IN THE CASE OF JOHN WILKES

(An Address Delivered to the Audience at the Trial of John Wilkes, on Two Informations for Libel, in the King's Bench and House of Lords; 4 George III., 10 George III., 1763-70)

IT

T IS fit to take some notice of the various terrors hung out; the numerous crowds which have attended and now attend in and about the hall, out of all reach of hearing what passes in court; and the tumults which, in other places, have shamefully insulted all order and government. Audacious addresses in print dictate to us, from those they call the people, the judgment to be given now, and afterwards upon the conviction. Reasons of policy are urged, from danger to the kingdom, by commotions. and general confusion.

Give me leave to take the opportunity of this great and respectable audience, to let the whole world know all such attempts are vain. Unless we have been able to find an error which will bear us out, to reverse the outlawry, it must be affirmed. The Constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence our judgments. God forbid it should! We must not regard political consequences, how formidable soever they might be; if rebellion were the certain consequence, we are bound to say, fiat justitia, ruat cælum. The Constitution trusts the king with reasons of State and policy; he may stop prosecutions; he may pardon offenses; it is his to judge whether the law or the criminal should yield. We have no election. None of us encouraged or approved the commission of either of the crimes of which the defendant is convicted; none of us had any hand in his being prosecuted. As to myself, I took no part (in another place) in the addresses for that prosecution. We did not advise or assist the defendant to fly from justice; it was his own act and he must take the consequences. None of us have been consulted, or had anything to do with the present prosecution. It is not in our power to stop it; it was not in our power to bring it on. We cannot pardon. We are to say what we take the law to be; if we do not speak our real opinion, we prevaricate with God and our own consciences.

I pass over many anonymous letters I have received. Those in print are public; some of them have been brought judicially before the court. Whoever the writers are, they take the wrong

way. I will do my duty unawed. What am I to fear? That mendax infamia from the press, which daily coins false facts and false motives? The lies of calumny carry no terror to me. I trust that my temper of mind and the color and conduct of my life have given me a suit of armor against these arrows. If, during this king's reign, I have ever supported his government and assisted his measures, I have done it without any other reward than the consciousness of doing what I thought right. If I have ever opposed I have done it upon the points themselves, without mixing in party or faction, and without any collateral views. I honor the king and respect the people, but many things acquired by the favor of either are, in my account, objects not worth ambition. I wish popularity, but it is that popularity which follows, not that which is run after. It is that popularity which, sooner or later, never fails to do justice to the pursuit of noble ends by noble means. I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, upon this occasion, to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press; I will not avoid doing what I think is right, though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels, all that falsehood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a deluded populace can swallow. I can say, with a great magistrate, upon an occasion and under circumstances not unlike, Ego hoc animo semper fui, ut invidiam virtute partam, gloriam, haud infamiam, putarem.

The threats go further than abuse; personal violence is denounced. I do not believe it; it is not the genius of the worst men of this country, in the worst of times. But I have set my mind at rest. The last end that can happen to any man never comes too soon, if he fall in support of the law and liberty of his country (for liberty is synonymous to law and government). Such a shock, too, might be productive of public good; it might awake the better part of the kingdom out of that lethargy which seems to have benumbed them, and bring the mad part back to their senses as men intoxicated are sometimes stunned into sobriety.

Once for all, let it be understood that no endeavors of this kind will influence any man who at present sits here. If they had any effect, it would be contrary to their intent; leaning against their impression might give a bias the other way. But I hope, and I know, that I have fortitude enough to resist even that weakness. No libels, no threats, nothing that has happened,

nothing that can happen, will weigh a feather against allowing the defendant, upon this and every other question, not only the whole advantage he is entitled to from substantial law and justice, but every benefit from the most critical nicety of form, which any other defendant could claim under the like objection. The only effect I feel is an anxiety to be able to explain the grounds upon which we proceed so as to satisfy all mankind, "that a flaw of form given way to in this case could not have been got over in any other."

IN THE CASE OF THE DEAN OF ST. ASAPH

(From the Proceedings on an Indictment in the Case of the King on the Prosecution of William Jones, against the Rev. William Davies Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph, for a Seditious Libel, at the Great Session Held at Wrexham for the County of Denbigh, on Monday, September 1st, 1783)

WHE

THEN I was attorney-general I prosecuted some libels; one I remember from the condition and circumstances of the defendant; he was found guilty. He was a common councilman of the city of London; and I remember another circumstance: it was the first conviction in the city of London that had been for twenty-seven years. It was the case of the King and Nutt, and there he was convicted under the very same direction, before Lord Chief-Justice Ryder.

Upon

In the year 1756 I came into the office I now hold. the first prosecution for a libel which stood in my paper, I think (but I am not sure), but I think it was the case of the King and Shebbeare; I made up my mind as to the direction I ought to give. I have uniformly given the same in all, almost in the same form of words. No counsel ever complained of it to the court. Upon every defendant being brought up for judgment, I have always stated the direction I gave, and the court has always assented to it. The defense of a lawful excuse never existed in any case before me, therefore I have told the jury if they were satisfied with the evidence of the publication, and that the meanings of the innuendos were as stated, they ought to find the defendant guilty,—that the question of law was upon record for the judgment of the court. This direction being as of course, and no question ever raised concerning it in court (though I have had the misfortune to try many libels, in very warm times, against VIII-185