thing done in pursuance of that Act, must be commenced within six calendar months from the act complained of; and the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 79, provides that that Act is to be construed as one with the stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 44. The stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, which provides for the appointment of additional police magistrates in the metropolitan district, requires, by s. 53, that all actions brought for any thing done in pursuance of that Act, or in execution of the powers and authorities thereby conferred, shall be commenced within three months from the commission of the act complained of. Then by s. 6 of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, it is enacted, "That any two justices of the peace having jurisdiction within the metropolitan police district, shall have, while sitting together publicly in the court or room used for holding special or petty sessions of the peace, in any part of the said district within the limits of their commission, except in the divisions to be assigned to the police courts already established, and any two justices of the peace for the city of London and the liberties thereof, having jurisdiction within the city of London and the liberties thereof, shall, within the said city of London and the liberties thereof, have all the powers, privileges, and duties which any one magistrate of the said police courts has while sitting in one of the said courts, by the two recited Acts of the last Session of Parliament, or either of them; provided always, that whenever a new police court shall have been established within the metropolitan police district, and a division assigned to such court, as aforesaid, such justices shall not act in that division, in the execution of the two said Acts, or either of them, elsewhere than at such court; and that at every police court at which the regular attendance of a police magistrate shall have been ordered by her Majesty, as hereinbefore provided, the police magistrate, while present in such court, shall act as the sole magistrate thereof."

Bramwell in this Term (Tuesday, Nov. 3), moved for a rule to shew cause why the nonsuit should not be set aside, and a new trial granted. The question is, whether the plaintiff was bound to bring his action within three months; if so, the nonsuit is right; but it is submitted that the plaintiff had six months within which to commence his action. It may be admitted, that if the defendants had been appointed under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, the plaintiff must have brought his action within three months, because that is the limitation imposed by the 53rd section of that Act. In Hazeldine v. Grove (3 Q. B. 997), the judgment of the Court proceeded on that ground. There the defendant was a police magistrate appointed under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71; and Lord Denman, C.J., in giving judgment, said: "When so appointed, the statute invests him with the ordinary authority of a justice of the peace, with certain restrictions. It appears to us, therefore, that when he is exercising the most ordinary jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, he is acting in execution of a power and authority conferred on him by the Act, as much as a commissioned justice doing the same thing would be acting in execution of a power and authority conferred by the commission." This is the view taken of that case by Maule, J. in Eliot v. Allen (1 C. B. 18, 36). But these defendants did not derive their authority from 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71; nor was the act complained of done in pursuance of that Act, or in execution of the powers and authorities given by it. They were justices appointed under the general commission of the peace for the county of Middlesex; and they were rendered competent to make this conviction by the statute 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 6; which authorizes two county magistrates to exercise the office of one police magistrate under certain circumstances; and confers upon them, whilst sitting as police magistrates, all the powers and privileges to which ordinary police magistrates are entitled. It was argued at the trial, that they must have the same protection, because they were required

to discharge the same duties, and were invested with the same powers; but the question is, whether they acted in pursuance of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, or in execution of powers conferred by that Act; and they certainly did not. Then that leaves the limitation of six months established by the former Acts, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, in force as regards the present case. The result is this: that in all cases particularly provided for by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, or in which the justices who act were appointed under that statute, the limitation of three months applies; but that any magistrate, not appointed under that Act, who acts in execution of the powers either of the 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, or 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, is subject to an action at any time within six months. Secondly, one uniform period of limitation has been established by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5. That section recites, that "divers Acts, commonly called public, local, and personal, or local and personal Acts, and divers other Acts of a local and personal nature, contain clauses limiting the time within which actions may be brought for any thing done in pursuance of the said Acts respectively; and that the periods of such limitations vary very much, and it is expedient that there should be one period of limitation only;" and enacts, "that from and after the passing of this Act, the period within which any action may be brought for any thing done under the authority, or in pursuance of, any such Act or Acts, shall be two years; or, in case of continuing damage, then within one year after such damage shall have ceased; and that so much of any clause, provision, or enactment, by which any other time or period of limitation is appointed or enacted, shall be repealed." Now, the Metropolitan Police Acts are clearly local Acts; they are confined in their operation to a certain district, and although the population of that district is very large, that can make no difference. It is impossible that the Court can adopt amount of population as the criterion; but, even if it did, the statute 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, under which the defendants acted, can only apply to a small district. Neither is it a conclusive criterion that the Act contains a clause making it a public Act, or that it is classed and printed as a general Act. In Richards v. Easto (15 Law Journal, Exch. 163), the Court held, that the Metropolitan Building Acts (14 Geo. 3, c. 78, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 84), though classed among the general Acts, were of a local and personal nature within the meaning of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97; and in Cock v. Gent (12 M. & W. 234), the same Court decided that a Court of Requests Act, having a clause making it a public Act, was, notwithstanding, a "public, local, and personal Act,” and fell under the operation of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97. Cur. adv. vult.

It is

LORD DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.-This was an action against two of the magistrates of the county of Middlesex, for a committal under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 18. The plaintiff was nonsuited because the action was not commenced within three months; and he has moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground that the nonsuit was wrong. decided, that if the plaintiff had been committed by a police magistrate under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, his right of action would have been barred at the end of three months. (Hazeldine v. Grove, 3 G. & D. 210.) The defendants were not so appointed, but were two magistrates acting under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 84, s. 6, by which it was provided that two magistrates of the county, sitting in the usual place of holding a police court within the metropolitan district, should have all the powers of police magistrates acting under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71. The defendants, therefore, having all the privileges of police magistrates, by virtue of the above-mentioned statute, have the privilege of the limitation of three months to any action brought against them, as much as

if they had been police magistrates. It is contended, secondly, that the Acts above mentioned, relating to the metropolitan police, are Acts which are "local and personal," or are "of a local and personal nature," within the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, and so repealed as to the limitation of three months; but we are of opinion that the Acts in question are not within the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97; they are collected with the public and general Acts, and not with the local and personal Acts, according to the direction of the two Houses of Parliament (a) mentioned in the case, argued in the Court of Exchequer last Hilary Term, of Richards v. Easto (15 Law Journal, 163, Exch.); and they are not, in our judgment, of a local and personal nature within the meaning of this Act of Parliament considering the public importance of the rights they involve, and the generality of their application in all the police districts within the metropolitan district. Therefore, in this case, there will be no rule.

B.

Rule refused.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

Michaelmas Term.-November 21, 1846.

SPENCE V. MEYNELL and ANOTHER.

Action against magistrates for false imprisonment-Damages.

In an action of trespass for false imprisonment, brought against justices, the plaintiff cannot recover in damages the amount of costs incurred by him in an unsuccessful application to a judge for his discharge on the return to a writ of habeas corpus, unless they be alleged as special damage in the declaration.

RESPASS for false imprisonment against two magistrates of the county of York, tried before Rolfe, B., at the Summer Assizes for that county, 1845. The declaration was in the usual form, but contained no allegation of special damage. Plea-Not guilty, by statute. At the trial it appeared that the plaintiff had been committed to prison by the defendants under a void warrant; (b) but that after he had been in custody some time, a second warrant was lodged with the gaoler, which was free from the defects apparent in the first. When the plaintiff had been in prison about two months, he sued out a writ of habeas corpus, upon which he was brought up, together with the second warrant, before Coleridge, J., during the winter Assizes of 1844, and

(a) The following is the passage of the judgment referred to :-"The Act of the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, was not an Act commonly called public, local, and personal. That designation did not take place until long after the statute passed. On the 1st May, 1797, the House of Lords resolved that the Queen's Printer should class the general statutes, and special and public, local and private, in separate volumes; and on the 8th day of May, 1801, there was a resolution of the House of Commons, agreed to by the House of Lords, that the general statutes and public local and personal in each session should be classed in separate volumes: that was the commencement of that division of the statutes."

(b) The plaintiff was convicted with three other persons, under the 4th section of 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, for the fraudulent removal of goods to prevent the landlord from distraining them for rent; and or

dered to pay the penalty by that section imposed. The warrant of commitment, under which he was sent to prison, was for want of a distress upon which that penalty might be levied; and the following objections, amongst others, were taken to the proceedings:-That the summons did not shew that there was any complaint in writing, and that it was signed by a single justice only; that the conviction did not state or shew that the justices who convicted were "justices residing near the place whence such goods and chattels were removed, or near the place where the same were found, not being interested in the lands or tenements whence such goods were removed; " that the plaintiff was convicted in his absence; and that the adjudication was of a joint penalty upon the plaintiff and three others, without stating how much was to be paid by each.

remanded. The learned judge, at the trial, told the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, but that, in estimating the damages, they ought not to include the expense of the application to Coleridge, J., and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with one farthing damages; but it was arranged that the verdict should be increased by the amount of those costs, as taxed, if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to them.

Baines, accordingly, in the following Michaelmas Term (Nov. 8), obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, or to increase the damages by the amount of the costs above mentioned.

Knowles (with whom was Bliss) now shewed cause. It is clear that the expenses in question cannot be recovered in this action, because they are not laid in the declaration as special damage. They are not expenses which necessarily accrued from the act of the defendants; and when that is the case, the rule is, that the plaintiff cannot give evidence of them unless they are particularly stated in the declaration. (1 Chitt. on Pleading, 396, ed. 1836.) [Ḥe was then stopped by the Court.]

Baines and Hall, contrà.-Whatever the plaintiff did for the purpose of obtaining his release is to be considered as necessarily incident to the wrongful act of the defendants. [LORD DENMAN, C.J.-Surely there is no presumption of law that expenses of this sort would result from the imprisonment.] It was the only mode by which he could obtain his discharge. There is a great distinction in this respect between the expenses of a successful and those of an unsuccessful application; if the application to be discharged be successful, the duration of the imprisonment is shortened; the trespass is at an end, aud the costs incurred are strictly in the nature of consequential damages, and must be stated in the declaration; but it is otherwise of an unsuccessful application. In that case the trespass continues, and the costs incurred are but a measure of damages; they shew the value which the plaintiff sets upon his own liberty, how costly a treasure he considers it, and how great a price he was willing to pay in order to regain it. In Batten's case (9 Rep. 54), it is said: "In assize of nuisance, quare divertit cursum aquæ, &c., and assigned that he made a trench across a river, which came to the plaintiff's mill, so that it was misturned, insomuch that where the mill used to grind three quarters, &c. in a day and a night, it could now grind but a bushel; and also that the said water did drown fifteen acres of the plaintiff's meadow, adjoining to the same mill, so as, where he used to have forty loads of hay in them, he could now have but seven, &c." Now, taking that illustration of land flooded by water, so as to reduce the number of quarters which it would produce, suppose the defendant were to answer that it actually produced as much as before, would not the plaintiff be at liberty to meet that by shewing that he had laid out 5007. upon the land, and would not that 5001. be a measure of the damage which he had sustained? It was understood at the trial that the amount of these expenses was to be added to the verdict, if the Court should think it right.

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-Mr. Hall has only convinced me that the plaintiff would be entitled to the amount of these expenses when taxed, if he were entitled to any thing; but I think he is not. This is a particular consequential damage, which might or might not result from the imprisonment, and therefore it ought to have been stated in the declaration.

The other Judges (a) concurring,

(a) Coleridge, J., Wightman, J., Erle, J.

Rule discharged.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

Michaelmas Term.-November 23, 1846.

THE QUEEN v. HARRISON and OTHERS.

Mandamus-Production of appointment of overseers.

▲ mandamus will not be granted to compel an overseer to produce his appointment, for the purpose of enabling the applicant to contest its validity upon a certiorari, as this might be done upon appeal to the Sessions.

Go

YODSON and Ramshay shewed cause against a rule nisi obtained by Pashley for a mandamus to the overseers of the parish of Kirby to produce to the applicant their appointment. There is no bonâ fide object in this application; and, without going into the question of law, as to whether a mandamus will be issued for such purpose, it is clear that it ought not to be issued here. It appears the applicant, Mr. Tennant, was dismissed from his situation as assistant overseer in this parish, and has ever since done every thing to annoy the parish by litigation. He professes to doubt that one of the overseers is not a substantial householder. We have an affidavit of Alderman Thompson, the largest rate-payer in the parish, who states, that the overseer is a substantial householder; and that he believes all the parishioners are satisfied with the appointment. It appears that the applicant knew the names of the magistrates who signed the appointment, and he might therefore have appealed; and in fact since this rule was obtained he has appealed. So also, if the appointment was bad upon the face of it, he could have appealed against it on that ground. This is quite a novel application, and is a mere vexatious proceeding. (Rex v. Clear, 4 B. & C. 899; and Rex v. Leicester, ib. 891, were referred to.)

Pashley, contrà.-The facts upon which this application was made remain uncontradicted. It appears that he applied to the magistrates to see the appointment, and they referred him to the overseers, who refused to produce it. He has a right to the production. Even if there is no appeal, or the time for the appeal gone by, he has a right to inspect public documents of this kind. The parish accounts may be inspected. (Rex v. Great Farringdon, 9 B. & C. 541.) (He also cited Reg. v. South Holland Drainage, 8 A. & E. 429; Fox v. Jones, 7 B. & C. 736; Ex parte Barnes, 2 D. Ñ. S. 20; Rex v. Tower, 4 M. & S. 62; Ex parte Hutt, 7 D. P. C. 690.) It was impossible to tell what was the fault in the appointment until it was seen, and no certiorari could have been obtained without a copy of the document. (Reg. v. Manchester and Leeds Railway, 8 A. & E. 413.)

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-I think it a most unreasonable application, and no authority has been brought before us in its favour.

COLERIDGE, J.-I regret that I granted the rule nisi. I did it only upon the belief that it was not a settled point, and not fit therefore for me to decide. Both the surmised objections were clearly grounds of appeal, and this is only an attempt to get at a defect in a circuitous way, when there is a mode pointed out by the law.

E. W.

Rule discharged with costs.

VOL. II.

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