Page images
PDF
EPUB

1833.

The KING
against
The Justices of
CHESHIRE.

the original order, and proved his notice of appeal; but the respondents contended that the second order was the only one of which the Court could take notice; and the sessions so held. The new order was then confirmed without opposition (a).

(a) The original order was intended to follow the precedent (No. 9.) in 1 Chitty's Burn, p. 1009., tit. Distress for Rent, xxi., but was inaccurately framed. The amended order was as follows:

"Whereas T. W. of P., in the county of Chester, Gent., agent for and on behalf of Sir Thomas S. M. Stanley, Bart., did, on, &c. at, &c., duly make and exhibit before me the Rev. R. M. F., clerk, being one of his Majesty's justices, &c. residing near the place whence the goods and chattels hereafter mentioned were removed, and not being interested in the premises hereinafter mentioned whence the same were removed, his complaint and information in writing against R. O. of, &c. labourer, thereby setting forth," &c. (stating the charge laid in the information, viz. that one W. O. was indebted to Sir T. S. M. S. for rent of certain premises occupied by the said W. O., and that the said rent being in arrear R. 0. did wilfully and knowingly assist him in fraudulently removing from the premises six cows, the goods and chattels of the said W. O., being under the value of 50l., and of the value, &c. with intent to prevent their being distrained for the said rent.) "And thereupon the said R. O. being duly summoned to appear before two of his Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county of Chester, on, &c. at, &c. to answer the said complaint and information; and the said R. O. having appeared accordingly before us the said R. M. F. and the Rev. U. C., clerk, being two of his Majesty's justices, &c. : now we the said justices residing, &c. and not being either of us interested, &c. in the presence of the said R. O., having heard and examined the witnesses produced by the said T. W. upon oath (we the said justices having then and there full power and authority to administer the oaths to the said witnesses) touching the said complaint and information, and having heard what was alleged by the said R. O. in his defence, and having also enquired in better manner upon oath the value of the said cows, and upon due consideration had in the premises, do hereby adjudge that the said R. O. is guilty of the offence with which he is charged in and by the said complaint and information, according to the form of the statute, &c.; and the said justices do adjudge and order the said R. O. to pay to the said Sir T. S. M. S., Bart., the sum of 721. 5s., being double the value of the said cows, goods, and chattels in the said complaint mentioned, on or before the 18th day of February now next, &c. In witness whereof we the said justices to this order have put our hands and seals, at, &c. on," &c.

Signed and sealed by the two justices.

Cot

Cottingham now shewed cause against the rule. Justices may return a conviction to the sessions in a more formal shape than that in which it was drawn up, although a copy has been delivered to the party convicted, Rex v. Barker (a); and the copy so returned to the sessions is the only one which that Court ought to notice, Rex v. Allen (b). The instrument returned here, is drawn up as an order, because the statute so directs, but it is in substance a conviction. [Parke J. The moment the justices have put their hands and seals to it, meaning it to be an order, it is one, and must be subject to the same rules.] Being substantially a conviction, it is within the reason of Rex v. Barker (a), and ought, like a conviction, to be returnable in an amended form. The error here, in the original instrument, was a mere mistake, and if it could not have been corrected, the sessions would have had to adjudicate upon an order which was absurd on the face of it. [Denman C. J. They must have done so if it was the order appealed against. If an order of removal were absurd, could a new one be filed at the sessions? absurdity of the instrument cannot increase the power of the justices. Patteson J. In Rex v. Bissex (c) it was expressly held that an instrument of this kind was to be treated as an order, and not as a conviction.]

Whitcombe, contrà, was stopped by the Court.

The

DENMAN C.J. The strongest point in favour of the respondents is, that the statute directs the justices to

[blocks in formation]

(c) 1 Chitty's Burn, 985. note (a), tit. Distress for Rent, V. Sayer's Rep. 304.

1833.

The KING
against

The Justices of
CHESHIRE.

VOL. V.

G g

determine

1833.

The KING
against

The Justices of
CHESHIRE.

determine whether or not the person be guilty, which

certainly makes the proceeding very like a conviction.
But still the adjudication is to be by an order. One
distinction between an order and a conviction is decisive;
namely, that, in a conviction, evidence is set out, upon
which the court of appeal is to form a judgment: in an
order, none is stated. The document here is only an
order; and the consequence is, that the party affected
had a right to appeal against it in the form in which it
was made.
The rule must be absolute.

LITTLEDALE, PARKE, and PATTESON JS. concurred.

Rule absolute.

Wednesday,

June 12th.

the jurors of a court leet holden for a borough and manor, to pre

The KING against The Duke of BEAUFORT.

A custom for MANDAMUS to the defendant, lord of the borough and manor of Loughor, in the county of Glamorgan, and to the steward and port-reeve, recited that the borough and manor of Loughor was an ancient borough and manor, and, by immemorial usage and custom used

sent persons to

be admitted

burgesses of the borough, and

for the persons

in the borough, the jurors of the court leet holden for so presented to the borough and manor of Loughor have and exercise,

be admitted

and sworn in burgesses, was

held, on motion

in arrest of judgment, to

be valid in law.

and of right ought, &c. the privilege and authority of presenting persons to be admitted burgesses of the said borough; and by such immemorial usage and custom the persons so presented by the jury to be admitted burgesses have been used to be and of right ought to be sworn in by the steward of the borough and manor, and admitted burgesses thereof; and further recited

that

that one T. Walters, on the 2d of May 1828, was, by the jury of the court leet holden for the borough and manor, presented as a fit person to be admitted a burgess of the borough, and in respect thereof, according to such immemorial usage and custom, had a right to be sworn in and admitted a burgess of the borough, and that he had, since such presentment, demanded to be sworn in and admitted, but had been refused: it then commanded the defendants to cause him to be sworn in and admitted. The lord and steward, after denying the custom stated in the mandamus, returned, as the immemorial custom used in the borough, that "all persons admitted or claiming to be admitted burgesses have been and ought to be presented by the jurors, previous to their being admitted and sworn as burgesses of the borough; but that no person by the said jurors presented to be such burgess has been or ought as of right to be sworn and admitted a burgess, except persons being sons of burgesses of the borough, born after their fathers have been sworn in burgesses, and persons married to the daughters of burgesses, born after their fathers have been so sworn in, and persons having served apprenticeships for the term of seven years to burgesses of the borough, residing during such apprenticeship within the borough, and which persons have been used and ought to be thereupon duly presented by the said jurors to be admitted burgesses of the borough. The return then stated that Walters did not come within any one of those classes of persons, and that he was not qualified to be admitted a burgess on any presentment of the jurors, and that he was not duly presented by the jurors to be of right thereupon admitted.

G g 2

1833.

The KING against The Duke of BEAUFORT.

1833.

The KING against The Duke of BEAUFORT.

admitted. The return of the port-reeve is not material. The prosecutor, by his plea, denied that the custom was limited, as in the return was

that issue was tendered and joined.

alleged; and upon

At the trial before for the county of

Alderson J., at the Spring assizes
Glamorgan, 1832, the jury found a verdict for the
crown. A rule nisi was afterwards obtained to arrest
the judgment, upon the ground that the custom stated
in the mandamus was bad, inasmuch as the effect of it
was to constitute the leet jury of the borough and manor
of Loughor electors of the freemen for that borough,
which jury might possibly consist of persons, none of
whom were corporators, or even inhabitants of the
borough.

The cus

E. V. Williams in this term shewed cause. tom stated in the mandamus is good. In Rex v. Rowland (a), a plea to a quo warranto stated that a court leet was, in part, holden in the morning and in part in the evening; and that the usage had been to elect a burgess to be mayor at the morning court; and it was proved, in addition, that a jury of the leet used to present the person elected to be sworn in by the steward at the evening court, which burgess had been accustomed to be sworn into the office of mayor, at such evening court, by the steward or his deputy; and the only objection there taken was, that the latter usage ought to have been stated in pleading, as a necessary part of the custom. In Rex v. Joliffe (b), a similar custom, as to the nomination of jurors, was stated, and no objection taken. There is no reason why the king should not grant to the court leet for the manor and borough, authority to

(a) 3 B. & 4. 130.

(b) 2 B. & C. 54.

present

« PreviousContinue »