9. RIGHT TO ENFORCE ORDINANCES BY FINE-Irrespective of statutory

authority a municipality has implied power to provide for the enforce ment of its ordinances by the imposition of reasonable and proper fines. Detroit v. Fort Wayne etc. Ry. Co., 580.

10. POLICE POWER-ORDINANCE DENYING PROPERTY OWNER THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT A BUSINESS THEREON, WHEN VOID.-An owner of property can. not be prohibited by a legislative body from conducting thereon a lawful business, unless such business is of such a noxious or offensive character that the health, safety, or comfort of the surrounding community requires its exclusion from that particular locality. An asylum for the treatment of mild forms of insanity is not a business of that character, and therefore a provision in an ordinance of a board of county super. visors declaring that no asylum in which persons suffering from any degree of insanity are treated shall be permitted within four hundred yards of any dwelling or school is not a valid police regulation. Ex parte Whitwell, 152.

11. POLICE POWER-ORDINANCE REQUIRING SEPARATION OF PATIENTS IN PRIVATE ASYLUM, WHEN VOID.-The proprietor of a private asylum for the treatment of certain specified forms of mild insanity cannot be com pelled to provide separate buildings for the different classes of patients, nor to segregate male from female patients. Ex parte Whitwell, 152. 12. POLICE POWER-ORDINANCES IMPOSING UPON THE PROPRIETOR OF A PRIVATE ASYLUM EXPENSES WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARY for the protection of the public are invalid. Hence such proprietor cannot be required to surround by a brick or stone wall, of not less than twelve feet high and eighteen inches thick, an asylum in which only patients suffering from the milder forms of insanity are to be treated. Ex parte Whitwell, 152. 13. POLICE POWER-ORDINANCE REQUIRING ASYLUMS FOR INSANE PERSONS TO BE FIREPROOF, WHEN VOID. -The board of supervisors of a county, in the absence of any general legislation on the subject, may, by ordi nance, prescribe proper regulations for the protection of patients in a private asylum for insane persons from the danger which might result to them from the destruction of the asylum building by fire; but a requirement that such an asylum shall be maintained only in a building constructed of either brick and iron, or stone and iron, without any reference to the size of the building, or the number of the patients it is designed to accommodate therein, and without regard to other safe. guards against fire with which it may be provided, is unreasonable. Legislation of this character, which imposes an onerous expense upon a lawful business, can only be justified by the fact that the danger which it ostensibly seeks to avert is one which experience has demonstrated to be a probable result of conducting the business, notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care to prevent it. Ex parte Whitwell, 152. 14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL WORK COMPLETED UNDER COLOR OF LAWFUL AUTHORITY and an existing statute must thereafter be regarded as lawfully done. King v. Philadelphia Co., 817.

15. ORDINANCES CONTAINING GRANTS may partake of the nature of con tracts, yet they are none the less by-laws, and have the force and effect, in favor of the municipality, and against persons bound thereby, of laws passed by the legislature of the state. The power to enact them involves all the incidents necessary to give effect thereto. Detroit v. Fort Wayne etc. Ry. Co., 580.

16. CONSTRUCTION OF ORDINANCES.-When a municipal ordinance is good in
part and bad in part, it is only necessary, in order to maintain the ordi.
nance, that the valid and invalid parts be so distinct and independent,
that the invalid may be eliminated, and what remains contain all the es-
sentials of a complete ordinance. Detroit v. Fort Wayne etc. Ry. Co., 580.
See CORPORATIONS, 1; CREDITOR'S SUIT; Statutes, 1, 9.

MURDER.

See HOMICIDE.

MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES.
See INSURANCE, 9–15.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. INJURIES RECEIVED FROM FALLING OBJECTS IN PUBLIC THOROUGHFARES.
Evidence that an object whose fall has caused an injury to a traveler
upon a public thoroughfare was under the management of the defendant
or his servants is sufficient to establish a want of due care on the part
of such defendant, if the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen, and no adequate explanation of its occurrence is
offered. Dixon v. Pluns, 180.

2. HIGHWAYS-DUTY OF PERSONS WORKING ON SCAFFOLDINGS.-A person
engaged with tools and materials upon a scaffolding erected directly
over a thoroughfare where people are constantly traveling is required
to exercise the greatest care in the performance of his work, so that
passersby may not be injured, and evidence showing that the plaintiff,
while traveling upon the sidewalk, was injured by the fall of a tool
from the scaffolding is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negli.
gence against the person working thereon. Dixon v. Pluns, 180.
8. WHEN A QUESTION FOR JURY.-If there is reasonable doubt as to the facts
or the inferences to be drawn from them, the question of negligence
is solely for the jury to determine.- Vannatta v. Central R. R. Co. 823.
4. WHEN QUESTION FOR JURY.-When, in an action to recover for personal
injuries received from a fall over an obstruction in the streets of a
city, the proof clearly shows that though the accident happened in the
night-time, yet the street was well lighted, and that the party injured
could have seen the obstruction if she had been looking for it, and her
testimony shows that just before she stumbled over it she heard a
whistle and became frightened and hurried on, the jury should deter.
mine the question whether or not this circumstance coupled with the
fact that it was in the night-time is sufficient to excuse her immediate
attention to the walk at the exact time of the injury. Graves v. Battle
Creek, 561.

B. CONTRIBUTORY Negligence, WHAT IS NOT.—In an action to recover
damages for an injury received through the falling of a chisel from a
scaffolding, a motion for a nonsuit is properly denied, where the evi.
dence shows that the plaintiff, at the time when he was thus injured,
was upon a sidewalk along which people were constantly passing and
that he had no sufficient reason to anticipate danger from overhead.
Dixon v. Pluns, 180.

Bee ARREST, 9; BAILMENT 1, 2; DAMAGES 5; EQUITY 2; Master and Serv.
ANT; PARENT AND CHILD; PLEDGE 1; RAILROADS 3, 4, 13, 14; 18-22,
25-27.

1

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1 INSURANCE-NOTE FOR WHEN MADE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION, AND VOID.-A note given to the agent of an insurance corporation to procure insurance on the life of the maker is without consideration and void if the contract for insurance provides that it shall be void, unless the premium is paid in cash, and that none but certain designated officers have authority to waive the condition, and the agent receiving the note did note himself pay the premium to the insurer nor do any⚫ thing except to charge himself and credit the insurer with the amount of such premium, and the latter did not know that the payment had not been made in cash nor in any way waive the condition requiring such payment. Dunham v. Morse, 473. CONSIDERATION-KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSIDERATION by one indorsing a promissory note for the accommodation of another is not necessary except when the note has been issued and become operative before such indorsement, and the indorsement must therefore be regarded as a new contract. Robertson v. Rowell, 466.

THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE HOLDER ACQUIRED A NEGOTIABLE Instru. MENT IN GOOD FAITH without notice of fraud arises upon proof that he paid full value for it before maturity. Market etc. Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 376.

4 NOTICE BY MAIL-PRESUMPTION. -A notice of protest and dishonor of a promissory note inclosed in a prepaid envelope requesting its return if not delivered, properly addressed, to the indorser at the place where he regularly receives his mail matter, and deposited in the postoffice, is, in the absence of its return undelivered, prima facie evidence of its receipt by him, sufficient to charge him as an indorser. Jensen v. McCorkell, 843.

NOTICE OF PROTEST AND OF NONPAYMENT of a bill of exchange is not necessary to charge one who is both the drawer and acceptor thereof. Garden City Nat. Bank v. Fitler, 874.

If a bill is indorsed to a bank for collection, it may, without any indorsement on its part, return such bill to its indorser, who is thereupon entitled to maintain an action thereon as if he had not so indorsed it. Garden City Nat. Bank v. Fitler, 874.

7. ACCOMMODATION BILL.-The averment that certain bills were accepted for the accommodation of the drawers on their representation that the proceeds would be applied to specific purposes, and that the drawers failed to apply such proceeds to such purposes, does not allege any de fense as against the bona fide holder of such bills. Garden City Nat. Bank v. Filler, 874.

NOTE, CHANGE OF PAYEE-A SEALED NOTE PAYABLE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON and made for a specific purpose and not negotiable in form can. not, without the consent of the surety thereon, be delivered to another person on the payee named therein refusing to accept it, and any person receiving it other than the original payee is chargeable with notice of any defenses existing against it. Janes v. Benson, 899.

A NOTE INDORSED AFTER MATURITY is equivalent to one payable on demand, and unless payment thereof is demanded and, in the event of refusal, notice given to the indorser within a reasonable time, the latter cannot be held. Beer v. Clifton, 172.

10. EXECUTION OF, IN BLANK.-If one affixes his signature to a printed blank for a promissory note, and intrusts it to the custody of another

for the purpose of having the blanks filled up, he thereby confers the
right, and such instrument carries on its face the implied authority to
fill up the blanks and complete the contract at pleasure as to names,
terms, and amounts so far as consistent with the printed words, and an
oral agreement between the maker and his agent limiting the amount
for which the note shall be perfected cannot affect the rights of an in-
dorsee who takes the note before maturity for value, in ignorance of the
agreement that a different amount should be written in it. Market etc.
Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 376.

11. PROMISSORY NOTE.-A TRANSFEREE OF A NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTE is not
bound to inquire of the maker whether any defenses exist against it,
and failing to do so, he stands exactly in the shoes of the person from
whom he receives it. If that person could not recover, the transferee
cannot. Janes v. Benson, 899.

See ASSIGNMENT, 2; BANKS, 2; FORGERY, 3, 4; HUSBAND AND Wirz, 11;
Partnership; Payment; SureTYSHIP, 4.

NEWSPAPERS.

See CONTRACTS, 10; FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 1.

NEW TRIAL

1. Ir EVIDENCE INCOMPETENT FOR ANY PURPOSE IS ADMITTED, and may have
influenced the jury in determining a material issue, a new trial must be
granted. Miller v. Curtis, 469.

2. NEW TRIAL will sometimes be granted on account of the misconduct of
counsel in attempting to get before the jury matters not within the
issues by means of improper questions and offers of proof. Marshall v.
Taylor, 144.

B. THAT AN INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN TO THE JURY IN THE ABSENCE OF
COUNSEL is not a cause for a new trial, if it is given in open court
after the cause had been submitted to the jury. It is the duty of the
parties and their counsel to be present in court while it is open, after
the trial of the action has been begun until it is concluded, and the pre-
siding judge cannot be prevented from giving a further instruction to
the jury because one or both of the parties or their counsel have absented
themselves from the court while in session and while the jury are de-
liberating upon the case. Kullberg v. O'Donnell, 507.

See EXECUTION, 3; SEDUCTION, 5.

NOLLE PROSEQUI
See JUDGMENTS, 13.

NONRESIDENTS.

See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 8; JURISDICTION, 1; PROCESS, 2

NONSUIT.

See EJECTMENT, 1; NEGLIGENCE, 5.

NOTICE.

1. RECORDING a Mortgage Made by the LESSEES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
having the right to acquire title thereto on making certain designated

payments does not operate as constructive notice to their lessors. Robinson v. Bird, 495.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE RECORD AS NOTICE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACT.—If a contract is referred to in a recorded mortgage all persons claiming under it take with notice of such contract. National Bank v. Morris, 754.

& CHATTEL Mortgage-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF RECORD OF.-A chattel mortgage duly executed and recorded in the state where the property is situated imparts notice to an innocent purchaser who buys the property in another state to which it has been removed by the mortgagor, unless the mortgage is opposed to the laws and public pol icy of the latter state. The fact that the mortgage provides that the mortgagor is to remain in possession of the property until forfeiture for failure to pay the debt upon its maturity makes no difference in such National Bank v. Morris, 754.

case.

4. THE PLEA OF "INNOCENT PURCHASER" IS An Affirmative DEFENSE, and must be affirmatively pleaded and proved. Holdsworth v. Shannon, 719. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 4; AGENCY, 1; ANIMALS, 1; APPEAL, 1; ARBITRATION, 1, 2, 5; ASSIGNMENT; BANKS, 2; CHATTEL MORTGAGES; COR PORATIONS, 6, 7; Costs, 2; EXECUTION, 5; MECHANIO'S LIEN, 18; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 3, 8, 9; NUISANCE.

NUISANCE.

RIGHT TO ABATE WITHOUT NOTICE-TREES OVERHANGING BOUNDARY. Branches of trees standing upon land adjoining a railroad company's right of way, and overhanging it to such an extent that at times they brush against the faces of the railroad company's engineers and obscure their view when their duties require them to maintain a lookout are a nuisance, which the company may abate by removing the overhanging branches without notice to the adjoining landowner. The fact that he refuses an offer of ten dollars made by the company for the removal of trees claimed by it to be a nuisance will not confer upon him the right to exact further notice before such overhanging branches are removed. Hickey v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co., 621.

See WATERS, 5.

OFFICERS.

1. DEALINGS BETWEEN A PUBLIC OFFICER AND HIMSELF AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN which bring him into collision with other citizens, equally interested with himself in the integrity and impartiality of the office, are against public policy. Goodyear v. Brown, 903.

2 DISQUALIFICATION TO ACT WHERE THEY ARE INTERESTED.-A DEPUTY secretary of internal affairs, whose duties are analogous to those of a deputy surveyor-general, will not be allowed to apply for and take meas. ures necessary to acquire title to, a tract of public land. Public policy cannot tolerate such dealings by an officer with his own department or office. Goodyear v. Brown, 903.

8. OFFICERS DE FACTO.-ACTS OF OFFICERS de facto are invalid when they concern themselves, but are valid when they concern the public or the rights of strangers and third persons who have an interest in the acts done. King v. Philadelphia Co., 817.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ACTS DONE BY DE FACTO OFFICERS UNDER UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.-Acts performed by officers de facto in the