership joint stock in trade. There was a provision in the deed, that A. and B. might borrow money upon mortgage of the stock, property, estates, &c., belonging to the copartnership; and it was declared that the land, mill, &c., should be deemed and considered as or in the nature of personal estate and not real estate, and be held in trust for the partners as part of their partnership stock in trade. A. and B., under the powers of the deed, borrowed money for the purposes of the partnership, for which they gave bonds and notes in their own names, but did not mortgage any part of the property. Held, that each partner had an interest in the realty corresponding with the amount of shares held by him in the partnership. Held also, that the money so borrowed had not the effect of mortgages on the shares of the partners. Baxter v. Brown, 7 Man. & Gr. 198.

A conveyance from one vendor to several persons, who purchase with the intention of obtaining and multiplying votes, by splitting and dividing the interest, the vendor not being cognizant of such purpose, is valid. Nor is such conveyance brought within the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, by the mere knowledge on the part of the vendor's solicitor or agent of the object of the purchasers. Hoyland v. Bremner, 2 C. B. 84.

A conveyance of land by one vendor to several vendees for a bona fide consideration is valid, although the avowed object of the vendor is to multiply, and that of the vendees to acquire, the right of voting. Alexander v. Newman, 2 C. B. 122; Beswick v. Ashworth, ib. 152; Beswick v. Akid, ib. 156; Rawlins v. Bremner, ib. 166.

A conveyance made to carry into effect a real boná fide contract of sale, where the purchase money is paid, and the possession taken without any secret reservation or trust whatever for the benefit of the seller, is not within the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, notwithstanding it is made with a view to the multiplying of voices or the splitting of freeholds; the intention of the statute being to avoid such conveyances only made with that view as are in

themselves fraudulent and collusive. Riley v. Crossley, 2 C. B. 146.

A conveyance made for a bona fide consideration, in trust, as to one-tenth, for the grantor himself, and as to the other nine-tenths for certain other parties who amongst themselves contributed nine-tenths of the purchase money, is not within the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, notwithstanding the avowed object of the grantor is to multiply, and of the other parties to acquire, the right of voting. Thorniley v. Aspland, 2 C. B. 160.

A deed of gift bona fide executed by a father to his sons, expressed to be in consideration of natural love and affection, is not within the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, although the avowed object of the father was to confer votes upon his sons. Newton v. Hargreaves, 2 C. B. 163.

A bona fide grant of a rent charged by a father to his son, expressed to be made in consideration of natural love and affection, is not within 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, though the intention of the grantor be to create a vote. Whether or not there is fraud in the making of a grant is a fact which must, in all cases, be decided by the revising barrister; the court will not infer fraud. Newton v. The Overseers of Mobberley, 2 C. B.

203.

A bona fide grant of a rent-charge by a man to his son and his son-in-law, expressed to be made for a nominal consideration only, is not within 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, though all of the parties contemplated the creation of votes. Newton v. The Overseers of Crowley, 2 C. B. 207.

Under the statutes 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7, and 10 Anne, c. 23, s. 1, a fraudulent conveyance made for the mere purpose of conferring a vote is void only to the extent of preventing the right of voting from being acquired, but is valid and effectual, as between the parties, to pass the interest. Phillpotts v. Phillpotts, 10 C. B. 85.

STAT. 10 Anne, c. 23, [ante, p. 182, A.] "An Act for the more effectual preventing Fraudulent Conveyances, in order to multiply Votes for electing Knights of Shires to serve in Parliament."

[See the cases given above under stat. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 25, s. 7.]

STAT. 2 Geo. 2, c. 24, [ante, p. 188, A.] "An Act for the more effectual preventing Bribery and Corruption in the Election of Members to serve in Parliament."

S. 7.-[See Baker v. Rusk, 15 Q. B. 870.]

STAT. 3 Geo. 3, c. 24, "An Act to prevent fraudulent and occasional Votes in the Election of Knights of the Shire, and of Members for Cities and Towns which are Counties of themselves, so far as relates to the Right of Voting by virtue of an Annuity or Rent-charge.

66

Repealed by stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 72, and no other provision enacted in lieu of it." Per Tindal, C. J., Murray v. Thorniley, 2 C. B. 223.

STAT. 22 Geo. 3, c. 41, [ante, p. 198, A.]" An Act for better securing the Freedom of Elections of Members to serve in Parliament, by disabling certain Officers employed in the Collection and Management of his Majesty's Revenues from giving their Votes at such Elections."

S. 1.-A letter-carrier to a post-office, who has resigned his situation within twelve months before the 31st July, being disqualified from voting until after twelve months from the resignation of such situation by 22 Geo. 3, c. 41, s. 1, is not entitled to be registered. Cooper v. Harris, 7 Man. & Gr. 97.

"No commissioner, &c., or other officer or person whatsoever, concerned or employed in the charging, collecting, levying or managing the customs or any branch thereof," is to have a vote. An "extra-glut tide waiter" is a person whose name is on the list, confirmed by the commissioners of customs, of persons ready to act as occasional tide waiters, in boarding vessels for the purpose of watching the cargoes to be examined by the proper officer of the customs, and liable to be called on to act