The bridge was erected on the same site as the one which existed in 1803, before the statute 43 G. 3. c. 59. passed, and it consisted principally even of the same materials. Rex v. The Inhabitants of Lancashire (a) shews that this section of the act does not apply to a bridge widened or repaired; and in that case new materials must be added. Taunton J. said there, "that the enlargement of the bridge did not destroy its identity; it was the same bridge, though wider." That observation applies to the present case.

Crowder and Praed contrà. This bridge was erected and built after the passing of the 43 G. 3. c. 59. s. 5., the object of which statute, as appears by the preamble, was to point out precisely the bridges which inhabitants of counties should be liable to repair. The enacting part applies to all bridges there described, which shall thereafter be erected or built. After the flood in 1807, Tipton Bridge had ceased to exist. The abutments which then remained did not constitute a bridge. The bridge indicted was then erected or built, and is, therefore, within the very words of the statute. The 22 H. 8. c. 5. s. 4. enables justices to tax inhabitants of counties for such reasonable sums as they may think sufficient for the repairing, re-edifying, and amendment of bridges. The word re-edify is not in the statute 43 G. 3. c. 59. s. 5. The object of that enactment was twofold: first, to relieve counties from the burden of repairing an increased number of bridges, which, before the act, might have been cast on them by any irresponsible persons who chose to build a bridge which was

(a) 2 B. & Ad. 813.

1833.

The KING against The Inhabit

ants of the County of DEVON.

after

1833.

The KING against The Inhabit

ants of

the County of

DEVON.

afterwards used by the public; secondly, to prevent the building of insecure and insufficient bridges. Now if, after a bridge has been once built, any person may substitute in lieu of it another, not constructed under the superintendence of the county surveyor, one of the mischiefs contemplated by the legislature may occur. The enactment was intended to apply to bridges rebuilt as well as built. [Parke J. What exempted the inhabitants from repairing the old bridge?] It no longer existed. [Denman C. J. Before the wooden part of the bridge was replaced on the old abutments, the inhabitants of the county were liable to repair; if that part was carried away in consequence of their neglect to repair, does that exempt them for the future?] Undoubtedly they might have been indicted, if guilty of neglect, but the parish took on themselves to build a new bridge. [Littledale J. Suppose judgment were given for the defendants on the ground that this is a new bridge erected since the statute; the inhabitants of the county were liable to be indicted for not repairing the bridge at the time when the wooden part was washed away; and if it was their duty then to repair the old bridge, and the parish has built a new one under a misconception, the inhabitants of the county are still liable to repair the old bridge. If this be not a county bridge, it might be the duty of the county to prostrate it as a nuisance.]

DENMAN C. J. I am of opinion that this is substantially the same bridge as that which existed before 1807. The stone abutments of the old bridge have always remained. It is a public bridge, which the inhabitants of the county are, primâ facie, bound to repair. They say they are not so bound, because it was erected

or

or built since 1803, not under the directions or to the satisfaction of the county surveyor, as required by the 43 G. 3. c. 59. s. 5. I think, however, that this is not a bridge which was built or erected in 1807, within the meaning of those words in that statute, but one which was then repaired and re-edified within the meaning of 22 H. 8. c. 5. s. 4. (a) It consists, for a great part, of the same materials which existed before 1807. But the question, whether it be the same or not, depends not so much on the identity of the materials of which the bridge is from time to time composed, as of the identity of the public right of passage over a bridge at that place.

LITTLEDALE J. In 1801, there was a bridge on the same site as the one indicted, and the inhabitants of the county were bound to repair it. The upper part of this bridge was of wood, and rested at each end on stone abutments. The wooden part was washed away in 1807, but the abutments remained. The inhabitants of the county were at that time bound to repair the bridge, which was then ruinous. If it had been repaired by the county in the manner it was subsequently by the parish, it would have been substantially the same bridge which existed before; and, although it was, in fact, repaired, not by the inhabitants of the county, but by other persons, I think it did continue the same bridge. If, indeed, the abutments, as well as the other parts of the bridge had been destroyed, and an entire new bridge had been built on the same site, I should have doubted, whether such a bridge would

(a) See, as to the words "rebuild and repair," and "re-edify," Doe d. Dymoke v. Wilkers, 2 B. & Ad. 896.

1833.

The KING against The Inhabitants of the County of DEVON.

be

1833.

The KING

against The Inhabitants of

the County of

DEVON.

be within the act or not. The fifth section of the act seems to have had two objects in view: one, that the number of bridges which the county were bound to repair should not be unnecessarily increased; and the other, that individuals or parishes should not take on themselves to build bridges, so as to cast the burden of repair on the county, unless they were properly built, under the directions of the county surveyor. Now, a new bridge built on the site and in lieu of an old one, seems to be within the intention of the legislature, and it is certainly within the words of the statute. It is unnecessary, however, to give a decided opinion on that point, because the bridge here is substantially the same as that which existed before the statute: it not only stands on the same site, but consists in great part of the same materials.

PARKE J. I am of opinion, that the bridge indicted was not built or erected since the passing of the 43 G. 3. c. 59. The evidence is, that there was not in this case an erecting or building of a new bridge, but a repairing of the old one.

PATTESON J. This is, in substance, the same bridge

.1833.

SIMS and Another against BOND and Another.

ASSUMPSIT for money had and received, money where a person 5 BNC.606

lends money

his own

really on

account of
another, the
cannot recover

real lender

the money,

unless he prove
distinctly that
the loan was in

reality intended
to be his, and

paid, &c. Plea, general issue. At the trial before nominally on Denman C. J., at the London sittings after Michaelmas account, but term, 1832, it appeared that the action was brought by the plaintiffs, who were surviving part owners of a vessel called the Princess Charlotte, to recover from the defendants, bankers in London, 1750l., the balance of a banking account, kept in the name of Charles Gribble, a part owner, and ship's husband, and 3478l. 3s. 8d., appearing due from them in an account with John Gribble, his executor. It was proved that Charles Gribble, as ship's husband, was permitted by the owners to have the possession of two warrants for the freight vessel, payable by the East India Company, which warrants had been given by the company on a receipt being signed by Charles Gribble and another of the owners, and which were directed to the cashiers of the

of the

Bank of England, ordering them to pay to the owners of the Princess Charlotte, or bearer, on account of freight. These two warrants Charles Gribble put into the hands of the defendants, in order that they might receive the money, and place it to his credit in an account opened in his name in the defendants' books. This was done; and on Charles Gribble's death, the

was received
as such :
And, there-

fore, where 4.
as the managing

owner of a ves

sel, was per

mitted by the

other owners to

have the pos

session of two

warrants or

orders of the

East India
Company, to

pay to the
said owners or

bearer the sum

of money there.

in mentioned,

for freight;

and 4. depo

sited these war

rants in the

hands of his

bankers, and
they received

the money due on them, and gave him credit for it in account: it was held, on assumpsit brought after A.'s death by the surviving part owners against the bankers, that on proof of the above facts, they could not recover the money, because it was not shewn that the loan was upon their account; for the fact of the warrants being the property of all the part owners, when placed in the bankers' hands, was, upon the evidence, consistent with the supposition that the loan of the proceeds to the bankers was A.'s loan.

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