PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. THOUGH several alterations have been made in the present edition, the Author has, so far as possible, avoided the introduction of new matter. Even where new matter has been introduced, it has rarely been necessary to alter the original paging. Teachers, in making references to the book, will thus be saved considerable inconvenience. Several friends have suggested to the Author the introduction of two new chapters, one on the Categories, the other on the Formation of Terms. Influenced partly by a desire not to increase the bulk of the volume, and partly by still more important reasons, he has, after some hesitation, decided against the introduction of these chapters. The doctrine of Categories is important in the History of Logic, but is not properly a branch of Logic, as that word is now generally understood and as it has been understood throughout this work. The Formation of Terms is a subject which properly belongs to Psychology and not to Logic, and moreover could not be adequately treated in a small compass. It is true that some questions properly belonging to Psychology or the History of Logic have been noticed in various parts of the book, but they have only been casually alluded to, not treated in distinct chapters. Logic has always been over-weighted with extraneous matter, and, wherever it is possible, it is desirable to relieve it of its superfluities, though much discretion may be needed in the process, and though the requirements of examinations have a constant tendency to lead writers on Logic to consider not how little, but how much they can introduce into their works. The Author is bound to acknowledge the courtesy of his reviewers even where they have expressed their differences from either his particular doctrines or his general method of treatment. Of the difficulties of the Nominalist theory of Logic, which is assumed throughout these pages and to which one Reviewer (writing in "The Churchman") takes such unqualified exception, the Author is himself fully aware. The question has of course been disputed time out of mind. The difficulties of the rival, or Conceptualist, theory are however far greater. Almost all modern logicians have, with more or less consistency, adopted the Nominalist hypothesis, and, where the Author's language differs from that of other recent writers, he believes it does so simply in consequence of his having attempted to apply that hypothesis consistently. The principles of Psychology, on which the laws of Logic repose, are probably destined to receive considerable elucidation in our own time, and it is not improbable that we may see many difficulties, which now beset the student of Logic in limine, removed by a more searching analysis of the origin and development of mental phenomena. The Author has to thank many friends for suggestions, some of which he will be found to have adopted, while others have been rejected only after considerable hesitation. He has naturally been anxious to minimize the number of alterations, and in some cases has felt that the adoption of suggestions, however valuable in themselves, would interfere with the unity or consistency of the book. To the English works on Logic mentioned in the Preface to the First Edition should be added the Syllabus and the Formal Logic of Mr. De Morgan, and the Laws of Thought of the late Professor Boole. To the student who is not deterred by a mathematical notation these works will afford much valuable assistance on points which are little noticed by ordinary writers on the science. An Index and a Collection of Examples have been added to the present edition. It is perhaps superfluous to mention that a few of the Examples have been adopted from other books on Logic or from Examination Papers. |
