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sense; that it is in applying themselves to and being embodied in our sensuous experience that the ideas of reason gain their true import. And though the forms of reason are thus contained within the vehicle of sense, it is still reason which is the cause and origin of them in things: for the reason is just the constitutive form which itself determines and applies the forms and categories of existence just as the hand is the instrument of instruments, the instrument which makes and uses other instruments1.
What thus holds good of the origin of our ideas generally applies also in no less degree to the origin of our ethical conceptions. They also are the growth of experience illuminated by the energy of reason. Ethics indeed must be studied by constant reference to personal experience: it is the particular fact which must form the starting-point of the moralist: and it is just by gradual experience, constant habituation (élioμós) that the apxal of conduct must be realized. For these principles are just the motives for which our acts are due: they embody themselves in our highest ideals of what is just and true : and as it is vice which destroys such principles so it is the experience of a moral life which forms and preserves them3. They constitute the major premiss of the practical syllogism by which our conduct is determined: and the universal here as elsewhere is the product of the inductive process by which individuals combine to form a universal truth". But this is only half of Aristotle's analysis. It remains further to be added that these particulars which thus go to make up the universal, require to be fixed and interpreted by reason: and if we give the name of aloenois to this apprehension of the individual, we must remember that it is also at the same time
1 432a1, ǹ xelp ŏpyavóv écriv öpyávwv kal ó voûs eidos eiðŵv.
2 Eth. Nic. 1. 4, 6: 1. 7, 21.
3 Eth. Nic. vi. 5. 114016, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.
4 VI. II, 4, 11434 ; VI. 12, 10, 1144a31.
an act of reason'. The recognition, in short, of the principles of morals is an instantaneous immediate act which resembles the direct apprehension of the senses, but it is an act not like the perception of the special senses but rather like the mathematical sense which combines a number of isolated points into a particular geometric figure'.
Reason then, it now only remains to add, is essentially what constitutes the individual 3. It is no longer dependent on bodily conditions like the other cognitive and emotional elements in our nature: it is something of a transcendental character: something which brings us into connection with God himself. And thus we cannot enquire about the time when reason came into existence: as an actualized state, something which does not become èvépyeta but is essentially itself developed, it never began to exist-rather it is coeval with the world. It is only in its personal application to experience that we can apply categories of before and after to it in itself as eternal and unceasing it is outside all relations of time.
With such thoughts we pass beyond the distinction between a creative and a passive reason. For the two it must be remembered are not "two reasons:" they are merely different modes of viewing the work of reason: and the passive discursive reason which becomes everything and applies itself to the varying phenomena of experience is capable of such action only in so far as its object is determined for it by creative reason. And it is therefore unnecessary for Aristotle to specialize the reason of which he says that it is introduced 'from
1 VI. 11, 114355, ἐκ τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα τὸ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.
a Eth. Nic. VI. 8, 1142326, ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ (φρόνησις) τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ (φρόνησις) τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθάνομεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον.
3 x. 8, 11782: δόξειε δ ̓ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. 4 Eth. X. 7, 1, 1177916, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον.
5 Metaph. Η. 5, 1044522, ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ μορφαί (οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ žúλov Nevкóv). Cp. Teichmüller, p. 387.
without: that it does not result from mere physical generation in the way that the faculties for sustaining life-the Yuxi OрETTIKη-may be said to do'. No doubt as so introduced into the mind this creative reason is only a dúvaμis: but the first key to understanding Aristotle is to know that dúvaμis and évépyeta are relative terms: and that what is an évépyeta from one aspect may be a dúvaμis from another. And thus Aristotle may perfectly well say that the different forms of soul must exist in man potentially before they do so in actuality' and yet hold that it is in potential form that reason as an actual or rather an actualizing faculty is present originally in man. Such a view at least is perfectly consistent with the view of reason as a creative faculty which has been here set forth. For the creative reason is just, we have seen, the source of those general forms or categories by which a world of sense becomes a world for intellect. But of course such categories are, to start with, only implicit in experience, they are mere potential forms which can be applied to experience: and the ypaμμaтelov of the human mind is at first destitute of anything but the forms themselves which, as they first exist in the mind, are indeed potentially all things-able to explain and interpret all the sensations which things can convey-but actually nothing; devoid of any particular content until experience provide them with it.
XII. THE WILL AND PRACTICAL REASON.
The analysis of man as a cognitive and intellectual being is followed immediately in Aristotle by the account of him as an active and conative being: and the theory of knowing determines directly his theory of acting. It might have been expected that
1 De Gen. 4m. 11. 3, 736817, λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.
2 Ibid. 736 15.
an intermediate stage would have been discussed, and that before proceeding to analyze man as an active being he would have treated him as emotional. But neither in the Psychology nor in the Ethics does Aristotle give us any account of the feelings as such. It is the powers and faculties not the susceptibilities of man with which he is occupied: and among such δυνάμεις no place is left for the πάθη or emotions. At the beginning indeed of the treatise, these feelings had excited considerable interest in Aristotle: their semi-bodily character had seemed to him to suggest some of the most difficult questions which he would have to discuss. The feelings he saw were always materialized notions (λóyoi ěvuλoi) and could only be described correctly when explained not merely from the standpoint of the physicist or physiologist, but also from that of the dialectician or metaphysician. But the conception of soul as a first entelechy or perfect realization left, it would seem, no opportunity for treating of the feelings. Man is an emotional being simply in so far as he is a sensitive or perceptive being1: and there is no definite phase of life which we can speak of as having a pathetic or emotional soul.
It is to the Rhetoric and Ethics that we must go if we would find out what little Aristotle has said on the subject of the feelings. Even in these treatises what we find is not any systematic exposition of the feelings but simply a description of some aspects of them. What we have in the Rhetoric is a popular delineation of some of the more obvious feelings to which we are subject: the Ethics gives us an analysis of the universal concomitants of all feelings. These concomitants are pleasure and pain feelings in fact are just the states which are followed by pleasure and pain. And of pleasure and pain Plato had given a more than usually exhaustive account. Pleasure, he had explained, arose from the npwois, the filling up and satis
1 11. 2, 413023, ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία.
2 Eth. Nic. II. 4, 1105 21, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαράν, φιλίαν, μίσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἡ λύπη.
faction of a preceding state of deficiency; pain on the other hand was just the sense of want and deficiency, čvdeιa. And though the explanation was suggested by and referred directly to the bodily pleasures it was still held by its author to apply also to the higher pleasures as similarly the answer to a sense of want which was waiting to be replenished by intellectual nourishPleasure accordingly was always a yéveris, a process towards the normal condition of a subject, and therefore as such never in itself an end. And the theory had consequently received a moral application as shewing, by the absence of finality from pleasure, that pleasure, taken by itself, could not be the end of life. It is similarly from a moral point of view that Aristotle analyses pleasure; and his immediate object is to shew that the argument which maintains that pleasure cannot be the summum bonum, because of its being a mere process towards an end, is unsatisfactory. Rather, he maintains, pleasure is an évépyeta it arises from the free play, the unimpeded, unthwarted operation of our faculties: it results from the contact of a perfectly acting organ with an appropriate object just as pain is on the contrary the result of thwarted constrained action on the part of either a sensitive or intellectual faculty1.
Of such pleasure and pain the importance in the economy of man's nature is that it is just through them that man passes from the state of a merely cognitive and intellectual and begins to be a moral and active being: "it is when the sense perceives something as pleasant or painful that the mind affirms or denies it-that it pursues it or avoids it." Aristotle in fact is fond
1 Eth. Nic. vii. 12, 1133*13, διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Cp. Eth. Nic. X. 4, 117410: κατὰ πᾶσαν αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ ̓ ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ ̓ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτήν. The Rhetoric contents itself with the popular theory criticised in the Ethics, v. Rhet. 1. 11, 1369°33: Vmokeiodw d' quîv eival tǹv ñôovǹv κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοῖναντίον.
* 111. 7, 2, 431*3, τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἡ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἡ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ή φεύγει.