1. Tenant restrained from cutting turf for sale, (his lease giving a right of estovers only) notwithstanding an un- interrupted practice for eighty years. Lord Courtown v. Ward,
8 2. Where a verdict at law has been ob- tained against a defendant who neglects to apply for a new trial within the time appointed by the rules of the court of law, this court will not entertain a bill for an injunction on the ground that the plaintiff's demand was unconsci- entious, or that it was subject matter for an account: provided it was com- petent to the party to lay those grounds before the jury on the trial, or before the court of law on motion for a new trial. Bateman v. Willoe, 201 3. Where, to a bill filed for an injunc-
1. The possession of a tenant even when abusing his right, or exercising it to an extent not authorised by his tenure, is still the landlord's possession; and the allowance for the abuse for any length of time shall not give the tenant a right to continue it,
2. Where there have been various deal- ings between landlord and tenant, so as to produce an account too complicated 2. to be taken at law; and the landlord has brought ejectment for non-payment of rent, the tenant may file a bill, before judgment at law; for an account on the foot of those dealings, and to have the balance applied to the rent claim- ed to be due, and for an injunction. O'Connor v. Spaight, 305 3. In such case the tenant need not bring in the rent, under statute 4 Geo. 1, c. 5, ibid.
"if she does not marry without the "consent of her trustees, the sum of "4007. one moiety to be paid her upon "her marriage with such consent, the "other moiety in one year after: but "if said M. was then married or should
marry without such consent, said 66 sum to sink into his personal fortune.” M. being unmarried, is not entitled immediately either to principal or in- terest: not to principal, because mar- riage is a condition precedent, and the legacy therefore contingent until then: nor to interest, because the legacy is payable in futuro, and there is no suf- ficient ground of implication that in- terest was intended in the mean time. Ellis v. Ellis,
A legacy out of a personal fund, be- queathed generally, without assigning any time for payment, bears interest only from a year after the death of the testator, though the fund out of which it is to be paid consist of stock and other matters yielding immediate pro- fit. Pearson v. Pearson,
10 In such case, interest is payable from the end of the year, though the fund does not come to be disposable for the payment of the legacies until long after; and if the fund is productive within the year, the intermediate profits belong to the residuary legatee, 12
4. But if the legacy be charged on lands, interest is payable from the death of the testator, or not at all,
5. Legacy to executor, to be distributed amongst the poor relations oftestator. A relation who was poor at the time of testators death, but became rich before distribution, not entitled. Mahon v Savage,
6. A specific legacy cannot, in a subse- quent part of the will be charged with 339 See ADMINISTRATOR pendente lite, 1. payment of debts and legacies, GRANDFATHER and GRANDCHILD, 1, 2.
Purchase money unpaid, is prima facie, a lien on the lands sold; and if a secu- rity is taken for that money, it lies on
LIMITATIONS, (STATUTE OF) See GREAT SEAL, 1.
3. The true meaning of the statute of limitations, as applied to titles to land, is, that the party shall have twenty years, during which it should be open to him to proceed to assert his title. Bond v. Hopkins, 413 4. Though the statute of limitations does not apply in terms to proceedings in equity, yet such proceedings are affect- ed by analogy to the statute: so that, in general, if a party be guilty, of such laches in pursuing his equitable title as would bar him at law, he shall be barred in equity. But equity will re- move the legal bar proceeding from lapse of time, as it would any other legal advantage, if sought to be used unconscientiously. Ibid. 428, 431 5. Lapse of time shall not prejudice a person who has title, while seeking a discovery of that title from persons who have possessed themselves of the evidences of it. Ibid. 413, 425 See POSSESSION, 1.
1. Where there is a suit pending for for- ty years, and not abated, but remain-
MARRIAGE, (ARTICLES ON)
1. By articles previous to the marriage of W. T. with R. F. the father of W. T."bound the whole of the farm of, "&c. as a dowry or marriage portion
to his son W. T. along with R. F. "one half of said farm to be the right "title and interest of the issue, wheth- er son or daughter, if begotten on "the body of R. F. by W. T." The issue take as tenants in common. Tag- gart v. Taggart, Joint-tenancy, as a provision for the children of a marriage, is an incon- venient mode of settlement, Limitation in a marriage article, to A. for life, subject to annuities for the lives of B. and C. and a charge for a jointure for D. if she should survive A. and after the death of said B. and C. A. and D. then to the use of the issue, &c.: The limitation to the issue is not to await the deaths of A. B. C. and D. but they are to take upon the death of A. subject to the charges for B. C. and D. Bushell v. Bushell,
Of changes on the Bench, &c. 136, 239
1. Mortgagee having got possession of mortgagor's title deeds, lodged them with an attorney, who claimed a lien on them for business done for mort- gagee. On the application of mortga- gor, mortgagee was restrained from proceeding at law upon his collateral security. Schoole v. Sall,
"at any time thereafter during his "life be qualified by law so to do." In 1778 he becomes qualified by law to carry these articles into execution. The lands were not specifically bound by these articles until 1778, and there- fore judgments subsequent to 1764, but before 1778, were prior liens. Kennedy v. Daly, 355 2. To hold that the articles of 1764 bound the lands specifically, would defeat the intent of the parties, by giv- ing a title to a protestant discoverer,
3. Judgment creditors were not bound by the articles of 1764 prior to the statute 17 & 18 Geo. 3. From the passing of that statute they were bound, 373
176 2. But it was referred to the master to take an account of what was due for principal, interest, and costs, and the costs of the proceedings at law, and the money to be paid into the bank and remain until the title deeds should be secured, the mortgagor paying the costs at law and in equity, 3. Mortgagee has a right to proceed on his mortgage and bond at the same 4. time, (being an exception to the rule, that a party shall not sue at law and in equity at the same time); but mort- gagor shall not be obliged to pay upon his bond, unless secure of his title deeds being delivered up, ibid. 4. An executor of a mortgagee restrain- ed from enforcing payment, and the money ordered into court, where there was no heir of the mortgagee who could re-convey, 177 See REGISTRY, 5.
See JUDGMENT, 1. REGISTRY, 1, 2, 3.
1. A papist, by articles on his marriage, in 1764, agrees "to convey to trustees "in strict settlement, in case he should
A papist neglecting to take the oaths prescribed by the statute 17 & 18 Geo. 3, c. 49, within six months, &c. was not protected by that statute from a protestant information, nor enabled to sue: but the consequences of such ne- glect are removed by statute 33 Geo. 3, c. 21, upon his performing the re- quisites therein mentioned, 355, 381.
PARENT AND CHILD.
1. In case of a legacy left by father to child, the child having no other pro- vision, it is a necessary implication that the legacy shall bear interest: but this implication is ousted if he pro- vides any maintenance for the child, however small the maintenance, and however large the legacy. Ellie v. Ellis,
5. Power of appointment in such shares and proportions as husband and wife should by any deed in writing direct, not well executed by appointment by the will of the husband with a written endorsement thereon made by the wife after his death, expressing her appro- 90, 96. bation. Bushell v. Bushell, 6. Nor would it have been better if the wife had ratified it at the time of the execution, it being revocable by the ibid. husband during his life, AGREEMENT, 6, 7, 8. COVENANT, 1.
1. Parties obtaining wrongful possession and setting up a false title (under co- lour of instruments finally condemned) during the investigation of which they are protected in their possession by the court, shall not avail themselves of any length of possession, pending the investigation, as a bar to the person 1. who ultimately proves to have the right. Bond v. Hopkins, See LIMITATIONS, 4, 5.
1. Power was given to husband and wife by deed, and to the survivor by will duly executed, to charge settled lands for payment of debts or for younger children. The wife surviving charged the estate by will executed in the pre- sence of two witnesses only. Lord HARDWICKE held that though the will was not duly executed within the meaning of the power, the court ought to aid the defective execution in fa- vour of the creditors and younger children. Wilkie v. Holmes, (note) 60 2. Power to make leases is to be con- . strued as liberally as powers of join- turing, charging, &c.; and a contract to make a lease pursuant to a power shall be as binding as a contract to make a jointure or charge pursuant to Shannon v. Bradstreet, 52, 61.
3. Non-execution of a power is where 5. nothing is done. Defective execution is, where there has been an intention to execute, and that intention suffi- ciently declared; but the act declar- ing the intention is not an execution in the form prescribed.
4.A contract to execute such power is a sufficient declaration of intent, ibid.
Where an injunction is obtained for want of an answer, defendant may dis- solve it by giving the rule to dissolve, and the second rule in six days after, which shall be absolute without further order, unless plaintiff files exceptions in four days, or moves on equity con- fessed in eight days, or on the first day of motions afterwards; notice of such motion having been entered with the register; and all such motions shall be listed and called on at the sitting of the court on such motion day. General Rule,
Writ improvidently issued, if within the controul of the court (either as not having gone out of the custody of the officer, or as having been returned) shall be quashed; if beyond its con- troul it shall be superseded. Lessee of Lawlor v. Murray,' The writ commanding judges to seal a bill of exceptions, ought to be made out by the clerk of the crown, and not 75, 80 by the cursitor, Such writ ought not to issue without special order from the person holding 75, 80 the Great Seal, If a creditor coming in under a decree, require relief which cannot be had by re-hearing the original cause, he ought to file a cross bill. Latouche v. Ld. Dunsany,
6. In all cases where conditional orders are granted, if cause he not shewn on the motion day next after the expira- tion of the time limited by such order,
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