restoring King Charles II. If then, at that time, twenty-seven thousand men were found sufficient, when a great part of our people were not only accustomed to arms, but bred to action, what may not eighteen thousand now do, after our people have been for so long bred up in a total disuse of arms, and hardly any man in the kingdom, except a few in our army, that ever saw an engagement? From the histories of other countries we may learn the same sort of experience. Julius Cæsar conquered the world with an army not much superior to what we have now on foot, for it is reckoned he had but about twenty-two thousand men, when he fought the battle of Pharsalia; and both in France and Spain we shall find that the armies which first established that arbitrary power which now subsists in each were not a great deal more numerous than the standing army now kept up in this island.

Having thus, I think, clearly shown that the keeping up a standing army of eighteen thousand men in this island may be of the most dangerous consequence to our Constitution, I shall next consider the necessity we are now under for keeping up such a number; but first, sir, I shall take some notice of our militia, notwithstanding its being now in such a contemptible state that 'tis worth no man's while to take notice of it, and notwithstanding my being convinced that it will be growing more and more contemptible every day; for while our government has a standing army to trust to, I am afraid they will endeavor to render our militia more and more contemptible, in order to make a standing army the more necessary and to make their dependence upon that army the more safe and infallible. However, sir, notwithstanding the present contemptible state of our militia, I am still of opinion that it might be made a good militia; nay, I am convinced that by proper regulations it might, in a few years, be made as good as any regular troops that have never been in action; for, with respect to discipline and the use of arms, I cannot look upon our present standing army as anything else than a well-disciplined militia. There are but few of the officers and soldiers that have ever been in action, and such as have might be incorporated with the militia; so that I can see no reason why our militia might not, in a few years, be made as good as our present regular troops can be supposed to be. In time of war, indeed, it would be necessary to have regular regiments and to give pay both to the officers and soldiers of

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those regiments; but at the end of the war all such regiments ought to be disbanded and incorporated with our militia, and proper care taken to provide handsomely for those officers and soldiers who could not provide for themselves. By this means, even our militia would always have a great number of veteran soldiers among them, which would make those soldiers of much more service to their country, and much less expensive or dangerous, than when kept in separate corps by themselves, according to our present method.

But, sir, if we still go on in the same error; if we continue to neglect our militia and to put our whole trust in a standing army, our king may enjoy the hearts and affections of the generality of the people and yet fall a sacrifice to the unjust resentment of his army; for in all countries where a standing army is kept up, those very measures and qualities which serve to endear a king to the generality of his people may probably expose him to the hatred and contempt of a standing army. In all countries where a standing army has been long kept up, and the rest of the people bred up to a total disuse of arms, the gentlemen of the army are apt to begin to look upon themselves, not as the servants, but as the lords and masters of the people; therefore they are apt to take such liberties with the people as ought not to be indulged in any society; and if the king, by an equal and impartial distribution of justice, should take care to prevent or put a stop to their taking any such liberties, they will probably think he does them injustice by not allowing them to make use of that right which they may think belongs to them as lords and masters of the people. In every such case, if the people have neither skill nor courage to defend their king and protector, he must necessarily fall a sacrifice to the resentment of his army, and for this reason we find that in all governments where a standing army has been long kept up, the king or chief magistrate generally despises the affections of the people and minds nothing but the affections of the army, for the securing of which it becomes absolutely necessary for him to look upon the people in the same light his army does. They join in considering the people as their slaves only, and they join in treating them accordingly.

I come now, sir, to the third necessary use we are said to have for a numerous standing army, and I must say it is such a one as surprises me. We are told that an army of eighteen thousand

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men is necessary for enabling the civil magistrate to execute those laws, which have been thought necessary by the wisdom of our legislature. If it were so, I am sure I should not think the wisdom of our legislature very conspicuous. 'Tis well known, sir, that with respect to some laws lately passed I have nothing to answer for, because I testified my disapprobation in the most public and explicit manner, of which several gentlemen in this House can bear me witness; but, nevertheless, I have so much confidence in the wisdom of our legislature, that I am convinced they neither have passed, nor will pass, any law for the execution of which a military force shall appear to be necessary, and if from experience such a thing should afterwards be found to be necessary, they would certainly repeal such a law and contrive some other method for effectuating that which was intended by the enacting of such a law; for in a free and civil government the lawgivers must always take care to pass no laws but what may be executed by the civil magistrate, assisted by the civil power of the country, or what we in this kingdom call the posse of the county. If they do otherwise, they must necessarily alter the frame of their government, and instead of a civil and free government they must establish a military and arbitrary form of government. In this we may see the difference between a free government supported by the power of the people only and an arbitrary government supported by a standing army. The former in all the laws they pass, or measures they take, are obliged to consult the inclinations of the people in general, because it is by the power of the people only they can propose to execute the laws they pass, or to enforce the measures they pursue. The latter, in neither of these respects, ever trouble their heads about the inclinations of the people; they consult only the inclinations of their army; because, if the people appear dissatisfied with any regulation they make, they can order their army to assist the civil magistrate in cramming it down the throats of the people.