before pleasure and pain have come to be elements in moral action they must have been translated into good and evil'. But to be so translated, the promptings of appetite must have been determined by an object and end which thought alone can contribute. The faculty of desire does not and cannot operate without the presentation of a mental image to consciousness (ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας 43328): it is only by being made an object of thought or by being presented by imagination before the mind that the object of desire comes to determine conduct (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆ vai 43312). And in the language of the exoteric psychology of the Ethics, it is only in so far as appetite is participant in reason (λόγου μέτεχον) that it provides a basis for the exercise of virtue.

What however neither reason alone nor desire alone can effect is produced by the two when acting in cooperation. But Aristotle as usual perplexes us by one of those provoking contradictions which seem at first at variance with the rest of his system. Not only, we are told, is it thought or reason acting with desire that can stimulate to action-imagination sometimes takes the place of thought. Yet the difficulty so caused is removed when we remember that Aristotle is speaking here of the forces which lead to action generally: he simply means that in the animal world as such the pictures of sense take the place of reason, and man, when he subsides into his purely animal nature, similarly follows the lead of his senses. But the difference is that the animal is restricted to these pictures of a purely sensuous experience and is unconscious of any higher ideal: man on the other hand cannot be merely

1 Eth. Nic. III. 3, 1111 17, ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ ̓ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ ̓ ἡδέος.

2 ΙΙΙ. 10, 4339, φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. Cp. De Motu Animal. 7oo 17: ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν.

an animal, and even in following the lead of sense is conscious of a superior faculty-a faculty which necessarily thinks the sensuous image and brings it into connection with his past experience'. For deliberation, the weighing of different and divergent courses of conduct, is only possible on the assumption that we can measure the competing motives and form one conception out of several pictures of sensuous experience.

The doctrine of the practical syllogism illustrates still further Aristotle's conception of the relation of reason to desire in determining conduct. Action, according to such logical analysis, resolves itself into a universal major and a particular minor, out of which some action or other follows as conclusion. In such a syllogism, the major is of course the general moral imperative— the conception of some end or other as the thing it is desirable to do; the minor, on the other hand, applies this general conception of what is good to some particular person or some individual object. According to one of the examples given in the Ethics, the major says everything sweet should be tasted, the minor this particular thing is sweet; and, if there be no antagonistic syllogism, the sweet thing in question must be tasted. But there is no disjunction between the elements which thus enter into our moral determinations. It is reason—practical reason—which has to do with the constitution both of the major and of the

1 Eth. Nic. VII. 3, 12473, διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

2

ΙΙΙ. ΙΙ, 4349, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει, ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν.

3 De An. III. II, 434 16, ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ ̓ ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τὸ νῦν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε) ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω ἀλλ ̓ ἡ μὲν ἠρεμovσɑ μâλλov, ǹ d'ob. Thus, it should be noticed, both the major and the minor premiss may have either an objective or a subjective reference. Cp. Eth. Nic. VII. 3, 6, 1147a4, diapépei dè kai tò kabóλov. The practical syllogism is also explained VI. 12, 10, 1144a31: VII. 3, 9, and De Motu Animal. 701a32, πотÉOν μoi, ǹ éπiðvμla Xéyel τοδὶ δὲ ποτὸν ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς. εὐθὺς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῷα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως. The way in which here Ovuía is made the source of a general imperative evidences the spurious character of the treatise.

minor premiss: it is an intuition of reason, acting as directly as the perceptive act, which interprets the particular instance, and which combines these instances into a universal law. Reason deals at once with the ultimates of universality and the ultimates of particularity; it is at once the beginning and the end of our moral reasoning'. And thus there comes to be a real unity between reason and desire in determining conduct. The universal law of what is desirable and good is, in a sense, fixed and stationary, while the minor premiss-the particular application of this maxim-is subject to movement, and passes under the influence of desire from one universal to another: the particular proposition 'this thing is sweet' may attach itself either to the major-'everything sweet should be tasted,'or its contrary nothing sweet should be tasted.' But the actual moral act displays to us nothing of this difference. The stationary universal of reason and the particular direction of desire are merely different aspects of one and the same process-a process which Aristotle effectively compares to the action of a ball-and-socket joint (yyyλvpós). In such a joint one part seems to be reaching forward, while another remains immovable in its position: (λğis) attraction and impulsion (dois) combine to produce the action which results. But just as in such a case the distinction between the two sides of the movement is one only of aspect, so that we can hardly say where the joint ceases to attract and begins to propel, so similarly in moral active reason and desire, the stationary and the impulsive factors unite in one common aim determined by an ideal of reason.

Reason thus appears as the ultimate basis of our moral, just as we saw it was also of our intellectual, life. For the true object of consciousness in this union of desire and reason is not two objects-one of desire, another of reason-it is one 1 Eth. Nic. VI. II, 4, καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ ̓ ἀμφότερα...διὰ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς.

2 De An. III. 10, 433 21, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. Readers of Teichmüller's highly suggestive volume (Praktische Vernunft) will see how much I am indebted to him in this interpretation. See p. 210.

single common force which finally becomes the principle of action'. And when we ask how this object of our final wish is framed, the answer must be, that it is so through the agency of reason. Ultimately, and transcendentally in fact, there is no difference between the object of thought and the object of wish; the ovλŋтòv and the voŋTòv are merely different aspects of one and the same great generality. Even in our own experience it is thought which determines desire: and the principle and starting-point of conduct turns out to be an exercise of reason. And when Aristotle proceeds to state more definitely what is this object of perfect wish which thus determines and regulates our natural desires, he becomes still more of an idealist. For while the object of wish to any individual is but the apparent and relative good, still to a perfect man it is the absolute ideal good and the aim of life comes to be an attempt to make our practical views in life elevate themselves to the full height of the absolute ideal of goodness3. It would take us outside psychology to develope these views further here. But it shews us once more the correspondence between the cognitive and ethical philosophy of Aristotle. The same writer who reproduces Plato's idea of good as the constructive reason which gives both knowledge and reality to things, now finds the determining aim of conduct in an absolute ideal which constitutes the pattern to which morality must raise itself.

XIII. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

The unsatisfactory character of many of Aristotle's psychological results is probably apparent to most readers. In following his account of our mental processes we are brought face

1

ΙΙΙ. 10, 433 21, ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτόν.

2 Metaph. Α. 7, 107229, ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡ νόησις.

3 Eth. Nic. III. 4, 1113 22, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ ̓ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον ;

to face with the same defects as also with the same merits as meet us in his other works. There is the same picture of a thinker who is distracted between two solutions of a question, who indulges in what at first sight are the most palpable contradictions and who leaves us without any satisfactory solution of the difficulties which he raises. The result might have been different had Aristotle sought to develope instead of merely seeking to criticise the Platonic idealism, and while noting the imperfections of Plato's theory, tried to correct and complete those points in the spirit of Plato himself. He chose instead to put himself in opposition to the teaching of his master and preferred (speaking generally) to state his views in such a form as would bring them into sharpest antagonism to the Platonic doctrines. Meanwhile however the mantle of the master had descended even on the pupil who set himself to oppose his teaching and the Aristotelian Anti-Platonism became itself a phase of Platonism. But this fact is constantly obscured by the phraseology in which Aristotle is led to state his results. And thus the unity by which Aristotle really tries to reconcile matter and form, individual and universal, the world and God, sense and reason, the material and the spiritual, is one which we must discover for ourselves rather than expect to find in Aristotle himself.

This unifying link between complementary or antagonistic conceptions is what a modern reader will assuredly most desiderate in Aristotle. Aristotle himself no doubt sees clearly enough the defects of the Platonic Psychology with its doctrine of locally separated faculties. But what inner unity is there in Aristotle's own theory? How does body become soul, how does a merely material organization become a spiritual agency, is a question which Aristotle only very partially solves by his view of soul as the truth or reality of body. And when we examine the different faculties of the soul, a like want of unity in the soul itself strikes us. No hint is given of a continuous development of one faculty from the other.

V