hold to the principle,-which, in fact, has had the chief share in making them unbelievers,-that the idea of a DIVINE REVELATION implies that of a universally accessible, INFALLIBLE INTERPRETER; and that the one without the other is an absurdity and contradiction.

And this principle it is that has mainly contributed to make these men unbelievers. For, when a tolerably intelligent and reflective man has fully satisfied himself that in point of fact no such provision has been made,-that no infallible and universally accessible interpreter does exist on earth (and this is a conclusion which even the very words of Paul, in his discourse at Miletus [Acts xx.]' would be alone fully sufficient to establish) -when he has satisfied himself of the non-existence of this interpreter, yet still adheres to the principle of its supposed necessity, the consequence is inevitable, that he will at once reject all belief of Christianity. The ideas of a REVELATION, and of an unerring INTERPRETER, being, in his mind, inseparably conjoined, the overthrow of the one belief cannot but carry the other along with it. Such a person, therefore, will be apt to think it not worth while to examine the reasons in favour of any other form of Christianity, not pretending to furnish an infallible interpreter. This-which, he is fully convinced, is essential to a Revelation from Heaven-is, by some Churches, claimed, but not established; while the rest do not even claim it. The pretensions of the one he has listened to, and deliberately rejected; those of the other he regards as not even worth listening to.

The system, then, of reasoning from our own conjectures as to the necessity of the Most High doing so and so, tends to lead a man to proceed from the rejection of his own form of Christianity, to a rejection of revelation altogether. But does it stop here? Does not the same system lead naturally to ATHEISM also? Experience shows that that consequence, which reason might have anticipated, does often actually take place. He who gives the reins to his own conjectures as to what is necessary, and thence draws his conclusions, will be likely to find a necessity for such divine interference in the affairs of the world as does not in fact take place. He will deem it no less than necessary, that an omnipotent and all-wise and beneficent Being should interfere to rescue the oppressed from the oppressor,

-the corrupted from the corruptor,-to deliver men from such temptations to evil as it is morally impossible they should withstand; and, in short, to banish evil from the universe. And, since this is not done, he draws the inference that there cannot possibly be a God, and that to believe otherwise is a gross absurdity. Such a belief, he may, indeed, consider as useful for keeping up a wholesome awe in the minds of the vulgar; and for their sakes he may outwardly profess Christianity also; even as the heathen philosophers of old endeavoured to keep up the popular superstitions; but a real belief he will regard as something impossible to an intelligent and reflective mind.

It is not meant that all, or the greater part, of those who maintain the principle here spoken of, are Atheists. We all know how common it is for men to fail of carrying out some principle (whether good or bad) which they have adopted;-how common, to maintain the premises, and not perceive the conclusion to which they lead. But the tendency of the principle itself is what is here pointed out: and the danger is anything but imaginary, of its leading, in fact, as it does naturally and consistently, to Atheism as its ultimate result.

But surely, the Atheist is not hereby excused. To reject or undervalue the revelation God has bestowed, urging that it is no revelation to us, or an insufficient one, because unerring certainty is not bestowed also,-because we are required to exercise patient diligence, and watchfulness, and candour, and humble self-distrust,-this would be as unreasonable as to disparage and reject the bountiful gift of eyesight, because men's eyes have sometimes deceived them-because men have mistaken a picture for the object imitated, or a mirage of the desert for a lake; and have fancied they had the evidence of sight for the sun's motion; and to infer from all this that we ought to blindfold ourselves, and be led henceforth by some guide who pretends to be himself not liable to such deceptions.

Let no one fear that by forbearing to forestall the judgment of the last day,-by not presuming to dictate to the Most High, and boldly to pronounce in what way He must have imparted a revelation to Man,-by renouncing all pretensions to infallibility, whether an immediate and personal, or a derived infallibility,by owning themselves to be neither impeccable nor infallible

'The one is unbelief, the other is contumely; and certainly

superstition is the reproach of the Deity?'

Bacon might have said that both are unbelief; for, he who rashly gives heed to superstitious delusions, errs not from excess of faith, but from want of faith; since what is true in his belief, he receives not because it is true,-but because it agrees with some prejudice or fancy of his own; and he is right when he is right, only by chance. Having violated the spirit of the first Commandment, by regarding what is human with the veneration due to that only which is divine, his worship, even of the true God, becomes an abomination. He has set up idols in his heart, and the Lord, the jealous God, will set his face against that man.'

And in reference to the contumely of God, it is a circumstance very remarkable, that, in many instances at least, superstition not only does not promote true religion, but even tends to generate profaneness. In proof of the strange mixture of superstition and profaneness that leads to the jokes and sallies of wit that are frequently heard among the Spanish peasantry, even in respect of the very objects of superstitious reverence, I can cite the testimony of an eminently competent witness. The like strange mixture is found in other Roman-catholic, and also in Pagan countries, particularly among the Hindus, who are described as habitually reviling their gods in the grossest terms, on the occasion of any untoward event. And in our own country nothing is so common a theme of profane jests among the vulgar of all ranks as the Devil; a large proportion of the superstition that exists being connected more or less with the agency of Evil Spirits.

This curious anomaly may perhaps be, in a great measure at least, accounted for, from the consideration, that, as superstition imposes a yoke rather of fear than of love, her votaries are glad to take revenge, as it were, when galled by this yoke, and to indemnify themselves in some degree both for the irksomeness of their restraints and tasks, and also for the degradation (some sense of which is always excited by a consciousness of slavish dread), by taking liberties whenever they dare, either in the way of insult or of playfulness, with the objects of their dread.

But how comes it that they ever do dare, as we see is the fact, to take these liberties? This will perhaps be explained by its being a characteristic of superstition to enjoin, and to attribute efficacy to, the mere performance of some specific outward acts, the use of some material object, without any loyal, affectionate devotion of heart being required to accompany such acts, and to pervade the whole life as a ruling motive. Hence, the rigid observance of the precise directions given, leaves the votary secure, at ease in conscience, and at liberty, as well as in a disposition, to indulge in profaneness. In like manner a patient, who dares not refuse to swallow a nauseous dose, and to confine himself to a strict regimen, yet who is both vexed, and somewhat ashamed, at submitting to the annoyance, will sometimes take his revenge as it were, by abusive ridicule of the medical attendant and his drugs; knowing that this will not, so long as he does but take the medicines, diminish their efficacy. Superstitious observances are a kind of distasteful or disgusting remedy, which, however, is to operate if it be but swallowed, and on which accordingly the votary sometimes ventures gladly to revenge himself. Thus does superstition generate profaneness.

There was an ancient superstition, the baptizing (as it was called) of church-bells, which probably had some share in leading to a profanation existing among us, the ceremony of what is called the christening of a ship. The Sacrament of Baptism is often called christening; i.e., making a person a Christian ;-a member of the Church of Christ. And because it is usual to give a name on that occasion (though this is no essential part of the Sacrament), hence the word is often applied, though most irreverently, to the naming of a dog, a horse, or a ship. And in this last case, it is usual to go through the ceremony of dashing a bottle of wine against the ship's side; which is in fact a kind of Parody of the Sacrament of Baptism, This profanation is practised and countenanced by persons who, I doubt not, have no deliberate design to do anything profane; but who are culpably careless of the tendency of what they are doing. And it may be hoped that when they are brought to consider the matter, they will cease to give such occasion to irreligious scoffers.

'As the contumely is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men.'

It is somewhat strange that it should be necessary to remark on the enormity-the noxious character-of all superstition. The mischiefs of superstition are, I conceive, much underrated. It is by many regarded, not as any sin, but as a mere harmless folly, at the worst ;-as, in some instances, an amiable weakness, or even a salutary delusion. Its votaries are pitied, as in some cases subjected to needless and painful restraints, and undergoing groundless terrors ;-sometimes they are ridiculed as enslaved to absurd and puerile observances: but whether pitied or laughed at, superstitious Christians are often regarded as likely at least as not the less likely on account of their superstition, to have secured the essentials of religion:-as believing and practising what is needful towards salvation, and as only carrying their faith and their practice, unnecessarily and unreasonably, to the point of weak credulity and foolish scrupulosity. This view of the subject has a strong tendency to confirm the superstitious, and even to add to their number. They feel that if there is any doubt, they are surely on the safe side. 'Supposing I am in error on this or that point' (a man may say), 'I am merely doing something superfluous; at the worst I suffer some temporary inconvenience, and perhaps have to encounter some ridicule; but if the error be on the other side, I risk my salvation by embracing it; my present course therefore is evidently the safest-I am, after all, on the safe side.' -As if there were any safe side but the side of truth; and as if it could be safe to manifest distrust of a skilful physician by combining with his medicines all the nostrums of all the ignorant practitioners in the neighbourhood.

How far the superstition of any individual may be excusable or blameable in the sight of God, can be pronounced by Him alone, who alone is able to estimate each man's strength or weakness, his opportunities of gaining knowledge, and his employment or neglect of those opportunities. But the same may be said of every other offence, as well as of those in question. Of superstition itself, in all its various forms and degrees, I cannot think otherwise than that it is not merely a