1803. v. WILLOE. Mr. Burston, Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Mahaffy, and Mr. R. Smith for the plaintiff insisted, 1st. That the producing the BATEMAN second bill of miscellaneous expenses in evidence on the trial, and taking a verdict for the amount of it, after having agreed to waive it, was such an unconscientious proceeding as a court of equity would relieve against, and if the court has jurisdiction in such a case, the fatality which occurred here respecting the motion for a new trial, will not take away that jurisdiction, although the court of law had a concurrent jurisdiction if the motion had been regularly brought before it. A case of Moore v. Kyan under similar circumstances,(a) occurred in this court in Lord LIFFORD'S time, in which his Lordship granted the injunction and ordered the accounts as prayed. 2. That supposing the verdict must be taken to be now conclusive as to the subject matter of the action at law, yet it appears in the case that a sum of 61% and upwards was left unsettled by the arbitrators, which could not have come in question upon the trial at law, and appears, even upon the answer of the defendant, not to have been completely settled to this day, and this affords a ground for equitable relief on the account prayed: and in a case of this nature where injustice has plainly been done to the plaintiff, the court will willingly lay hold of any ground that will warrant its interposition. Mr. O'Grady, Mr. Plunket, Mr. Franks, and Mr. S. Rice were for the defendant. Lord CHANCELLOR. This case has shewn that the eagerness of the parties will produce argument where the matter lies in a very narrow compass. It is said that Mr. Bateman has been ill used by (a) The particular facts of this case were not stated 1803. BATEMAN V. WILLOE. Not sufficient to shew that injustice has been done; it must be shewn that the court is warranted to interfere. Mr. Willoe, and great injustice done him: Supposing that to be the case; it is not sufficient to shew that injustice has been done, but that it has been done under circumstances which authorize the court to interfere; because if a matter has already been investigated in a court of justice according to the common and ordinary rules of investigation, a court of equity cannot take on itself to enter into it again. Rules are established, some by the legislature, some by the courts themselves, for the purpose of putting an end to litigation, and it is more important that an end should be put to litigation than that justice should be done in every case; the truth is, that, owing to the inattention of parties and several other causes, exact justice can very seldom be done. Now see what the circumstances of this case are: (Here his Lordship stated the case). It is objected to the verdict which has been obtained that there are many unreasonable charges, and also that the defendant did not give credit for several sums for which he ought to have given credit, and which were not included in the account taken by the arbitrators. The question first to be considered is, were these objections open before the jury, and I apprehend they were; one of the bills, it is said, was waived by Willoe, in consideration of the 700. being paid on the arbitration, and therefore ought not afterwards to have been made the subject of a charge, and Mr. Silke is examined to prove that fact; if the fact was one which ought to be conclusive on Willoe, Silke might have proved it on the trial, and the jury would have determined whether Bateman was chargeable with it or not: Silke was not brought forward then, but is now examined, upon what is in truth a bill for a new trial. I cannot find any ground whatever for a court of equity to interfere, because a party has not brought forward evidence which was in his power at the trial: I cannot grant a new trial. 1803. BATEMAN V. WILLOE. It is also said that credit has not been given for these several sums composing the sum of £61: 15: 5 1-2 mentioned at the foot of this cash account: these sums are certainly marked with the initials of the arbitrators, intimating that credit had not been given for them: what does this amount to? that Bateman had not produced evidence before the arbitrators to shew that Willoe was chargeable with these sums; it is not. a determination of these gentlemen that he was chargeable with them, but only that these several sums were sums in dispute at that time between Willoe and Bateman. Whether Willoe had a right to charge them or not was a matter capable of being laid before a jury, and if Bateman had shewn that he ought to have credit for these sums, credit must have been given him, if he took the proper means for that purpose. Then an application is made to the Exchequer for a new trial, which I understand to have been grounded on the same matters that are made the ground of the present suit, but the notice was too late, and the court refused a new trial: that court has established a rule necessary for the purposes of justice, and being so, it would be contrary to those purposes if I should break through it. I should render that rule nugatory, and defeat justice, if in every case where In cases where the party has neglected to apply in due time to the court of effectual cogni. law, he should be at liberty to come into equity for a new taken at law, trial. The inattention of parties in a court of law can equity interferes; as in scarcely be made a subject for the interference of a court of complicated equity: there may be cases cognizable at law and also in equity, and of which cognizance cannot be effectually taken at law, and therefore equity does some times interfere; as in cases of complicated accounts, where the party has not made defence, because it was impossible for him to do it something, effectually at law; so where a verdict has been obtained by has an unconfraud, or where a party has possessed himself improperly scientious advantage. of something by means of which he has an unconscientious zance cannot be accounts: 80, when a verdict obtained by fraud, or where party at law himself of has possessed a whereby he 1803. BATEMAN V. WILLOE. advantage at law, which equity will either put out of the way or restrain him from using: but without circumstances of that kind, I do not know that equity ever does interfere to grant a trial of a matter which has already been discussed in a court of law, a matter capable of being discussed there, and over which the court of law had full jurisdiction. Now in this case, every thing might have been discussed in a court of law, and the result must have been that the court would have given judgment for the sum really due, and I see no ground for me to open this matter again. A bill for a new trial is watched by equity with extreme jealousy; it must see that injustice has been done, not merely through the inattention of the parties; but some such reasons as those I have mentioned must exist. Under these circumstances this bill must be dismissed, and with costs, for I think it unconscientious and vexatious to bring into a court of equity a discussion which might have been had at law. Bill dismissed with costs. 1803. HOBHOUSE v. HAMILTON. THE bill in this case was filed by the plaintiff as assignee of a judgment affecting the estates devised to defendant, for payment of himself and other creditors having charges affecting these estates. The deed of assignment of the judgment had been lost, and was so charged by the bill; but a memorial of it had been duly entered according to the act of parliament (9 Geo. 2, c. 5). On the hearing of the cause an attested copy of the memorial was offered to be read as evidence of the assignment of the judgment after proof of the loss of the deed of assignment as charged by the bill. July 10. An attested copy of the me morial of the assignment of a judgment is evidence of the fact of the assignment. So the attested copy of the me. morial of the registry of a deed is evi dence of the fact of the registry; but if the memorial be used as evi Mr. Plunket (for defendant) objected that the original dence of the memorial should be produced, for that the attested copy of contents of the deed, the orithe memorial, when offered as evidence of the assignment, ginal must be could only be considered as the copy of a copy, and there- produced. fore not admissible evidence. He compared it to the cases upon the registry act, in which it had been decided that though the attested copy of the memorial be good evidence of the fact of registry, it was held not to be admissible evidence of the contents of the deed, when by the loss of the deed it became necessary to resort to the memorial for secondary evidence, and that in all these cases the memorial itself was produced, and it was the practice for an officer to attend with it from the registry office; and he cited lessee of Colclough v. Doyle, B. R. The Lord CHANCELLOR admitted the distinction as applied to the registry act, viz. that the attested copy of the |