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The foolish or immoral stories told by the poets were explained as allegories intended to convey some moral or physical truth. For instance, when Hera is represented as suspended by a gold chain from heaven with weights round her feet ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσιν, this is interpreted to mean the order of nature binding the four elements together'. The human soul is an emanation from Deity, and is often spoken of as the God within us. Although it outlives the body, it will only retain its individual existence till the next conflagration, and that only in the case of the wise. The stars being made

of pure fire are divine.

In all this we see the influence of Heraclitus, who was much quoted by the Stoics; but in their distinction between the active and passive elements of the universe they probably had in mind the Aristotelian distinction between Form and Matter, only substituting for the mysterious attraction exercised on Matter by the transcendent First Form of Aristotle, the quickening influence of an ever-active all-pervading Spirit. They agreed with Aristotle also in holding the unity, finiteness and sphericity of the world, but, unlike him, considered that there was an unlimited void beyond it. That which was peculiarly Stoical was the strong moral colouring which they gave to their materialistic system. The all-pervading fire was at the same time the all-seeing Providence, who `creates and governs all things for the best ends, and makes each several existence, each several fact, conspire together for the good of the whole. It is the privilege of

1 Heracl. Alleg. Hom. p. 463 Gale.

2 See Seneca Epp. 31 and 41, and other passages quoted in Zeller III. I. p. 3193.

man to be able knowingly and willingly to act as a rational part of the rational whole, instead of yielding himself up to irrational and selfish impulse: but however he acts, he must perforce carry out the divine purpose, as Cleanthes says in the noble lines:

ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη,

ὅποι ποθ ̓ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος"

ὡς ἕψομαι γ ̓ ἄοκνος· ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω,

κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

From this it follows that the summum bonum is to live -according to nature, both universal nature, i.e. the reason embodied in the universe, and the particular nature', not only of man in general, but of the individual concerned; or, to express the same principle in other words, each man is to act in accordance with his own particular nature in so far as that is in harmony with universal nature and it is through virtue or wisdom that we are enabled to do this; wisdom being not only speculative, judging what is in accordance with nature or the divine law, but practical, strongly willing what is thus determined to be right.

The stages of rational development in the individual were thus described. The first impulse in every animal is to its own self-preservation. This appetite manifests itself in little children before any pleasure or pain is felt. We begin by loving our own vitality; and we come, by association, to love what promotes our vitality; we hate destruction or disablement,

1 Cf. Diog. L. VII. 88 τέλος γίγνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, and Cic. De Of. I. 107.

2 This was called the prima conciliatio naturae, ǹ πρwτn oikeiwσls, see Cic. Fin. III 16 with Madvig's note.

And the right choice is

and we come to hate whatever produces that effect. But these prima naturae1 are not good in themselves, and there is nothing virtuous in the effort to attain them. It is only as the dawning reason of the youth becomes conscious of a wider nature of which his own nature is a part, and of a higher Reason revealing itself in the order and harmony of nature and of human society, that the true Good becomes possible for him, not in the attainment of those primary ends, but in the right choice of the means by which to attain them. one which is always in accordance with reason and with nature. If he takes the right course, whether he attains those lower ends or not, he has attained the highest end of man, the true Bonum or Honestum. Just as the archer's excellence is shown in aiming rightly, and there is no independent value in the mere act of hitting the target; so there is no independent value in those prima naturae; the acting in accordance with nature is all in all. One who has thus learnt to live in accordance with nature is avтaρkýs, in need of nothing. He alone is free, for he has all he wishes: his will is one with the universal Will. External good, external evil are matters of indifference (adiápopa): intrinsically and in themselves they are neither bad nor good, though they may become such according to the manner in which they are used. Nothing can be called really good which is not always and under all circumstances good. What are commonly regarded as goods, such as wealth, station, &c., only provide the field in which virtue is to exercise itself;

1 See on the prima naturae, прŵта катà púow, Madvig's De Finibus, Exc. 4.

2 Grote's Aristotle 11. p. 444, R. and P. § 420.

they are not essential to its exercise, as the Peripatetics thought. If ivory and gold are wanting, the art of Phidias will show itself in baser materials: so the wise man will show his mastery in the art of life, alike in poverty as in wealth, in adversity as in prosperity. Nay, the less favourable his circumstances are, the greater is the call on the resources of his art, and the more glorious his success if he succeeds in acting the virtuous part. A good man struggling with adversity is a spectacle worthy of God'. Until we have learnt the lesson that our happiness can neither be increased nor diminished by the presence or absence of anything outside of ourselves, anything which is not in our own power, we can never attain to that inner calm, which is the essence of true happiness.

This distinction between things in our power3, and things not in our power, is one on which the Stoics laid great stress. By the former they meant things which we could do or acquire if we willed, such as our opinions, our affections, desires and aversions; by the latter they meant things which we could not do or acquire if we willed, such as natural constitution of body, wealth, honour, rank, &c., but in regard to these last our judgment of them is in our own power, we can train ourselves to think of them as unimportant. Thus it is in our power to discipline the mind in the way of controlling or suppressing some emotions, generating and encouraging others. The grand aim of the Stoical system was to strengthen the governing reason and to enthrone it as a

1 Seneca Epist. LXXXV, De providentia, c. 2.

2 τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, the sphere of προαίρεσις according to Aristotle Εth.

III 4.

fixed habit and character, which would control by counter-suggestions the impulse arising at each special moment, particularly all disturbing terrors or allurements, by the reflection that the objects which appear to be desirable, or the contrary, are not really such, but are only made to appear so by false and curable associations. Nothing can really harm us unless we choose to make it do so by allowing it to conquer our reason and will'.

Pleasure is a natural concomitant (éπyévvŋμa) of activity, but is not a natural end: not even if we count as pleasure that high delight (χαρά as opposed to ἡδονή), which belongs to virtuous activity, for pleasure regarded in itself has a tendency to lead man away from the true end, viz, acting not for self, but for the whole. On this ground Chrysippus condemned Plato and Aristotle for preferring the contemplative to the practical life, alleging that the former was merely a higher kind of self-indulgence. Man is born for society, he is a member of the great body' which includes all rational creatures within it: if he forgets his relation to other men, and only cares to gratify his intellectual tastes, he abnegates his proper place in the world. The feeling of common membership in one body binds each not to justice only but to beneficence and to mutual help3: above all it constitutes the firmest bond of friendship between those who act up to that membership, so that every wise man is dear to all who are wise, even though he may be personally unknown to them*.

1 See Grote's Aristotle, II. p. 446.

2 Seneca Ep. XCV. 52 membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit; Cic. Off. III. 32.

3 Cic. Off. 1. 20.

4 Cic. N. D. I. 121.

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