Neuendorff v. Duryea.

city of New York was in any way affected. The section must therefore be adjudged void upon this ground."

The last two cases are cited in the Wisconsin case, as clearly pointing out the design and purpose of the provision, and they say: "It was obviously intended to prevent the mischief of uniting together, in the same bill, various objects which had no necessary connection with each other; and in order to guard against surprise and imposition on the part of the legislature and the community affected by the law, it is required that the title shall express the subject of the act."

In People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553, it was held that it was constitutional under the title, "An act to amend the several acts relating to the city of Rochester," to make provisions authorizing a city railroad to lay its tracks upon the sides instead of the center of an avenue, and authorizing water commissioners to contract with the trustees of villages through which the water may be conducted to the city, to supply those villages with water; because the first subject is connected with the regulation of streets, and the second is incidental to and promotive of the main purpose of supplying the city with water: The court say: "The subject expressed embraces the details of the city government, and any provision which relates to that government may be inserted in such an act, and as a general rule the means necessary or proper to accomplish the general design indicated in the title of the bill may be adopted. A subject has a signification according to its application, and it is capable of almost infinite division, and many particular or subordinate subjects may be included in one general subject. A city charter embraces many minor subjects, and yet they are all embraced in the general subject of the charter or corporation. In an act in relation to Lake avenue it would not be competent to insert provisions respecting Mount Hope avenue. As to such a bill Lake avenue would be the subject. So in a bill in relation to education in a city, it would be improper to insert provisions in relation to streets or police, unless they were in some way legitimately connected with the subject of education. But where the subject is general, comprehending all the functions of the corporation, provisions in relation to any of them, or necessary or pertinent to carry out any of them, may be, so far as this constitutional clause is concerned, incorporated in the bill. No one can be misled by such a title, and legislators and people are alike notified of the purpose of such an act." Three judges dissented, but the prevailing opinion was pronounced by the chief judge, who dissented in the principal case, and ANDREWs, J., who wrote the prevailing opinion in the principal case, concurred in this. See Harris v. People, 59 N. Y. 599; Lockhart v. City of Troy, 48 Ala. 579.

In Matter of Petition of Mayer, 50 N. Y. 504; it was held that "an act in relation to local improvements in the city of New York," was constitutionally entitled, and authorized a sewer assessment without filing a plan of sewerage. The court say: "The Constitution does not require that the title of an act should be the most exact expression of the subject which could be invented. It is enough if it fairly and reasonably announces the subject of the act." "The general subject of local improvements includes their plan and construction not only, but the means by which the work is accomplished, and the proceedings necessary to be adopted for these purposes, for assessing and paying the expenses incurred, as well as the remedies to parties for redress of grievances growing out of their construction. A general title relating to local improvements would be understood to include, or at least, that it might include these several details. No one could be deceived or misled by such a title."

Neuendorff v. Duryea.

In Matter of Petition of Astor, 50 N. Y. 363, acts indicating in their titles that they were intended to authorize the raising of money for the support and government of the city of New York, and to regulate the expenditure thereof, were held properly to cover provisions limiting the number of official newspapers to be employed, and appointing the officers of the corporation who were to designate them. The court say: "Instead of an unlimited power to employ all the newspapers in the city, and thus create obligations to pay therefor, these acts restricted the number which might be employed, and selected the officers of the corporation to designate them. The transfer of power of designation from the common council to specific officers of the corporation is not a different and independent subject, but immediately connected with the expenditure of the money authorized to be raised. We may presume that the change was regarded as a check upon expenditure, and that the mayor and comptroller, or the latter alone, would discharge the duty more for the pecuniary interest of the city than the common council. It is sufficient that it is connected with the support of the government and the expenses incident thereto." See, also, Matter of Petition of Volkening, 52 N. Y. 650. In Sullivan v. Mayor, 53 N. Y. 652, a prohibition of the power of the common council to create new offices is declared to be within the subject of the annual tax levy of New York.

In Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261, the fact that assessments for different streets were provided for in a bill entitled "an act to confirm, reduce and buy certain assessments on the city of Brooklyn," does not invalidate the bill, but one section providing that certain specified streets shall be repaired and kept in repair at the expense of the city, was held unconstitutional, as containing a different subject, not expressed in the title. If a local bill contains a subject which is properly expressed in the title, it is valid as to that subject, although invalid as to a subject not expressed," referring to People v. Briggs, supra.

In People v. Dudley, 58 N. Y. 323, it was held that an act entitled "an act to amend the Code of Procedure," fairly embraces the jurisdiction and practice of all the courts of the State, and authorizes a provision extending the jurisdiction of the justices of the District Courts in the city of New York throughout the city.

In Wenzler v. People, 58 N. Y. 516, an act entitled "an act to secure better administration in the police courts in the city of New York," was held properly to embrace the courts of sessions, of which the officers of the police are members. The Chief Judge and ALLEN, J., dissented, the latter writing the dessenting opinion. Both opinions are very elaborate. The former opinion rests on the ground that one general scheme is provided for, and the courts of sessions are in a sense police courts. The court say: "Surely no such construction can properly be put upon the constitutional provision in question, as to require a single scheme of legislation to be broken up into a series of acts, each of which, without the others, would be regarded as undesirable and ineffectual to accomplish the proposed object." In the dissenting opinion it is said: "The administration of the police courts might have been improved without touching or affecting the other tribunals named." The powers and jurisdiction of a police court,' and of the justice holding the same were prescribed by law, and are such as appertain more immediately to the preservation of the peace, the police of the city, the arrest, examination and holding to bail of the offenders against the law, and the summoning, trial, and conviction for certain minor offenses. The court of special sessions has jurisdiction to try, hear, determine and punish all complaints for misdemeanors; and this jurisdiction

Neuendorff v. Duryea.

is declared to be exclusive, except in certain specified cases. A reorganization of a court of this large jurisdiction is not within the title of an act relating to improved administration in police courts only; and so much of the act as relates to courts of special sessions is entirely beyond and outside of the enactments relating to the police courts." Of the title it is said: "It is not such as to indicate to any one the extent and general subject of the legislation covered by it."

In People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 88, the act of 1861, entitled “an act relating to fines, recognizances and forfeitures," and containing a provision that the provisions of the act of 1844 on that subject are in force, and shall be applicable to the city and county of New York, was held constitutional.

In People v. Willsea, 60 N. Y. 507, it was held that in the act entitled, “an act to amend an act entitled 'an act to provide for the drainage of swamp, bog, and other low and wet lands in the village of White Plains, and adjacent thereto,' a provision, extending the provisions of the original act by conforming the description of the lands to be drained so as to include lands in the adjacent town of Greenburgh, is constitutional.

In People v. Trustees of Dansville, 1 Hun, 595, it was held that where the title specifies two subjects, it is not material that the title mentions the particulars of one subject and not of the other.

In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495, it was said, respecting an act entitled "an act to establish a police government for the city of Detroit, "This purpose is fully accomplished when the law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require that every means and end necessary to this general object should be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be senseless, but would actually render legislation impossible." So much of the provisions of the "act to establish a Mutual Aid Association and to raise funds for the Common School system of Alabama," as purport to authorize a lottery or games of chance, are unconstitutional, as not expressed in the title, lotteries being prohibited by law in that State. Boyd v. State, 53 Ala. 601; Moses v. Mayor, 52 id. 212.

Under" an act to enlarge the jurisdiction of probate courts," provisions regulating appeals therefrom are properly included. Perkins v. Duval, 31 Ark. 236.

In "an act to incorporate the Institution of Deaconesses, and provide for the encouragement and control of a hospital in C.," a general power to establish hospitals anywhere is void. People v. Institution, 71 Ill. 229.

"An act to enable the corporate authorities of two or more towns, for park purposes, to issue bonds," embraces but one subject in its title. People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 433.

Under "an act to incorporate" a designated company, an exclusive privilege may be granted (Crescent City Gas-light Co. v. New Orleans Gas-light Co., 27 La. 138), but not a prolongation of a charter.

Under "a joint resolution in relation to " a designated corporation, authority to maintain a wharf and exempting vessels from wharfage is validly conferred. New Orleans v. New Orleans, etc., Railroad Co., 27 La. Ann. 414.

An act providing for publication of official matter in German newspapers, held unconstitutional as to notices of sales of real estate on execution, because local and special. Reissner v. Hurle, 50 Ind. 424.

A statute incorporating three distinct corporations, or reviving by name three obsolete charters, is void. Ex parte Conner, 51 Ga. 571.

Under "an act to establish a house of refuge for juvenile offenders," provis

Neuendorff v. Duryea.

ion may be constitutionally made for selling State lands and applying the pro ceeds to the support of the institution. McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151.

The subject of opening one street and closing another, and assessing the expense in a new mode, is not indicated in the title, "an act to alter the commissioner's map of the city of Brooklyn." People v. Brooklyn, 13 Abb. (N. S.) 121.

66

Provisions regulating the sale of liquors in and near the town may be conferred under the title, an act to extend the corporate powers of the town of Pontiac." Neifing v. Pontiac, 56 Ill. 172.

So under the title "an act to establish a board of public works" for a designated city, provisions transferring powers of former officers or boards of such works to new boards, may be sustained. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 55.

"An act to separate the offices of receiver and commissioner of the Louisville chancery court, and to provide for their appointment and define their duties," is constitutional, although the two offices are distinct. Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush, 108.

Under "an act to change the location of the county seat of" a designated county, provision can be made regulating the manner of election to determine whether the change shall be made. Simpson v. Bailey, 3 Oreg. 515.

Under "an act in relation to the establishment of a normal and training school in the village of Brockport," power may be granted to raise money for that purpose by bonds or taxation. Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 615.

Under "au act to change the line between" two specified counties, provisions may be made declaring the citizenship of the residents and apportioning the taxes. Ex parte Upshaw, 45 Ala. 234. The court say: "The addition of a considerable number of the inhabitants of one county to another would necessarily involve changes in their rights and duties, which, with eminent propriety, are adjusted in this act."

Under "an act to prevent domestic animals from running at large in the counties of M., S., and other counties," a prohibition confined to limited localities less than a county is effectual. Erlinger v. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94.

Under" an act to revise and amend the charter of the city of N.," constitutional provision may be made for new assessments for street improvements, and prescribing the powers of the authorities in making the same, and the mauner of collecting the tax. State v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236.

Under "an act to incorporate the village of F.," provisions for dividing the township of F. and forming a new town out of the portions set off, cannot be made. Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn. 524.

Under" an act to authorize the city of Madison to re-assess and collect certain taxes and assessments," the municipal authorities may be authorized not only to re-assess and re-levy taxes to pay for pavements theretofore laid, but to order pavements thereafter to be laid, and to purchase patents of pavements, etc. Miles v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; 9 Am. Rep. 578.

A provision in an act incorporating a college, that no ardent spirits shall be sold within four miles, is valid, although not specified in the title. O'Leary v. Cook, 28 111. 534. "Such a precaution is germain to the objects of a university of learning in the neighborhood of a large city like Chicago."

46

A direction to reduce the width of a highway is not embraced in the title, an act to regulate a road," etc. People v. Comm'rs, 53 Barb. 70. But this case is strongly disapproved by Mr. Sedgwick, Stat. 584.

In California and Ohio the constitutional requirement that statutes shall embrace but a single subject expressed in the title, is construed as a direction

Austin v. Holland.

for legislation, and courts do not enforce it. Matter of Boston Min., etc., Co., 51 Cal. 624; Ohio v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102. In the latter case the court say very uselessly: "In holding this provision to be directory, we do not mean, however, to be understood as saying that it is without obligatory force. On the contrary, it is a direction to the general assembly, which each member, under the solemn obligation of his oath, is bound to observe and obey. To the legislator it is of equal obligation with a mandatory provision."

Mailing notice of dissolution of partnership, properly directed, is not alone sufficient to relieve a retiring partner from liability to one who has had actual dealings with the partnership; it raises a presumption of notice, which may be repelled by proof that the notice was not in fact received. Where the party sought to be charged with notice, testifies first that he never received the notice, and on cross-examination that he did not remember receiving it, and thought that if he had seen it he should have remembered it, held, that the question of notice was properly submitted to the jury. (See note, p. 249.)

A

CTION on promissory note made in firm name of Dillon, Beebe & Co. to order of Horace Loveland. Defendant Holland answered that he was not a member of the firm. Defendants were copartners under said firm name, prior to the giving of the note. The facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for plaintiff on verdict was affirmed at General Term of the Supreme Court, and defendant appealed.

Esek Cowen, for defendant.

Martin I. Townsend, for plaintiff.

ANDREWS, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent engagements made by his former copartner in the firm name, with those who had previous dealings with the firm, and who entered into the new transaction without notice of the change in the partnership. In