time, by keeping the sale open until a fair price can be had for the estate, rather than suffer the debtor to be ruined: and is it unreasonable to call on this court to adopt the same

that rate of interest in this kingdom until the year 1732, whereas these fines ought to bear interest at 6 per cent only: the objection seems not to have been well founded, as legal interest at the time when the debt accrued, must have been the rule of calculation; and therefore if Mr. Glascock had been right in his supposition that Edward Deane the elder was the life named in the plaintiff's lease, in my opinion his calculation was just. However, the objection was made, and manifestly proceeded from a mistake in point of fact by both parties, a mistake originating with Mr. Glascock, who said he would lay the case before the defendant's counsel, and communicate his opinion upon it to Mr. Furlong. It does not appear however that this was done, and the matter rested in negociation between Mr. Glascock and Mr. Furlong, from February 1793, to the 10th of August 1793, during the whole of which period both parties supposed that Edw. Deane the elder was one of the lives named in the plaintiff's lease, and that the renewal fines were to be charged upon the fall of that life in 1717; and whilst the plaintiff continued in this error, it was certainly well worth his consideration whether to redeem his lease at an expense of 5501. But it now appears that both parties were mistaken in this essential fact: the tenant was deceived as well as the landlord; and it appears evidently that this deception continued for several months subsequent to August 1793; and if the deception had not taken place, it is material to observe that the question which was made by Furlong upon the rate of interest charged on some of the fines could not have arisen, as interest had been reduced to 6 per cent long prior to the year 1747, when Ed. Deane the younger died: and that in consequence of this deception, the amount of fines as computed by Glascock, was nearly one half greater than the sum really due by the plaintiff. Therefore, as the delay in settling this business originated in mistake and error, a mistake and error proceeding in the first instance from the landlord, this is a clear ground for the interposition of a court of equity to relieve the plaintiff from any forfeiture which he might otherwise incur. Certainly, however, the plaintiff has, in this case, acted with so little vigilance or attention on his part, in clearing up this mistake, and ascertaining the fines really due to his landlord, subsequent to the 10th of August, 1793,

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indulgent principle, for the purpose of establishing tenures of this description which were created with the intention of making them perpetual, instead of establishing a rule which,

when a formal demand was made upon him, that he cannot be entitled to a decree in this cause, unless upon the fullest indemnification to the defendant from all the consequences of his negligence and inattention. If this mistake had not happened, I should not hesitate to say that the tenant, under all the circumstances of this case, ought not to have a specific execution of the covenant for renewal; and if I were on the abstract question to declare what ought to be deemed a reasonable time within this clause of the act, I would say that it was no more than what was necessary to give the tenant full opportunity for ascertaining when the cestui que vies died, for computing the amount of the fines due, and for preparing leases and tendering them for execution. The precise time to be allowed the tenant cannot necessarily be defined; it must depend upon the difficulties which he may fairly have to encounter in complying with the demand: but I should incline strongly to determine that if a precise time for payment of the renewal fine was limited by the lease upon the fall of each life, that the tenant ought to be restricted to the same time after a demand made, unless he has a fair and reasonable excuse to assign for exceeding it. So if no time was limited by the lease, I should incline strongly to adopt the rule by analogy to the statutes giving the remedy by ejectment for nonpayment of rent; and to determine that the tenant coming into a court of equity for a renewal, after six months from a demand made upon him ought to be able to account fairly for his neglect. In this case I think the error into which the tenant fell with respect to the identity of one of the lives comprised in his lease, is a sufficient ground for the interposition of a court of equity, to relieve him from the forfeiture which otherwise, in my opinion, he must have incurred; and upon this circumstance alone it is that I ground my decree for a renewal. But he can have a renewal only upon the terms of paying to the defendant all the costs to which he has been put at law and in equity, and of course paying all arrears of rent and fines, and septennial fines, with interest.

Therefore, decree the plaintiff entitled to specific execution of the covenant for renewal comprized in his lease, on payment of all arrears of rent and fines, and septennial fines, with interest, and of the full costs of the ejectment brought by the defendant, and the full costs of this cause. Refer it to the master, &c. &c.

for the delay of a very few weeks or days, may ruin not only the tenant himself but his family and his fair creditors? And Mr. Saunders has the less reason to insist on the rigour of the law, because he dose not inherit from the lessor, but is a purchaser of his interest, and no doubt had credit for this lease as for a perpetuity.

Lord CHANCELLOR.

I have thought a great deal, and with no small anxiety, on this subject. I have had occasion to consider the principles on which cases of this description were to be determined independant of the statue, in the case of Lennan v. Napper,(a) where there were very extraordinary circumstances, arising previous to the statute, and not to be affected by it.

I think the statute is to be considered as having set the matter at rest, by drawing a line which the legislature considered beneficial, both to the landlord and the tenant: beneficial to the tenant by providing that mere neglect should not injure him; and beneficial to the landlord by providing, not only that fraud of any description, but also that wilful default, (by which I conceive was meant non-payment of renewal fines within a reasonable time after demand) should bar the tenant, so that the landlord should be thus able to put a limit to what would otherwise be indefinite. The legislature thought, I must presume, that under the circumstances which affect property of this description, and which are necessarily so extremely various, it would be very difficult to draw a precise line as to what should be deemed "reasonable time;" but that it must be left in each case, to be considered upon its own circumstances. In the discussion of this case, I am not merely to consider what are

(a) This case has been accidentally delayed, but shall appear in a future number.

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the hardships suffered by Mr. Jackson, or what the advantages gained by Mr. Saunders; whether the former be a distressed or an opulent man; or whether the latter inherits SAUNDERS. from the original lessor, or is a purchaser of his interest. I am to consider what is to be the rule for courts of equity to act upon in construing this statute; and I think I can lay down no rule on the subject but this: that there shall be no relief, if the conduct of the tenant be that of a man who has not used due diligence, after he has had sufficient intimation that such conduct would be insisted upon by his landlord, as excluding him from the benefit of renewal. I think it extremely material that this should be so understood in the country; the decision of this case necessarily affecting a variety of cases; not only as they now stand, but as they may in future stand: and affecting the value of the property of every landlord who has tenants of this description; for the value of such property materially depends on the facility with which landlords can enforce payment of the fines, and a continuance of acknowledgment of the tenure by acceptance of new leases. This acknowledgment of tenure perhaps is of more consequence than the actual payment of the fines; and the power to compel payment of the fines, and acceptance of new leases, is the only mean by which the acknowledgment of tenure can be effectually enforced. In this respect, landlords are even still under great difficulties; for if a life drops, the contract requires renewal, and the fact of that life having dropt, is infinitely more likely to be within the knowledge of the tenant who had the nomination of it, than of the landlord; and he is therefore put under great difficulty in being obliged to ascertain that fact. Yet this he must do; for, (unless there be something of fraud) he can in no way compel the tenant to renew the tenure under the penalty of being excluded, but by making the formal demand, which must proceed on his previous knowledge of the death of the cestui que vie;

and, then if the tenant neglects, or refuses to renew, he is under the further difficulty of preserving the evidence of such demand, until the dropping of the remaining lives and expiration of the existing lease.

In the present case, the first of the lives dropt so early as January, 1789. The landlord probably was ignorant of that fact; whether the tenant knew of it or not, does not appear. Now, suppose the landlord had called on the te nant to renew, and had made a formal demand of the fine; yet he would have been put under the difficulty of preserv ing the evidence of that demand, as long as the lease continued by the existence of the other two lives. This is a very considerable difficulty, and I know not how it is to be obviated, unless courts of equity will entertain a new jurisdiction, and permit the landlord, after making such demand, to file a bill to exclude the tenant from the benefit of renewal; and even in this proceeding, he would be put to great expense in barring the right of the tenant.

Another life dropt in 1791, and no attempt was made by the tenant to renew. There were then two defaults on the part of the tenant, which defaults I am to attribute to mere neglect. It is a neglect however of long continuance.

On the 1st March, 1799, the lease of the other moiety of these lands was renewed by Mr. Saunders, and Mr. Jackson was then in truth called on to renew for the moiety in question, though no formal demand was made on him ; nothing that would operate to exclude him from renewal under this act. But Mr. R. Saunders, at the time the lease of the 1st March, 1799, was executed, stated to Jackson, which he did not deny, that Saunders was informed two of the lives in the lease of this moiety were gone; and desired to know when Jackson would be ready to pay the renewal fines.

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