"What were the grounds on which the plea of prescription usually rested? And in what cases was it where any existing order of things, though violent and unjust in its original institution, had by lapse of time been so meliorated and softened down, and reconciled to the feelings of mankind, had so accommo dated itself to the manners and prejudices, and interwoven itself with the habits of a country, that the remembrance of its original usurpation was lost in the experience of present harmlessness or utility? Conquest was often of this nature: violent and unjustifiable in its first introduction, it did often happen, that the conquerors and the conquered became blended into one peo ple, and that a system of common interest arose out of the conciliated differences of parties originally hostile. But was this the case with the slave-trade? Was it in its outset only that it had any thing of violence, of injustice, or of oppression? Were the wounds which Africa felt in the first conflict healed and skinned over? Or were they fresh and green as at the moment when the first slave-ship began its ravages upon the coast? Were the oppressors and oppressed so reconciled to each other that no trace of enmity remained? Or was it in reason, or in common sense, to claim a prescriptive right, not to the fruits of an ancient and forgotten crime, committed long ago, and traceable only in its consequences, but to a series of new violences, to a chain of fresh enormities, to cruelties not continued but repeated, and of which every individual instance inflicted a fresh calamity, and constituted a fresh, a separate, and substantive, crime?

"He could not conceive that, in refusing to sanction the continuance of such a system, the House would feel itself as in the smallest degree impairing the respect due to the establishments of antiquity, or shaking the foundations of the British constitution."

Mr. Pitt, as usual, seconded the endeavours of the abolitionists by means of a long and able speech; but what is very remarkable, although, until of late, he has been accustomed to carry every question in which he interested himself, by means of a triumphant majority, yet, in respect to this, he has been uniformly in a minority!

Mr. Canning by this time had acquired considerable weight in parliament; as he was obviously in the confidence of Ministers, every opportunity was Jaid hold of to attack his opinions and conduct; and, among other things, he, as well as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were both accused of making use of exasperating language in respect to Bonaparte, who was then only First Consul. In reply to a leading member of the Opposition,who had insisted on the impolicy of such a measure, he expressed himself as follows, in the debate of July 18, 1800 !

"For my own part," said the member for Wendover, “having taken some share on former occasions in that which is called abuse of Bonaparte, I am not sorry to have an opportunity of saying a very few words upon this subject, especially as I understand that much has lately been said in this place of the unmanliness of the attacks which were made on the character of the First Consul, and the anxiety which it is apprehended some persons must feel to retract and disavow all that they then so rashly and illiberally uttered. Now, Sir, as I feel no sort of shame, and entertain not the smallest disposition to retract any thing that was then said, I wish to explain the principles upon which I spoke, and upon which I now maintain whatever I did then say. My principle, Sir, is simply this: there is but one thing, which I never wish to forbear speaking when called upon, and which, having spoken, I can at no time feel ashamed of, nor consent to disavow, retract, or qualify; and that is the truth. If what was said of Bonaparte was untrue, that is an accusation of which I know the meaning, and which, if need be, I am prepared to argue. But if it was true, I confess I am at a loss to conceive where the shame lies, or where the necessity for contradicting it. If indeed the nature and essence of truth were capable of being altered by subsequent events, there might be some call for caution in uttering it, and there might be some room for qualification afterwards. But if this be not the case, I really do not comprehend what is meant by desiring us, who said what we thought of Bonaparte's past actions at the time when we were Ii 2 called

called upon to examine them, and who still think precisely what we said of them, to take any shame to ourselves for our lan guage. I at least still think as I then thought; and I do not see what ground the events of the last campaign can furnish for changing my opinion. If, for instance, in Bonaparte's inva sion of Egypt (for that was one of the points more particularly brought forward in these discussions), there was treachery and fraud; if, in his conduct toward its inhabitants, there was unprovoked cruelty; if, in his assumption of the turban, there was impious hypocrisy; I called these qualities by their name: I call them so still; and I say that this hypocrisy, this cruelty, and this fraud, have left indelible stains upon his character, which all the laurels of Marengo cannot cover, nor all its blood wash away. I know, Sir, there is a cautious, cowardly, bastard morality, which assumes the garb and, tone of wisdom, and which prescribes to you to live with an enemy as if he were one day to become your friend, I distrust this doctrine for one reason, because I fear the same mind which could pride itself on adopting it, would be capable of entertaining the doctrine which is the converse of it, and would prescribe living with a friend as if he were one day to become an enemy. If this be wisdom, I do not boast it; I can only say, Heaven grant me a host of such enemies, rather than one such friend!

"So much, Sir, as to the moral question upon this point. But then as to the practical result, what is it that gentlemen are afraid of? Do they seriously apprehend, that with such declared opinions of Bonaparte's personal character, Ministers can never treat with him? Nothing surely can be more visionary than such an apprehension, If the nation with whom we are at war, thinking (I suppose) for reasons of its own, more favourably of his character, or for whatever other reason, choose to make this man the depository of the power of the State, and the organ of its intercourse with foreign powers, Ministers may lament they may be surprised at such a choice; but where did gentle men learn, that between these Ministers, and a. Government whose character and principles they disapproved, there could be no treaty? Not from the experience of the present war; for in the time of the good old Directory, what floods of abuse were poured upon our Ministers from the reading desks of the

Assemblies?

Assemblies and yet I never heard this urged as an impedi ment to treaty, either on the part of France or of this country. Not from the history of former wars; for in the wars against Louis XIV. the addresses carried up from this and the other House of Parliament, nay, the sacred lips which spoke from the throne of this kingdom, breathed stronger invectives against that Monarch than are to be found in any of the state papers so much complained of for the harshness of their language towards Bona parte; and yet I never heard that these just invectives were considered as throwing any obstacle in the way of negotiation or that, when the time of negotiation came, the conclusion of peace was in fact retarded by them. But perhaps there may be some distinction to be taken; perhaps the dignity of a lawful sovereign will bear without wincing rougher language than that with which it is decent or delicate to tickle the ears of an usurper.

"But neither, Sir, was the attack upon the character of Bonaparte a wanton and unprovoked attack, as the honourable gentleman would represent it. When Bonaparte challenged us to acknowledge and act upon the stability of his Government before it was three days old, we doubted, as well we might, the stability of such a Government, and thought all probabilities against it. To clear up our doubts, he referred us to his personal cha racter, as the pledge both of the permanency of his power, and for the use which he would make of it. What were we to do? to acquiesce, without examination, in what we heartily and in our consciences disbelieved? or to examine the value of the pledge which was offered us, and to give our reasons for not being willing to accept it? We preferred the latter alternative, as in fairness and in common sense we were compelled to do. What ground then had we to estimate Bonaparte's personal character, but his past actions? These, therefore, we were obliged to scrutinize; in scrutinizing them we were struck with their deformity; and that deformity we were obliged to expose to the world as a justification of our own conduct.

"If the event has contradicted the expectations which it was natural to form under the circumstances of the times; if the exfraordinary, and certainly unlooked-for successes of the campaign have given stability to Bonaparte's power (for the present,

at least-whatever may and must in all human probability, be the ultimate fate of a power so acquired, and resting on such foundations); if the battle of Marengo, though it did not overthrow Austria, has subjugated France; undoubtedly this change of circumstances may authorize and warrant a change of policy; and supposing the time to arrive when negotiation may be in other respects proper, undoubtedly (speaking my own indivi dual opinion) I should say that the question of Bonaparte's power would not now stand, as it before did most necessarily stand, in the way of negotiation."

Notwithstanding this, it appears to have been afterwards felt that a treaty could not be entered into between the Ministry of that day and the French government for Mr. Pitt at length resigned; and although the ostensible reasons made use of upon that occasion bore a different complexion, yet as they were never acted upon, and the same men afterwards returned to power, subject to the same pedicament, it is not altogether unfair to suppose, that the individual hostility adopted by Ministers, proved but little serviceable either to themselves or the nation.

Mr.Canning immediately retired with his friends on the dissolution of the administration, in which he had borne a part; and although he did not approve of the treaty of Amiens, yet we find that he declined either voting or speaking on that subject.

"

'Circumstances which I do not think it necessary to trouble the House with explaining," said he, soon after that event, “have prevented me from taking any part in the discussions which have lately occupied Parliament. But although by these circumstances, and by the feelings arising out of them, I have found myself precluded from expressing, even by my vote, the opinion which I certainly have formed upon the general subject of the peace which his Majesty has been advised to conclude;