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communicated the following resolution of the Committee of Proprietors," (Here was engrossed the resolution last quoted,) "The Naval Committee were of opinion, that having already agreed that every thing connected with access to the pillar should be subject to the rules and regulations of the Proprietors, what is now proposed, sanctioned by the Proprietors at large, ought not to be objected to by them; and as the point as to the gas is now yielded, the Committee consider that all matters may now be considered as adjusted betwixt them and the Proprietors, though the Naval Committee will not proceed with their operations until the Committee of Proprietors shall have had an opportunity of consulting with their constituents."

5th, The matter being thus apparently closed, a general meeting of the Proprietors of the Square was held on the 29th March 1819, when one of the gentlemen, who is stated as an objector, moved, that the transaction so entered into should be approved of, and that measures should be taken for rendering the veto effectual. No Proprietor of the Square stated any objection, but the secretary to the Naval Committee, who had always been permitted to attend the Square meetings, and a member of the Naval Committee, who held a proxy from the Royal Bank, as proprietors of two houses in the Square, moved that the veto should not be agreed to. That there may be no suspicion of misrepresentation in this statement, I insert the motions precisely as they were made.

-Moved, That the meeting do approve of the report of the Committee, now read, that the proposed Pillar be erected in the centre of the Square, and that the entrance to the same be by a door, secured by a lock and key: That there shall be affixed to the Pillar, so soon as it is constructed, a rodconductor, to prevent risk from lightning. That it is reasonable and proper, that the Proprietors of the Square, having thus consented to every thing proposed by the Naval Committee, should, at the same time, take such measures as may be necessary, to secure the same exclusive use of the Square, to themselves and their families, that they have hitherto and do at present enjoy: That this can only be secured, by providing effectually, for keeping the door of the Pillar shut at all times, excepting in cases of necessity: And therefore, that a minute to be signed by all the Proprietors, be immediately engrossed in the sederunt book of the

Square, providing, that each individual proprietor shall at all times have an effectual veto, against the said door being opened, on any condition, without his consent and apbe necessary for the purpose of repairs. probation, excepting when the same shall

2d, "That immediately upon these signatures being obtained, the Committee of Proprietors be empowered, and directed to communicate these resolutions to the Naval Committee; and to obtain from that Committee, the necessary obligation or writing, for vesting the property of, and control over the Pillar, in the Proprietors of the fore the month of May, 1821, and for proSquare; for finishing the same, in or beviding a fund for keeping the same in repair, in all time coming. "Mr (the Secretary of the Naval Committee), " moved, and dopted the following motion, which was seconded by Mr that the door shall not be opened on any condition, without the consent and approbation of a majority of the Proprietors of the Square, and that the concession of the site requested, shall not either directly or indirectly, confer any right either of property or of servitude, in or over the Square, in terms of their circular, of the 9th December, 1818.

"

3

"This motion was withdrawn, and (the same gentleman) moved to approve of the report, excepting as to the veto, and to

remit to a Committee, to consider the most of access to the Pillar." expedient arrangement relative to the mode

6th, Though the veto had been agreed to by the Naval Committee, yet seeing that it was objected to by their representatives in our meeting, the gentleman who had proposed it,

said, that to bring the matter to a close, he was willing to put his motion in the following manner: "That the meeting do approve of the report of the Committee now read; that the proposed pillar be erected in the centre of the Square, and that the entrance to the same be by a door secured by lock and key; that there shall be affixed to the pillar, as soon as it is constructed, a rod-conductor, to prevent risk from lightning."

This motion then proceeded to state as before, that it was reasonable and proper to secure the privacy of the Square; and, instead of proposing that the minute for that purpose should enact an absolute veto in each proprietor, it bore" that a minute to be signed by all the Proprietors be immediately engrossed in the sederunt book of the Square, providing that the said door shall never be opened on any condition, without the consent and approbation of three fourths of the resident Proprietors, excepting when the same shall be necessary for the purpose of repairs."

Then followed a repetition of the in

structions to the Committee to commu nicate with the Naval Committee, upon

which (the same member of the Naval Committee who had adopted the first amendment) again moved" to approve of the report, excepting as to the veto, and to remit to a Committee to consider the most expedient arrangement relative to the mode of access to the pillar."

"The meeting resolved, before approving of the report, to remit to a Committee of Proprietors to consider the most expedient arrangements relative to the access of the pillar, with power to communicate to the

Naval Committee.

7th, The Naval Committee, at their next meeting, sanctioned the opposition which had been so made by their secretary and member. Their minutes of 31st March 1819, bear,

men, who wished to approve of the suggestion of the Naval Committee,

were,

Imo, "That the gentlemen of the Naval Committee shall satisfy the Committee of Proprietors, herein after named, that the proposed Pillar be completed on or before. the 21st day of May, 1821.

2do, That the Stones and Mortar of the Pillar shall be completely prepared out of the area of the Square, according to the proposal of the Naval Committee.

3tio, That the rights of the Proprietors to the inclosed area, shall not be altered in any respect, by giving their consent to the building of the Pillar.

4to, That in no event shall indiscriminate access to the public be allowed: And that a set of rules respecting the access shall be made out, and approved of by a meeting of the Proprietors of the Square, to be specially called for this purpose, who shall name a Committee of resident proprietors, to give effect to the rules so laid down.

"The minute of last meeting having been read, it was resolved, on the motion of seconded by and unanimously adopted, That Saint Andrew's-Square should be the site of the Pillar, provided appointed for adjusting every detail respect5to, That a Committee of Proprietors be that the Proprietors of the Square agreeing the completion of the work, and the seto such terms, relative to the access, as curing the necessary means of keeping it in repair."

the Naval Committee can approve of, and provided the funds are found to be sufficient for the purpose of erecting, and afterwards maintaining the Pillar. It was moreover, the opinion of the Committee, that a majority of the Proprietors of the square ought to regulate every matter relative to the access, so soon as the Pillar is completed. And in the event of this resolution not

being agreed to, the Committee are of opinion, that the site of St. Andrew's-square should be given up."

8th, The Committee of Proprietors of St Andrew's Square agreed to this new proposal, by a majority, at a meeting held on 5th April 1819, two of their number, who dissented,signifying, verbally, that though, for the sake of unanimity, they would give up the veto, they still meant to insist that, whatever the regulations to be adopted with regard to the door of the pillar might be, they should be settled before it was erected, so as to have the force of a condition, instead of being postponed till afterwards, which would have rendered them mere rules, alterable at all times at pleasure.

9th, A meeting of the proprietors of the Square was held, at which even the resolution, with regard to three fourths, was dropped, and no other security for the privacy of the Square required, than that four resident gentlemen should give their consent, in writing, before any person was admitted into the inside of the pillar. The resolutions proposed by those gentle

On the part of those who wished to have the management previously fixed on a definitive basis, Mr proposed the following amendment to the 4th resolution:

"That the key of the Pillar shall never be entrusted to the custody of the square-keeper, or any other servant of the square: That no person shall have access to the Pillar at any time, without the consent in writing of a majority of a Committee of seven resident proprietors, appointed for the purpose, being specially obtained thereto, and that a minute be entered in the sederunt-book, and signed by all the proprietors, or their proxies duly other: That every individual proprietor authorised, binding the proprietors to each shall, at all times, have a valid and effectual veto against any other, or more, or indiscriminate access, being allowed to the Pillar, than is herein provided, excepting for the purpose of repairs."

This amendment was negatived by a majority of 10 to 9; whereupon the mover of it inserted a protest in the minutes, in precisely the same words, and "intimated that he would take all such measures as he might deem necessary, to prevent its being erected on any other condition."

Other matters were talked of during the course of the discussions, but as they dont appear in the minutes, and were, besides, of a nature which would tempt me to break my resolution not to argue, I shall say nothing about them here.

I trust you will now be able to judge whether the negotiation was broken off because one party proposed new or frivolous conditions, or, as one of the Committee" expresses it, "made illiberal opposition," and stated "futile objections," or because the other party departed from a condition which they had at one time agreed to by an entry in their own minutes, officially communicated to the Proprietors of the Square, and did not choose to accept of the very important modifications in

their own favour which were offered of that condition. And I have only farther to add, that it was not till after all this, that another proprietor, wearied out and disgusted with the number of meetings and disputes which there had been with regard to it, and especially with this refusal to abide by the terms which had been at one time distinctly agreed to, gave in a protest against the erection of the Monument in the square.

APROPRIETOR OF ST ANDREW'S-SQUARE.

PROFESSOR BROWN'S OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.*

In this volume is contained an abstract of Professor Brown's System relative to the Physiology of the Mind. It was meant to serve as a text-book for those attending his Lectures, and therefore the successive parts of the subject are discussed with a good deal of brevity, but, at the same time, with so much clearness, as to render the book by itself an agrecable and satisfactory vehicle of the author's leading doctrines, and to make the reader regret to find that it is broken off abruptly at a very interesting part; Dr Brown having been unable to finish what is set forth in the table of contents. For the sake of our readers, we shall endeavour to give an account of some of these new and remarkable speculations, of which till now there was no printed publication, to diffuse them beyond the limits of his class-room, and which cannot fail to be read with admiration for those penetrating talents, from which science must no longer hope to receive farther benefits. The language throughout is remarkable for precision, and for the dexterity and elegance with which it is used for the purposes of reasoning. It is well known, that Dr Brown was in the habit of introducing, in his Lectures, many illustrations beautiful as conceptions or pictures; but in the present publication these are almost entirely withheld, so that the reader finds few pauses or relaxations from abstract reasoning.

In what manner Dr Brown's ideas, at the outset, differ as to one important point, from those of former writers

on the same subject, the following remarks upon the nature of consciousness will show.

"Consciousness has been generally considered as a peculiar power of the mind, of which all our various feelings when present, are to be distinguished as objects, in the same sense as light is not vision, but the object of vision, or fragrant particles not smell, but the object of smell.

"This view, which appears to me very manifestly erroneous, seems to be a part of that general error with respect to the mind, which, after endowing it with many Powers, -that are truly nothing more than certain relations of uniform antecedence of states of mind to other states of mind or to bodily movements, learns to consider these Powers each a sort of empire over phenomena, of almost as separate entities, and assigns to which it is itself merely a name, expressive of a certain uniformity in the order of their

succession.

"Consciousness, in its widest sense, is truly nothing more than such a general name, expressive of the whole variety of our feelings. In this sense, to feel is to be conscious, and not to be conscious is not to feel.

"The series of states in which the mind exists, from moment to moment, is all that can be known of the mind; and it cannot, at the same moment, exist in two different states, one of consciousness, and one of some other feeling wholly distinguishable from it. Whatever its momentary feeling may be, simple or complex, a sensation, a thought, an emotion-this feeling or momentary state of the mind, which is said to be only the object of consciousness, as if consciousness

were something different from a state in which the mind exists, is truly all the consciousness of the moment.

"I am conscious of a particular feeling, means only I feel in a particular manner.

Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; Part I. comprehending the Physiology of the Mind; by Thomas Brown, M. D. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh; Bell and Bradfute, &c. 1820.

As far as regards the present merely, it expresses the existence of a particular feeling, but nothing more.

We may, indeed, look back on a particular feeling of the moment preceding, as we look back on some more distant event of years that are past; and from the belief of identity which arises intuitively in such a case, we may give the name of Consciousness to this brief retrospect and identification, as we give the name of Memory or Remembrance to the longer retrospect. But the difference is a difference of name only. The remembrance is in kind the same, whether the interval of recognition be long or short. The whole complex state of mind, in such a case, is in strictness of language one present feeling,-one state of the mind and nothing more; and even of this virtual complexity, we find, on analysis, no other elements than these-a certain feeling of some kind, the remembrance of some former feeling, and the belief of the identity of that which feels and has felt. If we take away the memory of every former feeling, we take away the very notion of self or identity, and with it every thing that distinguishes the complex feeling which is termed Consciousness, from the simpler feeling of which we are said to be conscious. "It is but in a very small number of our feelings, as they succeed each other in endless variety, that any such retrospects and identifications of past and present feeling, in one self or continued subject of both, take place. The pleasure or pain begins and passes away, and is immediately succeeded by other pleasures or pains, or thoughts or emotions. In such a case, when there is no retrospect beyond the moment, and no notion, therefore, of self, as the continued subject of various feelings, the consciousness of the mind is either the brief simple present feeling itself, whatever that may be, or it is nothing; and when it is mingled with a retrospective feeling, there is no occasion to have recourse to a peculiar Faculty, to be distinguished from the ordinary cases of remembrance, in which there is, in like manner, a retrospect of some former feeling of the mind, together with that belief of identity which is common to memory in all its forms. We do not suppose, that when at one time we look back on some event of our boyhood, at another time on some event of the preceding hour, and, in both cases, identify the subject of the past feeling with that which is the subject of a present sensation, we exerdise, in the recognition at the longer and shorter interval, a power of the mind that is specifically different in the two cases; and there is surely as little reason to suppose such a specific difference, when, in an interval still shorter, the recognition of a common subject of two feelings has regard to a present sensation, and to one so recent in its freshness as almost to seem present still.

From this extract it will be seen that Dr Brown views the thoughts and feelings of the mind as a mutually

derived series, of which each succes sive phenomenon is generated from the whole being so many different the last, or from external perceptions states of one sentient principle, and each state being uncompounded and simple, and including the whole essence of the mind so long as it lasts. But even this mode of viewing the phenomena is not inconsistent with the notion of the mind having particular faculties for particular purPoses. A faculty means only the power of existing in a particular state in relation to external objects; for every thought or feeling is a relation of some kind to external objects. Cut off the mind's communication with the outward world, and take away the conception of things formerly perceived, and all thoughts and feelings would immediately cease. Now, it is not in consequence of any one quality that the mind is capable of existing in so many different relations to external objects, or (what is the same thing) to conceptions and, if it be in consequence of different qualities, these qualities may without impropriety be called powers or faculties.

If the antecedent temporary state or affection of the mind were the sole cause of that which follows, then it would be unsuitable to speak of the mind's having permanent qualities; but the consequent state results not merely from the antecedent temporary state, but also from the permanent nature and constitution of the mind. If, on the other hand, it be said, that each successive state includes the permanent nature and capacities of the mind, and that, therefore, the antecedent state is the sole cause of what follows; it will be somewhat difficult to reconcile this notion with the perfect simplicity and unity which Dr Brown attributes to each mental state. In speaking of mental identity, he makes the following observations:

ing objection to be put.
"I can imagine, for example, the follow-

things, it may be said, are easily conceiv
"The changeful appearances of external
able, because a mass of matter admits of
addition, or subtraction, or at least of
change of place of the atoms that compose
it. But if mind be, as is asserted, abso,
lutely simple and indivisible, the same
at every moment, without addition, or
subtraction, or possible change of parts,
-that which is by its very nature so
completely incapable of essential altera-
tion, cannot admit of any difference what

ever. If strictly identical, it must be the same in every respect. Now we know, that what is called the Mind, far from being at every moment the same in every respect, scarcely presents for two successive moments the same phenomena. It is by its changes, indeed, indirectly, as sentient or percipient, and only by its changes, that all other changes become known to us; and independently of those varying perceptions, by which it reveals to us the phenomena of the material world, it is susceptible of innumerable modifications of feeling that have no direct relation to them. Without taking into account, therefore, such lasting changes of character, as the mind often exhibits, in different circumstances of fortune, or at different periods of life, are not even its more rapid changes, when the feeling of one moment has no resemblance whatever to the feeling of the preceding moment, sufficient to disprove its absolute identity? There is unquestionably in these changes a difference of some sort, and often a difference as striking, as can be supposed in the feelings of any two minds at the same moment. How, then, can that which is so different be absolutely identical?

"Absolute identity, in the strictest sense of that term, and difference of any sort, seem, I own, when we first consider them, to be incompatible: and yet, if such a compatibility be found to be true, not of mind only, but of matter itself, the objection that is founded on the analogy of matter, in the supposed necessity of some integral alteration in its changing phenomena, will lose the force which that analogy had seemed to give to it. If every material atom be unceasingly changing its state, so as often to exhibit tendencies the most opposite, and yet, in all its changes of physical character, be, without all question, the same substance which it was before; it may be allowed, in like manner, that the mind also, with corresponding diversities of character, may exist in various, and often in opposite states, at different times, and yet be in all these changes of state, whether the diversity be more or less brief or lasting, the same identical substance.

"The examination of this compatibility of diversity with sameness in external things, may involve a more subtile analysis of the general phenomena of matter, than has commonly been employed by philosophers. But it is a discussion that is interesting in itself, and that is particularly interesting in the present question, as obviating an objection, the force of which, but for such a proof of exact analogy in the phenomena of the material world, will be felt most strongly by those who are best qualified to judge of such questions.

In the narrow limits of the present outlines, it is impossible to state the argument in its minuter physical bearings. A single illustration, however, from one of the most familiar of the phenomena of matter, may be

sufficient to shew what is meant by that compatibility of sameness and diversity in things without, to which the internal phenomena of mind, in their similar union of diversity and sameness, present an analogy so striking, as to justify the assertion of the compatibility as a general law of nature.

"A body at rest, we believe, would remain for ever at rest, but for the application of some foreign force: when impelled by some other body, it moves, and, as we believe, would for ever in free space continue to move onward, in the line of impulse, with a certain velocity proportioned to that impulse. Let us take, then, any series of moments, a, b, c, in the continued quiescence, and any series of moments x, y, z, in the continued uniform motion. At the moment a, every atom of the body is in such a state, that, in consequence of this state, it does not exhibit any tendency to motion in the moment b; at the moment a every atom of it is in such a state, that in the subsequent moment y, though an impelling body be no longer present, it has a tendency to pass from one point of space to another; and thus progressively, through the series a, b, c, and the series x, y, z, the difference of tendency at each moment is indicative of a difference of state at each moment. Every atom of the body, at the moment y is, however, exactly the same atom which it was at the moment b. Nothing is added to the mass; nothing is taken away from the mass: yet how different are the phenomena exhibited, and consequently how different the tendencies, or physical character, of the identical atoms, at these two moments! Nay, more, as the varieties of velocity are infinite, increasing or diminishing with the force of the primary impulse or other cause of motion, and as, in the continual progressive motion, the cause of the particular velocity of that motion at the moment y is the peculiar state of the atoms at the moment x, with any difference of which the velocity also would be different, there is in the varieties even of such simple rectilinear motion, without taking into account any other varieties arising from any other foreign causes, an infinite number of states of every atom of every mass, with the same continued identity of the whole: and it is truly not more wonderful, therefore, that the substance to which we give the name of Mind should, without the slightest loss of identity, be affected in succession with joy, sorrow, love, hate, or any other feelings or tendencies the most opposite, than that a substance to which we give the name of Matter, without the slightest loss of identity, should have tendencies so opposite as those by which at one time it remains, moment after moment, in the same relative point of space, and afterwards flies through space with a velocity of which the varieties are infinite. However paradoxical, then, the statement may appear, it may yet safely be admitted, as a law both of mind and of matter, that

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