supported, or by the conversion of the particular estate into a right of action. (a)

A contingent interest may also be released by the owner, is devisable, (b) (except a contingent remainder in tail,) (c) and may be assigned in equity for a valuable consideration. (d) It may also be extinguished at law by feoffment, fine, or recovery. (e)

It may also be bound and conveyed at law by way of estoppel. A fine sur concessit is levied, by means of which the lands are demised to the conusee for a long term of years, so that when the contingency happens, the estate which passed by estoppel becomes an estate in interest, and has the same effect as if the contingency had happened before the fine was levied (f) and it has lately been decided, that a demise by indenture will have the same operation and effect; and although the person executing the indenture had no interest in the lands at the time of executing it, yet when his interest accrues it will be bound thereby. (g)

An interesse termini, unless it be contingent, may be assigned or transferred. Whether a contingent

(a) 2 Prest. Abs. 93.

(b) Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 88. (c) Fearne Cont. Rem. 371. (d) Fearne Cont. Rem. 366, 7th edition; 4 Co. 66 b. Kimpland v. Courtnay, 2 Freem. 250.

(e) Matthew Manning's case, 8 Co. 94b; Lampet's case, 10 Co. 46; Roe v. Jones, 1 H. B. 30; Doe v. Tomkinson, 2 Mau. & Sel. 165; Weale v. Lower, Pollex. 54; Moor. 554.

(f) Weale v. Lower, Pollex. 54; W. Jo. 456. Goodtitle v. Morse, 3

T. R. 365; Vick v. Edwards, 3 P.
W. 372.

(g) Rawlyns' case, 4 Co. 51 b; Bensley v. Burdon, 2 Sim. & Stu. 519; and see 4 Park and Stew. Cont. of Byth. 220-228, where the subject is fully considered, and the requisite forms given. And see also Helps v. Hereford, 2 B. & A. 242; Davies v. Bush, 1 M'Clell. & Yo. 58; Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. 411. Shep. Touch. 6; Whitfield v. Fausset, 1 Ves. 387; Doe d. Brune v. Martyn, 8 B. & C. 497. Wright". Marsh, 3 Bing. 31.

interest in a term can be assigned, is a point on which no authority is found. (a)

Although contingent interests may be bound in equity by contract, yet for the purpose of completing the legal title there must be a conveyance of the estate when vested, or there must be a release by persons capable of such release.

If the contingent or executory interest be vested in a married woman, or be entailed, it cannot be released without a fine; and in the case of a married woman a fine with proclamations is necessary. (b)

A married woman may also release by common recovery; but a common recovery suffered by a person who has a contingent interest in tail will bind himself, but not his issue, nor those in remainder or reversion. (c)

An equitable contingent remainder will never be extinguished by estoppel, and therefore there is not the same danger in levying fines and suffering recoveries, where persons have contingent interests of the equitable ownership, as when they have contingent interests of the legal ownership. But an equitable recovery of a contingent remainder in tail will be as ineffectual as a recovery of the legal estate under similar circumstances. (d)

III. OF TITLES UNDER POSSIBILITIES.

A possibility, such as the chance of an heir apparent to an estate, may be released, though it cannot be granted at law. (e) It may also be extinguished by

(a) 2 Prest. Abs. 95. 202. (b) 2 Prest. Abs. 98. 203.

(c) 1 Prest. Conv. 142, 143.

(d) 2 Prest. Abs. 256. See also 1

Prest. Conv. 117.

(e) See Doe d. Dormer v. Wilson, 4 B. & A. 303.

fine, &c., and bound by estoppel. (a) It may also be devised, (b) and may be transferred in equity for a valuable consideration. (c)

A bare right of entry cannot be conveyed to another, although it may be released. (d) A woman, therefore, who has recovered the third part of her husband's lands by a writ of dower, cannot make a lease or otherwise alien her share, until she obtain possession by execution. (e) But an heir may convey before he enters upon his lands. (f) And a lease or other conveyance, by a person out of possession, will operate by estoppel. (g) But a contract by a person out of possession to grant a present lease to a party, who is apprised that he cannot obtain possession except by a suit, will not be enforced in equity. (h)

(a) See ante, p. 284.

(b) Roe v. Jones, 1 H. B. 30. (c) Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. Wms. 191. Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. 409. Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. Wms. 182. Whitfield v. Fausset, 1 Ves. 391.

(d) Bac. Ab. Lease (1) 4. Lee v. Norris, Cro. Eliz. 331. Thurston's

case, Owen, 16. Plow 137.
(e) Touch. 269.

(ƒ) Browning v. Beaston, Plowd. 137 b.

(g) See ante, p. 284.

(h) Bayley v. Tyrrell, 2 Ball. & B. 358. And see Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. & C. 325; Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF ABSTRACTS OF TITLE OF PROPERTY OF A PECULIAR NATURE.

THIS chapter will be divided into-I. Titles of lands derived from the crown.-II. Titles of manors.III.-Titles of rectories and chapels.-IV. Titles of pews and vaults.-V. Titles of slaves and colonial property.-VI. Titles of company shares.-VII. Titles under the land-tax acts:-and VIII. Titles of equities of redemption.

I. TITLES OF LAND DERIVED FROM THE CROWN.

When the title of the property is derived from a grant of the crown, the original grant must be produced, although it was made at a more distant period than sixty years, for the purpose of showing that no reversion or remainder or burdensome rent or service was reserved by the crown; but the intermediate conveyances which have occurred since that date and the period at which, by the ordinary rules of practice, the

evidence of his title should commence, need not be produced. (a)

The ancient maxim of the law was nullum tempus occurrit regi; but by the 9 Geo. III. c. 16, (b) the crown is disabled to sue or implead any person or persons for any manors, lands, or hereditaments whatsoever, or make any demand for the same, where the right hath not or shall not first accrue and grow within sixty years next before the commencing such action or suit, and the subject is secured in the free and quiet enjoyment thereof, as well against the crown as all other persons claiming any estate or interest therein, by colour of any letters patent, or grants upon suggestion of concealment, wrongfully detaining, &c. for which judgment hath not or shall not be given to the crown within sixty years before the commencing such suit.

But a remainder or reversion of an estate of the gift of the crown, vested in the crown, will not be barred by any recovery; (c) for these estates (d) are expressly exempted from the operation of the acts limiting the rights of the crown to sixty years. (e)

Some doubt has arisen whether a reversion, not of the gift of the crown, but otherwise vested in the crown, can be barred by a recovery. The question arose in a recent case (f) where a reversion was forfeited to the crown by the treason of the owner, and on a recovery being suffered, and a sale afterwards made to a purchaser, Lord Eldon held that the title was so doubtful, that a purchaser could not be compelled to take the title; and Lord Redesdale came to