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Εκτωρ κεῖτ ̓ ἀλλοφρονέων. οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει 30 τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν. ̓Αναξαγόρας δ ̓ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν· πολλαχοῦ μὲν 404 γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις. οὐ φαίνεται δ ̓ ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νους πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ ̓ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις § 6 πᾶσιν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, οἱ κ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ Εμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτω

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ ̓ ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ ̓ αἰθέρα διαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον,

στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.

§ 7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυ

χὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ ̓ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο· μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ ̓ ἕν· τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ

404 1. ἀσαφεῖ Χ. om. STWX.

3. τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ TW.
· πᾶσιν
10. ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς ταύτας οἱ Χ.

21.

τὸ om. Χ. τὰς δ ̓ ἄλλας ὁμοιοτρόπους Them.

8.

20

as lying 'with thought apart.' Democritus, this shews, does not employ the term reason to denote a faculty conversant with truth, but uses reason as identical with soul. Anaxagoras himself, however, is less distinct in his identification of the terms. In many places he speaks of reason as the cause of what is beautiful and right, but in other passages he seems to place it on a level with the soul, as when for instance he maintains that it is present in all animals both great and small, both honourable and dishonourable. As matter of fact, however, reason, in the sense of intellect and insight, does not seem to be present equally in all animals or even indeed in all men.

Those then, who have concentrated their attention on the fact that what is animate is in motion have regarded soul as that which is most capable of movement: those thinkers, on the other hand, who have directed their observations to the fact that the soul knows and perceives things existing, identify soul with the elementary principles of all existence, some making those principles to be several in number, others resolving them into this one principle of soul. Thus Empedocles makes the soul to be composed of all the elements, and at the same time considers each one of these elements a soul. His words are as follows:

"Surely by earth we perceive earth, and man knoweth water by water. By air sees air the divine; by fire sees fire the destructive:

Yea, love comprehends love, and 'tis through strife dismal we know strife." In this same fashion also does Plato in the Timaeus construct the soul out of the elements. Like, he there maintains, is known by like, and the objects of knowledge are composed of the elements of existence. To the same effect also is the distinction drawn in his lectures on philosophy, where it is shown that on the one hand the generic or abstract form of the living subject is a product containing the abstract form of unity with the primary phase of length and breadth and depth and that on the other hand other things are formed in a corresponding manner. An additional mode of explanation is to represent reason as perfect unity, understanding as the two (because it proceeds like a single line directly in one way to one conclusion only), whereas opinion is represented as the number

W.AR.

2

30

τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ ̓ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγ- 15 ματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ ̓ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ ̓ αἰσθή § 8 σει· εἴδη δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν § 9 κινοῦνθ ̓ ἑαυτόν. διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, τούτοις δ ̓ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ ̓ ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφη-405 § το νάμενοι. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος· οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν. ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν· τό τε γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώ§ 11 των υπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως. ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι· : καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. § 12 Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφηνάμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον· ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, τοῦτο δ ̓ εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητι- το κὸν δὲ διὰ μικρομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα· τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει· τοιοῦτον δ ̓ εἶναι τόν τε § 13 νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ' ̓Αναξαγόρας δ ̓ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται δ'

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cf a superficies, and sense perception as the number of a solid. Numbers, in fact, were said by the Platonists to be the very fo ms and principles of existence: and such numbers are formed. from the elements. And things are apprehended-some by rea son, others by understanding, a third class by opinion, and fourth order by sense: while the numbers, to which these faculties correspond, constitute the forms or ideas of things. the mselves.

a

Since, moreover, the soul was held to be at once a faculty for movement and a faculty for knowledge in this numerical sense, there have been thinkers who have combined the two descriptions and have set forth the soul as a self-moving number.

While however these thinkers agree in reducing the soul to elements or principles, they differ as regards the name and number of the principles: a difference which prevails especially between those who make the principles corporeal, and those who make them incorporeal, and also between both of these and such thinkers as have blended and exhibited their principles as compounded from both sources. They differ too about the number of their principles, some reducing them to one, others regarding them as more in number.

soul.

There is a corresponding variation in their views about the The principle of movement they, not unreasonably, regarded as one of the primary elements in the natural world: and consequently there were some who viewed the mind as fire, this being that one among the elements which is made up of the finest parts and is most incorporeal, while further it is the element which is the first to be moved itself and to move other things. The reason for each of these facts Democritus has expressed somewhat neatly. Soul he regarded as identical with reason, and this he held belonged to the class of primary and indivisible bodies, and possessed the faculty of movement by reason of the smallness of its parts and of its peculiar form. Now the form which is most susceptible of movement is the spherical: and of such shape is reason and fire. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, might, as we have said before, sometimes be taken to speak of soul and reason as different from one another: but he really

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ἀμφοῖν ὡς μια φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μά -- 15 λιστα πάντων· μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶν αι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν. ἀποδίδωσι δ ̓ ἄμφω τῇ αὐ τῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ § 14 πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητι κόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὸν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, το § 15 ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ. Διογένης δ ̓ ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τι νες, ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ᾗ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, ᾗ δὲ λεπτότατον, § 16 κινητικὸν εἶναι. καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι 15 ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι· ἐν κινήσει δ ̓ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾤετο καὶ § 17 οἱ πολλοί. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ̓Αλκμαίων ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατοι εἶναι 30 διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις, τοῦτο δ ̓ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς § 18 ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον. τῶν δὲ 405 φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ ἵππων. πεισθῆναι δ ̓ ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά· καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ § 19 οὐχ αἷμα· ταύτην δ ̓ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν. ἕτεροι δ' αἷμα, 5 καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ ̓ ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύ

20.

TUVW.

ἔοικεν Τ.

τι om. V. | τὴν λίθον Χ Themist., Philop., Simpl.

24. λεπτομερέστατον

35. φησι τὴν ψυχὴν UW. 37. τε] δὲ SX, τε EW Tor. 4050 3.

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