1833. The KING against The Inhabit ants of WICK ST. LAWRENCE. shew that that matter was not brought before the arbitrator, Golightly v. Jellico (a). In Rex v. Denbighshire (b) an appeal was dismissed, on the ground that it was entered on behalf of one overseer only, and then a second notice was given by two. The second appeal was heard and decided on the merits in favour of the appellants, and this Court refused to disturb that decision. [Taunton J. There a new state of facts had intervened.] So it has here; for the pauper had parted with the property which made him irremovable at the time when the first order was made. In 1822 he was in possession of property too small to give him a settlement, but which made him irremovable. This point. is adverted to in Phillips on Evidence, vol. i. p. 329. (7th edit.), where it is said that it will be competent to the respondents to prove that the judgment in the former appeal, reversing the order of removal of the pauper, was given, not on enquiry into the settlement, but on the preliminary objection that the pauper was not chargeable. The Solicitor-General and Rogers contrà. A judgment of a court of quarter sessions, confirming an order of removal, being in rem, is conclusive, not only as between the contending parishes, but against all the world, that the pauper was, at the time of that order, settled in the parish to which he was removed; but a judgment of a court of quarter sessions, quashing an order of removal, without assigning, on the face of it, any special reason for doing so, is conclusive against the removing parish, that the pauper, at the time when the order was made, (a) 4 T. R. 147. note (a). (b) 1 B. & Ad. 616. was was not settled in the parish to which he was removed, and that on the presumption that the order was quashed on the merits, and that the sessions must therefore have adjudged that the pauper was not settled in that parish; nor is parol evidence admissible to shew that the decision proceeded on any other ground. Secondly, if such evidence could in any case be given to explain the ground on which the judgment had proceeded, it cannot be done in the present case, because the order was quashed by consent, and the special ground attempted to be proved was not even stated to the court of quarter sessions. It has been the general understanding of the profession, that an order of sessions, quashing an order of removal, is conclusive between the contending parishes; and on that ground it has been a frequent practice to apply to the court of sessions to make a special entry of the ground on which an order is quashed. In Rex v. St. Andrew Holborn (a), the special ground for quashing the order of removal was stated on the face of the order of sessions. In Osgathorpe v. Diseworth (b), it does not distinctly appear, from the report, whether or not the special ground for quashing the first order of removal was stated on the face of the order of sessions. There the pauper, at the time when the first order was made, must have been removed on the ground that he was likely to become chargeable; but as that was no ground for removing a certificated man, as soon as the certificate was produced, the order must have been quashed; but afterwards he became chargeable, and was removed a second time. [Patteson J. Evidence must have been (a) 6 T. R. 615. (b) 2 Str. 1256. Burr. S. C. 261. 1833. The KING against The Inhabitants of WICK ST. LAWRENCE. 1833. The KING against The Inhabit given on the trial of the second appeal to shew that the pauper was a certificate man, though the first order on the face of it was good.] The second order of removal must have been different from the first. The first must ST. LAWRENCE. have stated that the pauper was likely to become ants of WICK chargeable; the second, that he was actually so. In Rex v. Wheelock (a), what is said by Bayley J. is a mere obiter dictum. It was sufficient ground for the decision there, that the sessions had pronounced their judgment, and that this Court is not a court of error from that. In Mungerhunger v. Warden (b), two justices removed a pauper from the parish of Warden to the parish of Mungerhunger, which appealed, and the order was reversed for a defect of form; but the order was good. Afterwards the parish of Mungerhunger sent the pauper back: yet, the order being good, it was held final, and a bar to all subsequent orders. Here it must be taken primâ facie that the first order of removal was quashed on the merits, no special ground being stated on the face of the order. [Parke J. The parol evidence rebuts the primâ facie presumption that the court of quarter sessions adjudicated on the settlement; it shews that no evidence was heard.] That evidence was not admissible. The Court must be understood to have adjudicated only on the facts legitimately brought before them. Assuming that evidence might have been admissible to prove that the order was quashed because the pauper was irremovable, there was no sufficient evidence here to shew that it was not quashed on the merits of the settlement. The only proof was, that the parties consented to its being quashed. (a) 5 B. & C. 511. (b) Cited 6 T. R. 614. DENMAN 1833. The KING against The Inhabitants of WICK DENMAN C. J. The only question submitted to us by the court of quarter sessions is, whether the parol evidence was properly admitted. The justices have drawn their conclusion from the facts proved; and I think it sufficiently appeared that the consent was given ST. LAWRENCE in consequence of its having been discovered that the pauper was irremovable. The question, as to the admissibility of the parol evidence, depends on the nature of the point actually decided by the court of quarter sessions when they quashed the first order of removal; for judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction directly on the point are, as evidence, conclusive between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question in another suit. Upon this principle a judgment of the court of sessions confirming an order of removal is conclusive not only against the parish to which the removal is directed to be made, but (being a judgment in rem) against all the world, that the pauper, at the time when that order was made, was settled in the parish to which he was sent; for that is the point which the sessions must have decided when they confirmed the order of removal. An order of sessions, quashing an order of removal, is also conclusive between the contending parishes as to the point decided by it. Then the question is, what that point really is. It is that the parish to which the removal was directed to be made was not bound to receive the pauper. The Court may have come to that decision, either on the ground that the pauper was not settled in the parish to which he was sent; or that he was not chargeable, or was irremovable when the order was made. That being the effect of an order of sessions quashing an order of removal, it seems to follow that if 1833. The KING against The Inhabitants of WICK it be offered as evidence to prove that the pauper was not settled in the appellant parish, it may be shewn by parol evidence, that the judgment proceeded upon some other ground. It is said that the sessions ought to have ST. LAWRENCE. made a special entry of the ground on which they quashed the order of removal, and that there being no such entry, it must be presumed that they decided on the merits; but in Osgathorpe v. Diseworth (a) there was no such entry on the face of the order, and therefore parol evidence must have been given on the trial of the second appeal to shew that the pauper was a certificated man when the first order of removal was made, and consequently not chargeable. That is an authority expressly in point; and in Rex v. Wheclock (b), Bayley and Holroyd Js. refused to compel the sessions by mandamus to make a special entry of the cause for which they had quashed an order of removal; and that on the ground that the party had his remedy by giving, on the trial of a second appeal, parol evidence of the distinct ground on which the order of removal was quashed. It is said that admitting parol evidence to explain such an order of sessions, will be inconvenient; but supposing the inconvenience were greater than any I can see in the case, injustice is the greatest of inconveniences, and when an order of removal has been discharged, not on the merits but on other grounds, it would be great injustice if it could be set up as a decision on the merits, by a party who knew that they had not been enquired into. PARKE J. The only question referred to us by the sessions, is, whether they were right in receiving the (a) 2 Str. 1256. Burr. S. C. 261. (b) 5 B. & C. 511. parol |