 | H. B. Nisbet, Claude Rawson - Literary Criticism - 2005 - 978 pages
...forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions.' For Hume,... | |
 | Terence Penelhum - Philosophy - 1992 - 240 pages
...forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical,...express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,... | |
 | Klaus Ceynowa - Instrumentalism (Philosophy) - 1993 - 258 pages
...den menschlichen Geist anders an als im Falle des Nichtüberzeugtseins: „An idea assented tofeels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone...different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior/orce, or vivacity, or solidity, orfirmness, or steadiness."23 Dieser Auffassung hat James... | |
 | David Hume, Eric Steinberg - Philosophy - 1993 - 170 pages
...forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical,...express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,... | |
 | Wayne Waxman - Philosophy - 2003 - 368 pages
...(force, firmness, steadiness, etc.) as verisimilitude. In a text considered earlier, Hume explained that "This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical,...express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,... | |
 | Oliver A. Johnson - Philosophy - 1995 - 398 pages
...feeling. Hume addresses this point in his second appendix note. "An idea assented to [believed]_/w/r different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone...it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmnes1, or steadiness" (629). This list of somewhat vague terms illustrates why Hume was not fully... | |
 | Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi - Literary Criticism - 1994 - 1398 pages
...forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical,...express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken as such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought,... | |
 | Ben-Ami Scharfstein - Philosophy - 1998 - 710 pages
...and by the belief that distinguishes what probably exists from what is (almost) surely fictitious — "an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us."126 Hume is a skeptic who generally believes in experience and generally trusts habit, though he... | |
 | Kevin Hart - Literary Criticism - 1999 - 254 pages
...term amongst others that give some body to context. In an appendix to the Treatise Hume concedes that 'an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious...vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness' (629). At first this emphasis on feeling seems a weak way of telling reality from fiction, yet when... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - Philosophy - 1999 - 452 pages
...therefore, between belief and fancies by referring to the manner in which we conceive the relevant ideas. 'An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious...superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.'8 Belief is 'a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life';3 but in philosophy... | |
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An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. 
