of his house and to pledge some of his plate; we may therefore conclude that the partition was not earlier than B. C. 368, and the 'eighteen years' bring us once more to B. C. 350 as the date of the speech.

Further, the lease of Phormio lasted eight, that of the subsequent lessees, ten years; but it would be far from correct to assume that this points to the lapse of only eighteen years from the death of Pasion to the delivery of the speech, and consequently to B. c. 352 for the date of the latter; for (1) the previous lease began before the death of Pasion, (2) the subsequent lease does not appear to have followed immediately on the expiration of the first lease', and (3) the second lease had terminated before the date of the speech. The date B. C. 352, besides being open to the objection that the phrase 'more than twenty years' has to be explained away as a round number, in other words as equivalent to less than twenty years, only just allows time for the two leases, with no margin over, either for the interval between the first and second, or for the further interval after the second; while B. c. 350 is consistent with both these data3.

The only difficulty in our accepting this date arises from the reference to Callippus in § 53, as then alive in Sicily. Now Callippus left that island for Rhegium in the spring of B. C. 350 at the latest, and was killed in the same year. This would reduce us to the

1 § 11 εὐθὺς ὡς ἀφεῖσαν του τονὶ τῆς μισθώσεως νέμονται τὴν τράπεζαν κ.τ.λ., § 13 ἐμίσθω σεν ὕστερον Ξένωνι κ.τ.λ.

2 § 14 ἐλευθέρους ἀφεῖσαν...καὶ οὐκ ἐδίκαζοντο οὔτ ̓ ἐκείνοις τότ' οὔτε τούτῳ.

3 This date is supported by Fynes Clinton, Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der

Attischen Redner, 1. 43. 67), Imm. Hermann (de tempore, &c. p. 11 and einleitende Bemerkungen zu Dem. paragraph. Reden p. 16), Rehdantz (Jahns neue Jahrb. LXX. p. 505), Lortzing (Apoll. p. 15-18), and Sigg (Apoll. ap. Jahrb. f. class. Philol. Suppl. Bd. vi. Hft. 2 p. 406-8).

alternative of either supposing that the news of these events had not yet reached Athens, or resorting to the heroic remedy of striking out the words as spurious'. Otherwise, it may be worth while to suggest as the date the latter part of B. C. 351; this would involve our reckoning the term of 'more than twenty years' from the beginning of B. c. 371 to the end of B. c. 351 inclusive, and similarly the eighteen years from the partition would be counted inclusively from B. C. 368 to B. c. 351.

2

The speech is undoubtedly the genuine work of Demosthenes; this is proved not only by the testimony of Aeschines but by the frequent quotations of ancienț lexicographers and grammarians, and the internal evidence is equally conclusive. It holds a high place in his Private Orations; among the merits of its earlier portions may be noticed the closeness of its reasoning and the lucid arrangement of its argument, while its later portions are rendered interesting by the strong invective of the personal attack on the plaintiff and the dignified tone of the appeal to the court in favour of the defendant. All the points are supported by evidence, and except where the public services of the defendant are apparently unduly depreciated, there is every evidence of fairness on the part of the speaker. It is a forcible oration, in which we clearly recognize the characteristic feature that gives Demosthenes the superiority over Lysias, the great master of clear narration, and over his own instructor Isaeus, the best lawyer of all the Attic orators, namely,

1 This has been proposed by Sigg u. s., p. 408, who objects to them as breaking the symmetry of the sentence οὐχὶ Τιμομάχου κατηγόρεις; οὐχὶ Καλλίππου; οὐ πάλιν Μένωνος ; οὐκ Αὐτοκλέους; οὐ Τιμοθέου ; οὐκ ἄλλων Tov; We here have six rhetorical questions divided in

to a set of two beginning with ouxi, and a set of four beginning with ou. The transition from the former to the latter is marked by πάλιν.

2 de fals. leg. § 165, quoted in full on p. xxxvii.

3 See§§ 39-42 with notes, and esp. A. Schaefer, u. s., p. 168.

the ethical warmth of colouring, by which the dullest details are lit up with a fresh life and interest1.

The result was decisive; the court, according to the statement of Apollodorus himself, upheld the plea of the defendant, and refused to listen to any reply on the part of the plaintiff. More than four-fifths of the jury must have voted for the defendant, as we learn that the plaintiff was condemned to pay the erwßeλía, i. e. a sixth part of the twenty talents claimed, a fine amounting in this case to about £810. We are not surprised to learn that the plaintiff left the court in high dudgeon (Or. 45 § 6).

1 die ethische Wärme welche selbst einem nüchternen Stoffe

Leben verleiht. A. Schaefer, u. s., p. 168.

INTRODUCTION TO

OR. XLV

ΚΑΤΑ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΥ

ΨΕΥΔΟΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΩΝ Α.

THE effect of the verdict given in support of Phormio's special plea in bar of the action brought by Apollodorus, was to prevent the latter from raising the same issue again, except in an indirect manner. It was still open to him to bring an action for false evidence against the witnesses on whose testimony Phormio had relied; such an action was known as a δίκη ψευδομαρτυριών, and if the plaintiff made good his case against the accessories, he could next proceed against the principal who produced them, by an action for subornation of false witness (díkη KakoTexviŵv1); and in the event of his succeeding in the latter, he might then bring forward afresh his original suit (in the present instance a δίκη ἀφορμῆς).

Apollodorus accordingly brought an action for false testimony against one Stephanus, who was called on Phormio's side in the previous trial. This witness deposed to neither of the points on which the special plea was raised; he was neither produced to prove the date of the original lease, shewing the lapse of the term fixed by the Athenian statute of limitations, nor did he give evidence to the release and quittance effected between

1 Or. 49 § 56, Or. 47 § 1.

Apollodorus and Phormio; he simply attested a point which was, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the special plea and really belonged to the main issue. He was called, with others, to prove a legal challenge' given by Phormio to Apollodorus, demanding that, if the latter declined to admit that a document put in evidence by Phormio was a copy of Pasion's will, Apollodorus should himself open the original; he deposed that Apollodorus declined to open it, and further that the said copy was a counterpart of the original".

The plaintiff denies that any such challenge had been made and declares that his father left no will. He contends that (1) had the challenge been given, there could have been no reason for his refusing to open the document (S$ 9-14); (2) it was unnecessary to demand his acknowledgment of the correctness of a copy, when according to his opponents the original might have been readily produced (S$ 15-19); (3) the terms of the deposition were false because it assumed that Pasion made the will alleged, whereas he made no will at all; its terms ought to have run, not the will of Pasion,' but the will Phormio asserts to have been left by Pasion' (§§ 24-26). His argument on these points is a singular combination of shallowness and subtlety3, as may be seen in further detail by referring to the italicised abstract of the somewhat difficult sections here referred to.

He next argues that the terms of the 'will' prove it was forged by Phormio in his own interests (§§ 27-28), that the 'will' was inconsistent with the 'lease,' that the latter was also a fabrication (§§ 29-36), and that the discharge pleaded by Phormio was false (S$ 40-42). In anticipation of the defendant's probable reply, that his

1 Or. 36 § 7.

2 Or. 45 § 10.

3 nur einige schwache, ja ganz

nichtige Tekuńpia...; gegenzeùgen...hat er nicht. Sigg, Apoll.

p. 412.