Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public GoodsClimate change, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a global pandemic have the potential to impact each of our lives. Preventing these threats poses a serious global challenge, but ignoring them could have disastrous consequences. How do we engineer institutions to change incentives so that these global public goods are provided?Scott Barrett provides a thought provoking and accessible introduction to the issues surrounding the provision of global public goods. Using a variety of examples to illustrate past successes and failures, he shows how international cooperation, institutional design, and the clever use of incentives can work together to ensure the effective delivery of global public goods. |
Contents
The Incentives to Supply Global Public Goods | 1 |
Global Public Goods that Can Be Supplied Unilaterally or Minilaterally | 22 |
Global Public Goods that Depend on the States that Contribute the Least | 47 |
Global Public Goods that Depend on the Combined Efforts of All States | 74 |
Paying for Global Public Goods | 103 |
Agreeing What States Ought Not to Do | 133 |
Agreeing What States Ought to Do | 149 |
Do Global Public Goods Help Poor States? | 166 |
Institutions for the Supply of Global Public Goods | 190 |
Endnotes | 199 |
| 223 | |
| 241 | |
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