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CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.
7 CLARK & FINNELLY; 11 BLIGH (N. S.); WEST; 10 SIMONS;
3 YOUNGE & COLLYER, EX. EQ.; 4 MEESON & WELSBY;
SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE.
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PREFACE TO VOLUME LI.
At p. 139 of this volume we have the ch discussed case of Birtwhistle v. Vardill, where the f is dictum of the great men of the realm at the parliarif Merton “quod nolunt leges Angliæ mutare" received a suict interpretation. Historically the result was correct enough in this sense, that if such a case could have arisen in the thirteenth century the King's counsellors and judges would almost certainly have decided it as the House of Lords did five centuries later. Considered in the light of the general current of modern authority on questions of personal status in relation to domicil, the decision is anomalous. The learning of the judges in the antiquities of the law might have been more critical. They were perhaps excusable at the time for treating that farrago of impudent fictions called the “Mirror of Justices” as a serious authority (p. 168), but hardly so for relying on the false Ingulf, which had already been exposed by Palgrave. Munro v. Munro, p. 103, shows that the whole doctrine of domicil as bearing on legitimacy was still in an immature condition sixty years ago.
Jordan v. Norton, p. 508, is a case well known in students' books, perhaps rather because, being concerned with horses, it has a certain remote flavour of sport, than for any other assignable reason. As far as the point of law goes, it is an elementary case of failure to form a contract, the parties never having agreed on the same terms.
Hemingway v. Hamilton, p. 497, is very doubtful indeed. No judicial comment on it of any kind has been found. It certainly does not decide, as represented in some oldfashioned text-books, that it is not fraudulent to inake a
contract with the intention of not per
Recent text-writers appear to be unanimous in ignoring it, or mentioning it only by way of warning.
Chanter v. Hopkins, p. 650, is noteworthy for Lord Abinger's statement as to the difference between a warranty and a condition or integral term of the contract, though the latter may be called a warranty. “I have always considered that to be as sound an exposition of the law as can be,” said Martin, B. in the Exchequer Chamber in 1867: Azémar v. Casella, L. R. 2 C. P. 677, 679.