ceased to carry on the trade, and that at the death of A. he had not any stock in trade, and that no account of the said stock in trade in the condition mentioned was or could be taken at the time of the death of A., or from thence hitherto: Held on demurrer that the true construction of the condition of the bond was, that the obligor had an option to continue or discontinue the trade during the life of A.; and that he having discontinued it, the event on which the money was to come to the children of A. had never happened; and that the plea therefore was good. Beswick v. Swindells, H. 4 W. 4. Page 914

BREWER.

See ASSUMPSI, 2.

BRIDGE.

Before the statute 43 G. 3. c. 59. there had been a public county bridge, which was of wood, resting on stone abutments. After that statute passed, the wooden part of the bridge was, during a flood, carried some distance down the river, but the stone abutments remained. Part of the wooden materials being afterwards collected together, were, with new materials formed into the upper part of a bridge, which was wider than it had been before the flood, and placed upon the old abutments. This was done at the expence of the parish, and not under the direction of the county surveyor: Held, that this was not a bridge erected or built after the passing o 43 G. 3. c. 59. s. 5.; and that the inhabitants of the county were bound to repair it. The King v. The Inhabitants of the County of Devon, T. 3 W. 4. 383

BROKER.

See INSURANCE Broker.

BUILDING.

See INDICTMENT, 3.

BURGESS.

See CUSTOM, 1, 2.

BUTTER, SALE OF.

See VENDOR And Vendee, 1.

CANAL ACT.

1. By acts of parliament enabling a company to make and maintain a canal navigation, and to take lands for that purpose making satisfaction, it was provided that the company should not take any garden ground without consent of the respective owners and occupiers, and that any action to be brought for any thing done in pursuance of those acts, should be commenced within six calendar months next after the fact should have been committed; or if there should be a continuance of damages, then within six calendar months next after the committing of such damage should have ceased.

The company wishing to take garden ground for the purpose of sloping the banks of the canal, told the occupier, or tenant, that they had obtained the consent of the owner's agent, without which the tenant would not have given them permission; but the statement was not true. They then paid him a sum which he demanded on account of a former transaction, after which they entered and sloped away the ground. The land in consequence was from thence

thenceforth overflowed by the Thames at every high tide. For this damage the landlord sued the company more than six calendar months after the ground was taken, and the tide was let in:

Held, that the injury was one for which an action should have been brought within six months from the taking away of the land; and that the defendants were within the protection of the limiting clause, inasmuch as the act complained of was really done for the purpose contemplated by the statutes, though in the prosecution of that purpose the defendants had been guilty of a misrepresentation and of bad faith towards the occupier. Lord Oakley v. The Kensington Canal Company, T. 3 W. 4. Page 138 2. A river navigation act directed that the salary of the clerk to the commissioners should be paid by the proprietors of the tolls. A person seised in fee of a part of the navigation and tolls, granted annuities, and conveyed her part of the tolls to a trustee, to secure the annuities, and to permit her to hold the conveyed premises and the profits thereof to her own use, till default in payment of such annuities. By a subsequent deed she conveyed the premises in fee to Y. together with other property, in trust to sell as in the deed was directed, and to receive the proceeds of such sale, and the tolls and profits of the navigation; and out of the several receipts and profits to defray the costs and expences necessary for carrying the trusts into effect, to pay up, and if possible discharge the annuities, to pay off certain creditors and to hold the surplus, if any, for her benefit.

The trustee under the last men. tioned deed entered into receipt of the tolls, appointed a collector

and represented himself to the commissioners as a mortagee of the tolls, and as having a control over them and over the repairs of the navigation, but refused to pay the salary of the clerk. The annuities were still subsisting. The clerk sued the trustee for nonpayment of his salary :

Held, that it lay upon the trus tee having conducted himself as above stated, to shew that he was not a proprietor within the meaning of the act: Held further on on reference to the several deeds, that he was such proprietor, although he only held the tolls in trust to pay creditors and discharge incumbrances, and although there was a legal estate outstanding in a trustee, to secure the annuities.

The act, passed in 1794, required that certain notices should be given in the Northampton and Cambridge newspapers. There was at that time one newspapepublished at each place. A news paper was subsequently established called The Huntingdon, Bedford, and Peterborough Gazette, and Cambridge and Hertford Independ ent Press; and it was published (among other places) at Cam bridge: Held, that publication of the notices in the former papers was sufficient. Tibbits, Gent. One, &c. v. Yorke, M. 4 W. 4. Page 605

CAPIAS.

See PRACTICE, 12.

CERTIFICATE. See BANKRUPTt, 3.

CERTIORARI.

See INDICTMENT, 1. SESSIONS. CHELSEA

CHELSEA WATER WORKS'

COMPANY.

See POOR RATE.

CLERK TO COMMISSIONERS OF NAVIGABLE CANAL.

See CANAL Act, 2.

CLERK TO TRUSTEES UNDER A TURNPIKE ACT.

See MANDAMUS, 2.

CLOSES IN WHICH, &c.

See PLEADING, 3.

COAL MINES, RATEABILITY

OF.

See INCLOSURE Act, 2.

COMMENCEMENT OF RISK.

See INSURANCE, 2.

CONDITION.

See BOND, 1, 2, 3.

CONDITION PRECEDENT.

See LEASE, 3.

CONVICTION. See JUSTICES, 1.

COPARCENER. See LIVERY OF SEISIN.

COPYHOLD.

Page 131

1. Copyholds are within the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4. which avoids all conveyances of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, made for the intent and of purpose to defraud and deceive persons that shall afterwards purchase the same. Doe d. Tunstill v. Bottriell, T. 3 W. 4. 2. A copyholder in fee surrendered to the use of another person and afterwards and before the admittance of the surrenderee, committed and was convicted of simple felony there being a custom in the manor that any tenant of customary tenements who should commit and be convicted of felony, should forfeit his said tenements to the lord: Held, that the surrenderor before admittance was still tenant for the purpose of forfeiture, and that his estate was forfeited to the lord, and the surrenderee not entitled to be admitted. The King v. Lady Jane St. John Mildmay, T. 3 W. 4. 254 3. At a court baron, held in 1812, before the steward of a manor, two copyhold tenements were granted to W. R. and J. H., habendum for their lives and the life of the longest liver of them successively at the will of the lord according to the custom of the manor, at the yearly rents of 26s. 4d. and 7s. all services therefore due, and a heriot when it should happen, and the said W. R. was admitted tenant; but the admission and fealty of J. H. were respited until,

&c.

In 1823 the lessees of the manor by deed appointed C. L. steward of the manor, with full power to hold courts baron and customary courts, and to do all acts usual to be done by stewards in relation there

thereunto; and they more especially authorised him to make any voluntary grants of customary or copyhold lands within or parcel of the manor, and to give licences to demise, or otherwise, as he the said C. L. should think fit, and either in or out of court as fully as the lessees might or could do.

At a court baron held out of the manor in 1825, J. H. (who survived W. R.) surrendered to the lords lessees the above mentioned copyhold messuages, and the lessees by C.L. their steward granted them again to W. H. L. and J. W. W. habendum for their lives, and the life of the longest liver of them successively, according to the custom of the manor, at the yearly rent of 26s. 4d. and 7s. and all services therefore due, and a heriot for each of the said tenements when it should happen, according to the custom of the manor; and J.H. L. and J. W. W. were admitted tenants:

Held, that it was no objection to this grant that J. H. the surviving life under the grant of 1812 was never admitted tenant: nor that two rents were reserved, without distinguishing how much was payable for each tenement the same rents having been reserved by a former grant in 1771: nor that a heriot was reserved for each tenement when it should happen, according to the custom of the manor; for if a heriot was not demandable for each tenement, the claim could not be enforced; but that would not avoid the grant:

Held, secondly, that a customary court cannot be held out of the manor unless there be a custom to warrant it; and if one be held out of it without such custom, it is void, and such things there done, as are required to be done at a court, such as presentments by the homage, imposing fines, levy.

ing fines, and suffering recoveries, are void:

But thirdly, that as the lord may grant to or admit a copyhold tenant, not only out of court, but also out of the manor, the grant of 1825, if it had been made by the lord, would have been good, though it purported to have been made at a void court:

Held, fourthly, that a steward cannot in his mere character of steward admit a copyhold tenant out of the manor.

Fifthly, that as C. L. by the deed of 1823 had a special authority to make any voluntary grants, either in or out of court, as fully as the lessees of the manor could do, he might take the surrender, and make the grant in question out of the manor; and that although he professed in making the grant, to act only as steward and not as the special agent of the lord, the grant so made might operate as a grant made by the lord's attorney, and was therefore valid.

Sixthly, that although, in general, to make a party tenant by copy of court roll, his admission ought to be notified, for the information of the tenants, at the next or some other court, and a regular entry of it made by certificate, presentment, &c.; yet, as the proceedings at this void court were entered by the steward on the court rolls, as if done at a valid court, the tenants must, at a following court, after the admittance, have had information of what had been done, and that was sufficient. Doe dem. Leach and Another v. Whitaker, T. 3 W. 4.

Page 409 4. If a copyholder pull down a barn, without any intention of rebuilding, the lord cannot recover the place from him, on the ground ot a forfeiture, if the jury find that the premises are not damaged.

Doc

Doe dem. Grubb v. The Earl of Burlington, M. 4 W. 4. Page 507 5. A. and B. by a settlement made

on occasion of their intended marriage (which afterwards took place) conveyed certain freehold estates to trustees, for the benefit of themselves and the survivor of them for life, then for the benefit of the issue of the marriage, if any, and if none, then to the use of such person as the wife by deed or last will, notwithstanding her coverture, and as if she was sole and unmarried, should appoint, and in default of appointment to the use of herself in fee. The wife at the time of the marriage was seised in tail of certain copyhold lands.

The

The husband and wife afterwards executed a power of attorney to C., authorising him to surrender the copyhold lands of which the wife was seised in tail to a third person, in order to make him tenant to the præcipe or plaint in a recovery intended to be suffered in the manor court. wife, previous to her executing the power of attorney, was examined apart from her husband, by the deputy steward of the manor. The recovery was suffered, and immediately afterwards the premises were surrendered to the same uses as those mentioned in the marriage settlement: Held, that the power of attorney was valid as the act of the husband; he having sufficient interest in his wife's copyhold lands to pass them by surrender during the joint lives. of himself and his wife; and that the recovery (which had stood unreversed for twenty years) was therefore well suffered.

After the above surrender, the wife was admitted to other copyhold lands, which were not surrendered to the use of her will. By her will, made in 1802, she devised her real and leasehold

estates to certain persons therein named. At the date of her will and of her death she was seised of freehold estates: Held, that the will was a valid disposition of the copyhold which had been surrendered to the use of her will, though it did not refer to the surrender in which the right of disposition was reserved, and though it was made after she ceased to be a feme covert :

Held further, that the copyholds which had not been surrendered to the use of the will, did not pass by the general devise of the real estate, the will having been made before the 55 G. 3. c. 192. Doe dem. Smith v. Bird and Another, M. 4 W. 4. Page 695

CORONERS.

The court on the application of the crown, set aside a coroner's inquisition, for defects apparent on the face of it. Rule absolute in the first instance. In the Matter of Culley, T. 3 W. 4. 230

CORPORATE OFFICER.

See MANDAMUS.

CORPORATION.

See QUO WARRANTO.

In an action against a corporation on a bond, the condition of which recited, that the company were, by act of parliament, authorised to raise money by bond, and that at a general assembly of the company of proprietors, it had been resolved that the bond in question should be issued for that purpose, the defendants pleaded non est factum: Held, that although the company could not, under that plea, shew that the bond executed

by