Opinion of the Court. that a later paragraph of the section, namely, paragraph 27, above set forth, enumerates, in the most explicit language, the several classes of such apparatus for which bonds may be issued. It is evident from the language of these two paragraphs of said Section 2835 that the general assembly intended that bonds may be issued for purchasing only the expensive apparatus designated "fire engines" and "fire boats," and that payment for all other classes of apparatus shall be made out of current revenues. The construction which we have placed upon the foregoing paragraphs of said Section 2835 are in strict accord with the elementary and approved rule that when there are in an act specific provisions relating to a particular subject, they will govern in respect to that subject, as against general provisions contained in the same act. Sutherland on Statutory Construction (1 ed.), Sections 158, 216, 222; State, ex rel., v. McGregor, 44 Ohio St., 628; Gas Co. v. Tiffin, 59 Ohio St., 421; Section 1536-205, Revised Statutes. SUMMERS, J. In March, 1908, the council of the city of Akron passed an ordinance providing for a bond issue of thirty thousand dollars, for the purpose "of purchasing real estate for public purposes, to-wit, for erecting thereon and equipping a building necessary for the fire department, and for purchasing a fire engine, and for improving and equipping fire stations 2, 3, 5 and 7, all of said fire stations being buildings used for public purposes, to-wit, for the fire department of said city." Prior to the 6th day of April, 1908, the bonds Opinion of the Court. were duly issued and sold, and the proceeds paid into the treasury of the city. Upon the 6th day of April, 1908, the council passed an ordinance authorizing and empowering the directors of public safety to expend the sum of thirty thousand dollars, realized from the sale of said bonds, for the purpose stated in the first mentioned ordinance. The last mentioned ordinance further authorized the directors to enter into contracts "with the lowest and best bidder, after advertisement according to law." In June, 1908, the directors of public safety advertised for bids for three combination hose and chemical wagons, in accordance with specifications adopted by the directors. The Webb Motor Fire Apparatus Company bid to furnish three combination hose and chemical wagons, in accordance with the specifications, for $11,950, or according to specifications submitted by the company for $13,500. On July 7, 1908, the directors awarded the contract to The Webb Motor Fire Apparatus Company for furnishing said engines according to the company's specifications for $13,500. In November, 1908, the company delivered in said city the three combination hose and chemical wagons provided for by the contract. The wagons were not delivered to the directors, but remained in the custody of the company. On November 27, 1908, the defendant in error, plaintiff below, requested the city solicitor to apply for an injunction to restrain the directors from making payment for the apparatus. The city solicitor did not make the application, and on Opinion of the Court. November 30, 1908, the plaintiff brought suit for an injunction. Thereafter on December 11, 1908, the directors passed a motion rejecting the bid of The Webb Motor Fire Apparatus Company, and all other bids under its former advertisement, and readvertised for bids for three combination hose and chemical wagons in accordance with new specifications which had been adopted by the directors, and which were substantially the same as the specifications which had been theretofore submitted by said company. Bids were received from The Webb Motor Fire Apparatus Company and from one other company, each in the sum of $13,500 to furnish such apparatus. On December 23, 1908, the bid of one company was rejected on the ground of informality and the bid of The Webb Motor Fire Apparatus Company was accepted and a contract entered into with it. A supplemental petition was filed setting out the transactions subsequent to the filing of the petition. The court of common pleas found the issues in favor of the defendants and dismissed the petition. On appeal, the circuit court found the facts above stated, and also that the combination hose and chemical wagons were necessary fire apparatus in cities the size of the city of Akron, and that in the judgment of the directors of public safety it was necessary to purchase said wagons for use in stations 2, 3 and 5 of said city, but enjoined the directors from paying for the same out of the proceeds of said sale of bonds on the ground that the city was not authorized by law to issue bonds for that purpose. Opinion of the Court. It is contended, first, that the city council neither authorized nor approved the contract; second, that the city auditor did not certify to the council that the money was in the city treasury to meet the contract, and third, that the municipal code does not authorize the issuing of bonds for the purchase of such apparatus. Section 2835, Revised Statutes, provides that the council of any municipal corporation shall have power to issue its bonds, whenever the council by an affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds of the members elected or appointed thereto shall by resolution or ordinance deem the same necessary for any of the purposes provided for in the section, among which purposes are these: "2. For extending, enlarging, improving, repairing or securing a more complete enjoyment of any building or improvement authorized by this section, and for equipping and furnishing the same." "27. For erecting any building necessary for a fire department, purchasing fire engines, fire boats, constructing water towers, and fire cisterns, and paying the cost of placing underground the wires or other signal apparatus of any fire department." The contention is, that paragraph 27 expressly mentions fire engines; that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies, and that a combined chemical and hose wagon is not a fire engine, and that if it is, the ordinance does not authorize the purchase of three; and that recourse to paragraph 2 cannot be had under the well settled rule of statutory construction, that where there are in acts specific provisions relating to a particular subject, they will govern in respect to that subject as Opinion of the Court. against general provisions contained in the same act. We think counsel take too narrow a view of the statute. The original act was passed in 1879 (76 Ohio Laws, 158), and as it remained until the passage of the Longworth Law, 1902 (95 Ohio Laws, 318), mentioned not only fire engines, but also hose and apparatus. The purpose of the act was to enable a city, with the approval of the electors, to issue bonds for any improvement for which it might levy a tax. The evident purpose of the original provisions of the act was to enlarge the specific provisions or to cover omissions. Rules of interpretation are adopted to assist in ascertaining, and not to defeat, the intention of the legislature, and hence the rules referred to are not applicable. The purpose of the Longworth Law was to make the statute so comprehensive as to leave no excuse for constant appeals to the general assembly for special laws authorizing the issuing of bonds, and if the purpose of the general provisions was, as has been suggested, then the omission of the words "hose and apparatus" from paragraph 27 does not indicate an intention to limit the general provisions of paragraph 2. The next question is, whether the council authorized the contract? Section 154 of the municipal code of 1902 (Section 1536-690, Revised Statutes), provides as follows: "The directors of public safety shall have power to make all contracts and expenditures of money for acquiring lands for the erection or repairing of station houses, and for the erecting and build |