The Love of Truth.

"Whatsoever things are true, think on these things."

DISC. II.]

PHILIPPIANS, iv. 8.

THE injunction of the text, to think on whatsoever things are

true, obviously implies that the love of truth, for its own sake, is a habit which we are bound to cultivate and cherish. If it is the circumstance of their being true, which entitles these things to our attention and regard, and makes it our duty to investigate and pursue them, there must be something in truth, essentially considered, which commends it to the moral approbation of the species. It is to be regretted that philosophers, in commenting upon the obligation of veracity, have not paid sufficient attention to the habit or general disposition of the soul, which lies at the foundation of every form of the virtue—

of accuracy in narrative, sincerity in conduct, and fidelity to engagements. Commentators have even gone so far as to maintain that the apostle, in the words before us, had his eye only upon that species of truth, which relates to the social intercourse of men; taking it for granted that this is the only kind of truth to which an ethical character pertains. One* represents him as describing "moral characters and the duties of a Christian," and accordingly restricts his meaning to “integrity and uprightness in opposition to hypocrisy, insincerity, or moral falsehood." The conviction seems to be common, that the operations of the understanding are not immediately under the cognizance of conscience, and that of the processes by which we form our speculative opinions, virtue and vice can neither be affirmed nor denied. These speculations are often directed to subjects in their own nature indifferent, and it is confidently inferred, that because the objects of our thoughts have nothing to do with the distinctions of

* Dr. Watts. Sermon on this text.

morality, our thoughts themselves are equally exempt from a moral character. Hence has arisen the dogma that we are not responsible for our opinions. The understanding is treated as a series of faculties, subject to its own laws, moving in a peculiar and restricted sphere, having no other connection with conscience than as it analyzes and applies the rules of morality to the cases of practice, which are constantly occurring in the business of the world. It may study, arrange and digest the moral code, but the laws which it acknowledges have no reference to its own processes, but only to the conduct of life.

This, however, is not the doctrine of the Scriptures. They represent the domain of morality as extending to the whole nature of

man.

Whatever directly or indirectly falls under the jurisdiction of the will possesses an ethical character, and may be the occasion to us of praise or blame, according to the principles and habits by which we have been governed. The morality does not attach to the processes or faculties themselves, but to

the spirit and temper, the motives and purposes, which have shaped and determined their operations. There is a general sense in which all the elements of our spiritual nature are in subjection to the will. The springs of action, in our appetites, affections and desires, with which we are endowed, all act blindly; they simply impel, but they do not direct. They cannot regulate their own motions; they cannot prescribe the extent or circumstances of their gratification, or determine the relative value of the objects which elicit them. They rouse the will; and that must consult the conscience and the understanding as to the course to be pursued. Corresponding to

all these springs of action there are moral laws, in obedience to which the will must control them. These laws, ingrained into the nature, and invested with the supremacy which belongs to them, are so many habits of virtue, the complement of which makes up integrity of character. In the springs of action themselves there is nothing directly virtuous or vicious-they are simply indifferent.

It is when they have put the man in the attitude of motion that responsibility begins, and according to the principles upon which he treats them he is entitled to praise or blame. These motive impulses are adjusted to the whole nature of man. Some spring from the body and operate at periodic intervals—such as hunger and thirst, the appetite of sex, and the desire of repose. There is nothing virtuous or vicious in any of the naked appetites; but virtue and vice may attach to the methods of their gratification. There may be excess, as in gluttony and drunkenness, food may be unlawfully procured, or may consist of materials prejudicial to the health of the system. Other springs of action are directed to the mind-among which one of the most prominent is curiosity, or the desire of knowledge. In this, also, there is nothing directly moral; but an ethical character ensues, the very moment the will pronounces upon the manner, the ends, and the extent of its gratification. When the question arises, how shall this desire of knowledge be gratified? there