regular notice to quit, abandoned the premises, locked up the door, and left only a few articles of furniture therein; and the landlord afterwards, in his absence, and when no person was in the house, broke open the door and took possession: -Held, that he was justified in so doing, as he had a legal right of entry; and it seems that the tenant cannot maintain trespass against him, but that his remedy, if any, is by indictment for a forcible entry. Turner v. Meymott (Gent.), H. 3 & 4 G. 4. Page 574 LEASE. See POWER, 2. USE AND OCCUPATION, 1. By the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10. s. 3. "all leases made by spiritual persons other than for the term of twenty-one years, or three lives, whereupon the accustomed yearly rent or more shall be reserved, are void :"-Held, that in order to render a lease valid under this statute, it must be made of land which had been previously let, or on which some rent had been before reserved :-Therefore, a lease by a vicar for three lives, of uninclosed and waste land not proved to have been before let, was held not to be binding on his successor; although the lessee covenanted therein to inclose the land, and pay a rack rent for it :-Held also, that the statute 32 Hen. 8, c. 28, and 13 Eliz. c. 10, are in pari materid, and must be taken together. Doe d. Tennyson v. Yarborough (Lord), T. 3 G. 4. LEGACY. See EXECUTORS, 2. 258 LETTERS. See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 1. EVIDENCE, 1, 2. LIBEL. the 1. Where in a declaration for a libel published in a newspaper, which reflected on the plaintiff in his profession as an attorney; libel was headed with the words "Shameful conduct of an attorney," and then professed to give an account of certain proceedings in the Insolvent Debtors' Court, injurious to the plaintiff's professional character; and the defendant pleaded the general issue, and nine special pleas of justification, stating that the alleged libel contained a faithful and true account of the proceedings in that Court: such pleas were held ill; as the words "Shameful conduct of an attorney," formed no part of the proceedings in the Insolvent Court. Clement v. Lewis (in error), T. 3 G. 4. Page 200 2. Where the plaintiff was proprietor of a public building kept for the purpose of exhibiting the art of pugilism or boxing, commonly called sparring, by persons skilled in that art, and to which spectators were admitted on payment of a certain sum each:-Held, that it was an illegal occupation, as it tended to encourage prize fighting: Therefore; where the plaintiff brought an action for a libel contained in a newspaper, imputing misconduct to him as such proprietor, and it was proved that he had sustained damage thereby, but the Jury found a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the occupation was illegal; the Court refused to disturb it. Hunt v. Bell, T. 3 G. 4. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. Page 212 LIEN. : See ATTORNEY, 13. BANKRUPT, 2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. The Witham Drainage Act, 2 Geo. 3, c. 32, provides, that where persons shall refuse or neglect to treat, the Commissioners may issue their warrant to the sheriff to impanel a Jury, who are to assess the damages, and their verdict is to be binding: and it is also provided, that upon payment or tender of the sums so assessed by the Jury, the Commissioners may enter upon, and make use of the lands: and the act contained a clause limiting the commencement of actions against the commissioners to six months next after the doing the matter or thing for which such actions should be brought.-Where, therefore, the surveyor to the Commissioners widened a ditch nearly a year before the commencement of the action, and the plaintiff's sheep fell in and were drowned within six months from thet period :Held, that in an action of trespass, brought against him for widening the ditch, he was entitled to claim the protection of the act; although the Commissioners might not have made the compensation, or pursued the course thereby directed. Boothby v. Morton, E. 3 G. 4. 51 LORDS' ACT. See EVIDENCE, 6. INSOLVENT Debtors, 2. 1. Where, in an action for an assault, the plaintiff declared that the defendant beat, bruised, and wounded him;-Plea, son assault demesne, and the plaintiff replied de injuriá sua propria; and it was proved that the latter, being on horseback, got off and held up his stick at the defendant, when the latter struck him :-Held, that the plaintiff should have replied specially; and it having been left to the Jury, whether from the evidence, the plaintiff was so far the aggressor, as to justify the assault committed on him by the defendant, and they having found in the affirmative ; the Court refused to grant a new trial, Dale v. Wood, E. 3 G. 4. Page 33 2. Where the plaintiff sought to set aside a verdict found for the defendant, on an affidavit, stating that hand-bills, reflecting on his character, had been circulated in Court, and seen by several of the Jury at the trial; the Court refused to admit affidavits from the Jurors, stating that they had not seen such hand bills; but granted a new trial; although the defendant swore that he had no knowledge of their having been printed or circulated. Coster v. Merest, E. 3 G. 4. 87 3. Where the avowants in replevin, gave in evidence an attornment by the plaintiff to them seven years before the commencement of the action, during which period no rent had been demanded; and the plaintiff offered to prove a feoffment to him by the person under whom they claimed, as well as certain letters written by such person, as being adverse to their claims, and tending to shew that he had an equitable interest only, which were rejected at Nisi Prius, on the ground that the plaintiff could not be permitted to dispute his tenancy after the attornment; the Court granted a new trial. Gravenor v. Woodhouse, T. 3 G. 4. 289 4. Where, in an action on a policy of assurance, the Jury found a verdict for an average loss, the Court would not interfere, or grant a new trial, on the ground that it should have been left to the Jury to determine whether the expences of the sale of the damaged cargo should be borne by the underwriters or not; as that fact was in the discretion of the arbitrator, by whom the amount of the loss was to be ascertained. Hudson v. joribanks, H. 3 & 4 G. 4. VOL, VII. Ma 463 5. If a material witness states on affidavit that he had made a mistake in giving his testimony at the trial, the Court will grant a new trial:Where, therefore, in an action brought against the defendants, as part owners of a vessel, for articles supplied by the plaintiff, a notary public swore that one of the defendants employed him to execute a bill of sale before the goods were furnished; but after the trial, swore that he had been mistaken, and that he had been employed by the original owners alone; the Court ordered the cause to be re-tried. Richardson v. Fisher, H. 3 & 4 G. 4. Page 546 NOTICE TO QUIT. ОАТН. See WITNESS. OFFICER. See SHERIFF. An action of assumpsit cannot be maintained against the Secretary at War, by a retired clerk of the War Office, for his retired allowance; although such allowance was included in the yearly estimates drawn for by such Secretary, and received by him as applicable to such specific allowance; on the ground that the Secretary is only chargeable in his public and official character: and that an action cannot be maintained against him as such, for any thing done by him in that character; although it may amount 2 Y POST-HORSE DUTY. Where the defendant, an innkeeper, contracted with a coach proprietor to furnish him with two additional horses to assist in dragging a stage coach carrying the mail up a hill about three-quarters of a mile in length in the course of each journey, and for which he was to receive a guinea per week:-Held, that such horses were not subject to the post-horse duty under either of the statutes imposing such duty, as the stage coach duty is to be regulated by the number of passengers each coach is licensed to carry, and not on the horses employed to draw it. Dowse v. Garett. M. 3 G. 4. POUNDAGE. See SHERIFF, 3., POWER. 441 1. Where A. previously to the marriage of his daughter C. conveyed property to the use of himself for life, remainder to the use of B., C.'s intended husband, for life; remainder to the use of C. for life; remainder to the use of the issue of the marriage, in strict settlement; remainder to the use of A. for ever and A. afterwards devised all his property not before settled on his daughter's marriage, to the use of his widow for life; with like remainders to the use of B. and C. and their issue, (subject to a term for the provision of younger children); remainder to the use of C. and her heirs; and B. and C. afterwards levied a fine of all the before mentioned premises to the use, (subject to the uses in the settlement and will mentioned,) of such persons as C. by will in writing, or any writing of appointment purporting such will, to be signed by her in the presence of, and attested by three or more witnesses, should appoint, (which will, or writing of appointment in nature of a will, C., notwithstanding her coverture, was thereby empowered to make); and in the mean time, and for want of such appointment, for the whole or any part, to the use of C. and her heirs: C. having survived B., by whom she had no issue, married D., whom she also survived, and then died, leaving E. an only son by D.; to which son C, by an instrument purporting to be her will, signed in the presence of, and attested by three witnesses, left.all her estates in fee; the instrument containing a provision that, the property should go over to C.'s sister, in case of E.'s dying in C.'s life-time. E. shortly afterwards died an infant, intestate and without issue. Held, that the instrument executed by C. did not, as to the estates comprised in the fine, operate at law as an execution of her power of appointment, but as a devise by force of her in terest. Langley v. Sneyd. Alcock v. The Same, T. 3 G. 4, Page 165 2. Under a power in a will" to demise and lease such parts of the testator's premises as had been usually granted or demised, and were then in lease, for any term of years determinable on lives, to any persons for the like terms, and in like manner, and under the like rents, services and conditions as the same had been usually granted; and the residue of the same premises unto any persons, for any term of years not exceeding twenty-one years in possession, at the best and most improved rent that could be reasonably gotten for the same, so as that no such demise or lease should be made dispunishable of waste, nor without a condition of re-entry on non-payment of the rent or services thereby reserved, and so as each lessee should execute a counterpart of his lease:" Held that the word "such" could not be thrown back, so as to apply to or govern the first class of the testator's premises, which had been usually let and were then in lease, but must be confined to the latter class of property, viz. the residue of the premises, as to the terms of leasing which, the testator had given separate and specific directions.--Where, therefore, a lease was made under the power, of lands which were in lease at the time of its creation, and strictly pursuing the terms of such original lease, by which 40s. were reserved for a heriot;—it was held to be well executed according to the power, although it was contended that such second lease should have contained a clause of re-entry for non-payment of 40s. in lieu of a heriot. Doe d. Bligh v. Colman, T, 3 G. 4. 271 POWER OF ATTORNEY, See FORGERY, 2. PRACTICE. See AMENDMENT-ARREST-ATTOR OF PAPERS-NEW TRIAL-PRISO- 1. It was notified by the Court, that 66 cause of action against several defendants, he may sue out bailable process against one, and serviceable against the others.-Where, therefore, the plaintiff sued out bailable process against A. on which he was arrested and put in bail, and a week afterwards, sued out serviceable process against B, C, D, and E, and delivered a declaation to A. as against him and the four other defendants jointly as of the Term after the writs were returnable-Held, that such declaration was not irregular, the object of the process being merely to bring the defendants into Court, and the plaintiff not being bound to declare until after appearance by all. Christie v. Walker, T. 3 G.. 4. 301 See S. C. Id. 362, 599 |